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second century, Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch. Other scholars have properly assigned the origin of creatio
ex nihilo to these thinkers, notably Gerhard May and David Winston, but the reasons for the teaching' s
appearance remained unexplained. By examining the Classical philosophical views of matter, the challenge
that Greek views of matter raised for the Christian message become evident. For Stoic, Platonist, and
Peripatetic alike matter imposed the natural necessity of corruption upon the body. The moral limitations
imposed by matter made a bodily resurrection seem offensive. Christian hopes for a resurrection seemed
misguided both intellectually and morally. The Christian apologists of the late second century struck back by
redefining matter as a creature of God, which he directed to his purpose. The religious claims of the Christian
apologists signalled a major philosophical change. Within a century, Plotinus developed a rigorous monistic
system of emanation within the Greek philosophical tradition. In his system, even matter was derived from the
One. Nevertheless, because it was wholly indefinite, matter remained evil and the sage eschewed it. Augustine
gave creatio ex nihilo its first careful philosophical consideration in the Christian tradition. Turning the
valences of the Classical world on their heads, he argued that as something capable of being formed into good
things, matter itself was good and a creature of the good God. The next major philosophical consideration of
creatio ex nihilo in the Christian tradition came at the hands of Aquinas, who taught that creatio ex nihilo meant
that nothing was presupposed to God's creative act, not matter, forms, natures, essences, ideas, laws of nature,
or a hierarchy of being. The creature depended entirely on God's creative act. Despite the great dependence of
the creature upon God, Aquinas taught that the creature still bore a genuine likeness to God, in his highly
developed teaching of participation.
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ABSTRACT
CREATIO EX NIHILO: MATTER, COSMOS, AND THE BODY IN CLASSICAL AND 
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY THROUGH AQUINAS
J. NOEL HUBLER 
JAMES F. ROSS
Creatio ex nihilo marked a major redefinition of the material cosmos by the Christian 
apologists of the late second century, Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch. Other scholars 
have properly assigned the origin of creatio ex nihilo to these thinkers, notably Gerhard 
May and David Winston, but the reasons for the teaching’s appearance remained unexplained. 
By examining the Classical philosophical views of matter, the challenge that Greek views 
of matter raised for the Christian message become evident. For Stoic, Platonist, and 
Peripatetic alike matter imposed the natural necessity of corruption upon the body. The 
moral limitations imposed by matter made a bodily resurrection seem offensive. Christian 
hopes for a resurrection seemed misguided both intellectually and morally. The Christian 
apologists of the late second century struck back by redefining matter as a creature of God, 
which he directed to his purpose. The religious claims of the Christian apologists signalled 
a major philosophical change. Within a century, Plotinus developed a rigorous monistic 
system of emanation within the Greek philosophical tradition. In his system, even matter 
was derived from the One. Nevertheless, because it was wholly indefinite, matter remained 
evil and the sage eschewed it. Augustine gave creatio ex nihilo its first careful philosophical 
consideration in the Christian tradition. Turning the valences of the Classical world on 
their heads, he argued that as something capable of being formed into good things, matter 
itself was good and a creature of the good God. The next major philosophical consideration 
of creatio ex nihilo in the Christian tradition came at the hands of Aquinas, who taught that 
creatio ex nihilo meant that nothing was presupposed to God’s creative act, not matter, 
forms, natures, essences, ideas, laws of nature, or a hierarchy of being. The creature 
depended entirely on God’s creative act. Despite the great dependence of the creature upon 
God, Aquinas taught that the creature still bore a genuine likeness to God, in his highly 
developed teaching of participation.
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Chapter 1, Monism: Egyptian and M ilesian
In the sixth century B.C.E. in Miletus on the southwestern coast of Asia 
Minor, Greek speculation about the origin of the world took a dramatic turn. 
P rev iously  Hesiod1 an d  the near con tem poraries P h erecy d es2 an d  
Akusilaos3 explained the origin of the world in terms of anthropomorphic 
genealogy. Breaking w ith tradition, the M ilesian cosmologists, Thales, 
A naxim ander, and Anaximenes adopted from Egypt a single, divine, yet 
undifferentiated material source which produced the world by its own physical 
transformations and continued as an immanent force in the world. For Thales 
the source of the world and life was water; for Anaximander, the infinite (see 
below); and for Anaximenes, air. It is hard to overestimate the impact the 
new teaching had on Greek thought. The archaic genealogical approach 
assumed that Zeus and the Olympians had received their powers by overcoming 
their parents, rendering the origins of the world to the stuff of ancient lore.4 
The new Milesian metaphysics presumed cosmic birth from still active physical
’Hesiod traced the lineage of all gods and nature to Gaia, Tartaros, and Chaos. For 
Hesiod Chaos was a gap. Etymologically it is related to chasm. On this basis, Cornford related 
the cosm ology in H esiod to other cosm ogonic myths of separation of heaven and earth (in 
Principium Sapientiae: the origins o f Greek philosophical thought, N ew  York: Harper, 1965; 
p. 194f.). The difficulty with Cornford's interpretation is that heaven, Ouranos, does not arise 
until the second generation, as the offspring of Earth. It would seem better to take the original 
Chaos as the gap between earth and Tartaros. The first act of creation was the separation of 
Earth and Tartaros. Their separation produced Eros (the fourth and final god listed at the 
beginning) and the subsequent birth of the other gods.
^Hermann D iels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. W alther Kranz, Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1951, 7.B.I.
’D iels, 9.B.1
4H esiod's succession myth is the most developed example. In the Theogony, Kronos 
seizes power from his father Ouranos, as does Zeus from Kronos. Zeus also needs to overcome 
the Titans, vestiges of the earlier powers. The notion of succession is presupposed by Homer, 
who presents the Olympians as younger gods, although without narration of their rise to power. 
References to the succession myth can be found in Pherecydes who mentions the Titanomachy 
(Diels, 7.B.4) and in Akusilaos who mentions the castration of Ouranos (Diels, 9.B.20).
1
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principles allowing the study of the cosmogony to be part of the study of every 
day phenomena. It had the reciprocal effect of raising the importance of study 
of natural phenom ena to unprecedented levels.
A lthough crucially im portan t to Greek philosophy, the Egyptian 
contribution has yet to be recognized because no study of adequate scope has 
been undertaken  on the relevant Egyptians texts. G. S. Kirk made brief 
comparisons of Thales' work to Egyptian and Babylonian cosmogonies which 
began from w ater and Egyptian cosmology in which earth floated upon waters.5 
Even Kirk's general and m odest comparisons to things N ear Eastern have 
draw n a skeptical response. In the Cambridge Ancient History, T. F. R. G. 
Braun has argued that the difficulty of translation m ade exchange of ideas 
between Greeks and Egyptians difficult and that if communication had occurred, 
"it is hard to believe that Greek speculative thought w ould have gained."6 
In similar arguments, G. E. R. Lloyd charges that contacts between Greek and 
N ear Eastern thought rem ain an "assum ption."7 He further objects to drawing 
com parisons betw een m yth and philosophy, arguing that m yth does not 
influence philosophy as philosophy: The philosopher's "theses are arrived at, 
and supported or defended, by reasoned argum ent and (where appropriate) 
appeals to evidence."8
5 G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971, p. 90. Other commentators have compared Greek m ythologists to 
Babylonian and Egyptian predecessors. Cornford compared Thales to Hesiod and Hesiod to the 
Babylonian creation epic, the Enuma Elish, p. 248f. W. K. C. Guthrie, A H istory o f Greek 
P h ilo so p h y , v .l ,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, compared both the Orphics' 
and Hesiod's cosm ogony to the undifferentiated waters of Babylon and Egypt, p. 68.
6T. F. R. G. Braun, 'T he Greeks in Egypt," Cambridge A ncient H istory, III.3, 2nd ed., J. 
Boardman and N . G. L. Hammond, edd., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.55.
7G. E. R. Lloyd, 'T he Debt of Greek Philosophy and Science to the Ancient Near East," 
P ed ilav ium , 1982, p. 5. The article w as republished in G. Lloyd, M ethods and Problems in 
Greek Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 278-298.
8G. Lloyd, p. 10.
2
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In response to Braun and Lloyd, the burst of new commercial and 
political contact between Greece and Egypt in the seventh and sixth centuries 
made an immediate and clear impression on the cultural and religious records 
of the time. More importantly, a careful consideration of the texts reveals the 
sophistication of Egyptian myth. In language of myth, the Egyptians made 
startling metaphysical claims about the underlying unity of the world and its 
physical transform ations into the phenomena of the world. Thereby, they 
forged new metaphysical and physical paths for the Milesians. Neither the 
Egyptians nor the Milesians were yet prepared to prove their claims. Although 
yet untested, their insights would prove instrumental for the coming science. 
The proof of Egyptian influence comes from the sudden change of Greek 
thought in an Egyptian direction precisely at the time when Miletus was 
actively seeking new contacts with Egypt.
The second half of the seventh century B.C.E. for the Greeks of Ionia 
was a time of renewed commercial contact with the Near Eastern Civilizations 
and Egypt and new exploration in the West.9 In the late seventh century, a 
Greek trading center was founded in Naucratis in the Nile delta near Sais, the 
26th dynasty capital.10 In the early sixth century, Naucratis was granted 
exclusive trading rights in Egypt by the Pharaoh.11 Miletus was a key player
9Carl Roebuck Ionian Trade and Colonization, Monographs on Archaeology and Fine 
Arts IX, Archaeological Institutes of America, N ew  York: Archaeological Institutes of America, 
1959; p. 137, sum m arizes his foundational study of the period: "The great period of Ionian 
expansion opened in the last quarter of the 7th century, w hen Africa [Egypt], Spain, and the 
Black Sea were brought into its orbit."
10Roebuck, op. cit., p. 135, on the basis of the pottery found at Naucratis dates the 
settlement to the last quarter of the 7th century.
uOn the excavations at Naucratis, see D. G. Hogarth, H. L. Lorirner, and C. C. Edgar, 
"Naucratis, 1903," The Journal o f Hellenic Studies, 25 (1905), pp. 105-36; John Boardman, The  
Greeks Overseas: Their early colonies and trade, 2nd ed., N ew  York: Thames and Hudson,
1980, p. 115; CAH III, 3, pp.41ff.
3
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in the founding12 and the trade of Naucratis. They m aintained their own 
sanctuary in the city.13
Boardm an notes that from the time of the founding of Naucratis, 
Egyptian styles began to effect Greek monumental sculpture, architecture, and 
painting. Egyptian objects, faience scarabs, glass flasks, and alabaster began to 
appear throughout Greece.14
The Egyptian 26th dynasty opened to Greece in unprecedented ways 
because they needed Greek m ilitary support. The dynasty began when 
Psammeticus I came to power with Ionian and Carian mercenary support. 
Greek mercenaries continued to serve throughout the 26th dynasty, and 
established settlements in Egypt.15 Necho (610-595) began building Greek 
triremes probably for defence against the Phoenicians.16 Later, Amasis again 
turned to Greece for help in establishing a naval force against the overland 
threat from a newly resurgent Babylon.17
Trade and joint military operations presuppose knowledge of language 
on one side or other. As the Greeks were taking the initiative to travel to 
Egypt either to trade with or serve militarily, they needed translators to make 
the necessary communications. They also began to settle both trading and 
m ilitary communities mainly in the Delta area. The main trading center,
12Braun, Cambridge Ancient History III, 3, pp. 37-43.
13Roebuck, op. cit., p. 135.
1‘'Boardman, op. cit., pp. 141-153. See also Alan Lloyd, Herodotus, Book II: Introduction, 
Brill, Leiden, 1975; p.29ff, the Greeks obtained mainly corn but also faience, ivory, and papyrus 
for the silver. The Egyptians needed silver in their religious cult but it w as not available in 
Egypt.
,5A. Lloyd, op. cit., pp.14-23
16A. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 37f.; T. G. H. James, Cambridge A ncient History  III.2. 2nd ed. 
ed. J. Boardman, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 720-24.
17James, CAH III, 2, p. 724.
4
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Naucratis, had both Greek and Egyptian sanctuaries, indicating a mixed 
population.18
From the seventh and sixth century religious contacts between the Greeks 
and Egyptians are known. Herodotus claims that Necho dedicated armor at a 
Milesian tem ple.19 A bilingual statue dating from the latter half of the sixth 
century bears a dedication to Amun in Egyptian and to the 'Theban" Zeus in 
Greek, proof that both practices and deities were being shared.20
Most contact was probably oral as testified by Herodotus in his own 
accounts of conversations w ith Egyptian priests.21 H erodotus knew the 
Egyptian god Am un and elements of the H erm opolitan and Heliopolitan 
cosmogonies (see below), indicating that these doctrines were not so esoteric 
as to be hidden from foreigners, whether they were communicated directly 
with Herodotus or through intermediaries.22
Egypt
By the sixth century B.C.E., the Egyptians had long taught creation from 
divine elements acting according to their physical characteristics. Divine 
materials are central to both major creation traditions found in Egypt, the
18See Hogarth, et al. "Naucratis, 1903."
19Herodotus, Histories, 2:159.
“ F. LI. Griffith, "An Early Greco-Egyptian Bilingual Inscription," Classical Review  5, 
1891: 77-9.
21For a detailed analysis of what Herodotus learned from his Egyptian informants, see 
A. Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 89-116.
“On Amun, see Herodotus, H is tories, II, 42.5; also 18.1,2; 32.1; 55.3; and 1,46.3.
On the Ogdoad, see, II, 43.4; 46.1; 145.1.
On the Ennead (which Herodotus mistakenly calls the twelve, although he gets the lineage of 
divine kings right), see II, 144-145.
On Necho's school of interpreters, see II, 154.
5
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H eliopolitan and the H erm opolitan, nam ed after the cult centers which 
produced each tradition.23 The Heliopolitan creation accounts were inscribed 
into the Pyramids beginning in the fifth dynasty (2465-2323).24 Heliopolitan 
creation accounts begin w ith Atum, the "All," who produced himself from 
the precosmic ocean, Nun. Then he created air, earth, and heaven from Nun. 
H erm opolitan creation accounts first appear in the Coffin Texts in the first 
interm ediate period (2134-2040) but are not developed until the Eamasside 
period (1307-1070). Herm opolitan accounts attribute creation to Amun, the 
hidden god associated with Nun. Amun rose to preeminence in the pantheon 
in the New Kingdom (1550-1070), a position he m aintained until the last 
dynasty of Egypt. Thales and A naxim ander show closest connection to 
Hermopolitan creation, which is to be expected inasmuch as the 26th dynasty 
witnessed a resurgence in Amun worship. The dynasty's capital was in Sais in 
the Delta only ten m iles from  N aucratis and its M ilesian m erchants. 
Anaximenes also shows connections to the Heliopolitan tradition, which may 
indicate a progressive familiarization with Egyptian theories in Miletus.
Heliopolitan
In the H eliopolitan account, A tum  first produced air and moisture, 
Shu and Tefnut, by means of expectoration or ejaculation. Shu and Tefnut in 
tu rn  gave birth  to earth  and heaven, Geb and Nut, who then produced the
23There are several good studies of creation in Egypt that recount the major teachings 
and major traditions: James P. Allen in Genesis in Egypt: The philosophy o f Ancient Egyptian 
creation accounts, Yale Egyptological Studies 2, N ew  Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, 
1988; Leonard Lesko, "Ancient Egyptian Cosmogonies and Cosmology," Religion in Ancient Egypt, 
Ithaca: Cornell, 1991, p. 91ff.; Siegfried Morenz, Egyptian Religion, trans. Ann Keep, Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1973, on creation, see chapter 8, pp.159-182; John A. Wilson, 'T he Nature of the Universe" 
in Intellectual Adventure o f Ancient M an, ed. H. Frankfort et al., Chicago: University Chicago 
Press, 1946.
^Inscriptions first appear in the pyramid of Pharaoh Unas (2356-2323 B.C.E.).
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kings and their sisters, Osiris and Seth, Isis and Nephthis. These nine primeval 
gods, called the Nonad, expressed both cosmic and political understandings. 
The account of the struggles of Osiris and Seth and the restoration of the 
proper monarchy under Osiris' son, Horus, was fundam ental to the Egyptian 
view of the divine origin of kingship, as the Pharaoh was seen as a Horus 
king and legitimate successor to Osiris. On a natural level, Osiris was also 
understood as the Nile River, the offspring of the Earth.
Shu, the god of air,25 produced the earth by creating a division in the 
prim ordial waters, which allowed the dry earth to appear. In the same act, 
Shu created the heaven as the under surface of the prim ordial waters which 
were raised above the Earth. As Allen so aptly expressed it, the Egyptian 
universe existed as a bubble of air in the m idst of the prim ordial w aters.26 
Even in the earliest recorded versions of Egyptian cosmogony, the Egyptians 
were already invoking the physical properties of elemental gods such as air 
and water as keys to understanding the origin of the universe.
H erm opolitan
The Hermopolitan account of creation was based on the work of eight 
primordial gods, known collectively as the Ogdoad. They were the gods of the 
prim ordial waters themselves and of their properties. In male and female 
pairs they were: Nun and Naunet, the waters; Kak and Kauket, darkness;
“ See R. O. Faulkner, "Some Notes on the God Shu," Jaarbericht 18, 1964, p. 266-270. 
Faulkner takes particular note of Shu's cosmogonic role in the Coffin Texts.
“ Allen, Genesis in Egypt, gives a detailed analysis of Egyptian cosm ology based upon a 
relief and inscription of the 19th dynasty, dating to ca. 1280 B.C.E.; pp. 1-7. Allen show s that 
the Egyptians view ed Nun as surrounding both heaven and earth. Wilson, art. cit., pp. 45 f., 
pictures the Nun as existing under the earth only, but does not support this view  from Egyptian 
texts.
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Heh and Hehet, infinity; Amun and Amaunet, hidden ones.27 Nun and 
Naunet, Amun and Amaunet appeared together as primordial gods in Pyramid 
Texts,28 but they are not described as the agents of creation until the Coffin 
Texts.29 It was not until the Ramasside period that the creation by the Ogdoad 
was fully developed as part of the new Amun-Re theology of the New Kingdom. 
Amun grew  in importance in the New Kingdom as he was identified with 
the sun god, Re. He remained the hidden god despite displaying himself in 
his chief manifestation as the sun.30
Although Am un's centrality persisted through the later dynasties of 
Egypt and into the Ptolemaic period, the texts of the developmental period of 
the New Kingdom contain the best statements of Amun theology. The best 
narratives of the creative process are found in the Coffin Texts. The later 
dynasties preserve mainly hymns which reflect the narrative and theology of 
the earlier texts but do not recount it in detail. The narratives of Theban
^The essential them es of creation by the Ogdoad are developed in multiple variations 
in their order and membership. The Harris Magical papyrus, which is reproduced in the Amun 
tem ple at el-H isbe, DMTh 50.51, presents Amun as the offspring of Nun in keeping with the 
older traditions of the Pyramid Texts (Kurt Sethe, Am un und die acht Urgotter von Hcrmopolis, 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 1929, § 78). The Ramasside period developed a more theological account by 
assigning priority to the hidden deity, Amun, a theory which is explained at length in the 
pLeiden I 350 (see below). Amun's priority was preserved into the Ptolemaic period in the 
Theban tem ple texts. The membership of the Ogdoad also varies in the texts. Tenem, gloom, 
takes Am un's place in the Coffin Texts from Bersheh. Gerech, night, takes his place at el 
Hisbe. N y takes Nun's place in an Amasis inscription and Amun's at Edfu. (Sethe, Amun, Tafel
I.)
^Pyramid Text 446-7. See Sethe, Amun, § 64.
^Coffin Text 80.
MJan Assmann, Agyptische H ymnen und Gebete, ed. Erik Hornung. Zurich: Artemis- 
Verlag, 1975, p.18, argues that the new Amun theology markedly differs from the earlier sun 
theology. He claims that the development of an Amun pantheism makes sense only as a response 
to Akhnaten's Aton worship: Das spezifisch "pantheistische" Geprage der ramassidischen 
Amun-Theologie ist in deren Friihform nicht angelegt und ist nur als Antwort auf die Amarna- 
Religion verstandlich: als der Versuch, die Idee des Einen Gottes mit der polytheistischen  
Vorstellung von der Gottlichkeit und Differenziertheit des Kosmos zu verbinden. See also Lesko, 
"Cosmology," p. 140f.
8
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temple inscriptions are an exception, but they are Ptolemaic and too late for 
comparison with the Milesian cosmologists. Nevertheless, they do show the 
continuity of Am un thought through the late dynasties.
Two texts will serve to illustrate the key developments of Heliopolitan 
and Hermopolitan theology. Coffin Text 80 is a Heliopolitan text of the Middle 
Kingdom (2040-1640). It clearly reveals new elaboration of the old Nonad 
cosmogony under the influence of the newer Ogdoad cosmogony.31 Papyrus 
Leiden 1350 which dates to 1250 B.C.E.32 contains a collection of hymns which 
are the best statement of Ramasside Amun theology.
Coffin Text 80
Coffin Text 80 forms part of group of seven spells devoted to Shu, the 
god of air. In the seven spells, the coffin's occupant identifies himself with 
Shu. In most Coffin Texts, the dead identifies himself w ith  Osiris, as the 
deceased seeks to reenact Osiris' trium ph over death. In the Shu texts, the 
deceased seeks to imitate Shu as the first life that came forth from the precosmic 
flood. Death threatens the soul with return to the darkness and formlessness 
of precosmic N un and requires the reenactment of the origin of life in Shu by 
means of spells. Cosmogony is recreated in the service of immortality.
The ancient Pyramid texts merely state that Atum formed himself from
31Between the Hermopolitan and Heliopolitan systems syncretism is common. Much of 
the speculation of the O gdoad is subsum ed under the earlier Nonad. In Coffin Text 76, 
Heliopolitan Shu comes first and produces Nun and the Ogdoad. In a neighboring text, Coffin 
Text 80, the Ogdoad creates Shu. In pLeiden 1350, Amun creates the Nonad (see below). There 
are many other system s that share many elements with the major system s. Ptah, the god of 
craftsmen, fashions the world in pBerlin and in the Memphite theology. Khnum, the potter 
creates the world at Esna. Magic is the creator in Coffin Text 261. These variations and mutual 
borrowings testify to considerable activity in cosmological speculation.
32A. H. Gardiner, "Hymns to Amun from a Leiden Papyrus." Zeitschrift fu r  agyptische 
Sprache und Altertum skunde  42,1905: 12-42. For another text and translation, see Jan Zandee, 
De Hymnen aan Amon van Papyrus Leiden 1 350, Leiden: Brill, 1948.
9
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Nun before he produced the world. Coffin Text 80 develops the account of 
Atum 's formation as a dialogue between Atum and Nun, as the Ogdoad first 
appear and play prominent roles in a Nonad text.
Spell 80 begins by invoking the eight infinite ones as parents of Shu. 
The list of the eight varies from the later standard formulation of the Ogdoad 
in its substitution of Gloom (Tenem) for Amun, which is appropriate to the 
spell's narrative and descriptive tone:
Oh that Ogdoad, in million of millions.
Heaven was enclosed in their arms,
Aker of earth was drawn together
Only w hen you gave birth  to Shu in the millions, in  Nun, in
Gloom, and in Darkness. (27 d-28 b)33
The production of Shu is also recounted by Atum:
Behold I am alone with N un in weariness 
I cannot find a place that I might stand there.
I cannot find a place that I might sit there.
Heliopolis has not yet been founded that I might be there,
Lower Egypt34 has not yet bound that I might sit on it.
Heaven has not been made that it might be over my head
The first body has not been born
The prime Nonad had not yet become,
Then they were with me.
tr a n s la t io n  here and throughout is by the author. The Egyptian text is found in A. de 
Buck and A. H. Gardiner, The Egyptian Coffin Texts, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1935, v. 2.
See appendix for a copy of de Buck's Hieroglyphic text and transliteration by the author.
Allen, op. cit., p. 21, translates, "Shu has given you birth out of the Flood, out of the Waters, 
out of Chaos, out of the Darkness." Besides its grammatical difficulties, Allen's translation 
makes the identity of the eight rather mysterious. They could not be the male-female pairs of 
flood, waters, chaos, and darkness as w e would expect if the eight are born out of these. Tn 
should be taken as the subject, not the object.
MFor the writing of "Lower Egypt" as it appears here, see Worterbuch der Aegyptischen  
Sprache, A dolf Erman and Herman Grapow, 5 volumes, Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1926-1931, v. 2, p. 
123.
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Then Atum  said to Nun,
I am  upon the flood, having become greatly wearied,
A nd my limb being tired.
By my son, life, shall my heart be supported,
He will give life to my heart when he has draw n together these 
very weary limbs of mine. (33 e-35 a)
Nun replies, suggesting the exhalation of both Shu and Tefnut.
Shu then recounts his own birth:
It is from his nose that he bore me,
It is from his nostrils that I came forth.
I was set as his neck, w hen he inhaled me together w ith my 
sister, Truth (Maat),
It is from his egg that he shines forth every day,
When the splendid god is born. (35 j—36 d)
I am life, the binder of the head,
The fixer of the neck and vivifier of the throat.
I bind Atum.
I fix Isis' head upon her neck
Even for Cheper [the god of becoming] I bound the spine.
I am  splendor, the extender of journeys,
The bringer of the sky for Atum 
To the nose of Re everyday.
My coming is my going.
In order that he may sail to the western horizon, I open the way 
for Re. (37 a-g)
Spell 80 is as dualistic as it is dialectic. It attributes the production of Shu and 
hence the subsequent creation of the world to both Atum and to Nun. Nun 
provides precosmic location of creation. In itself it is formless, yet it binds 
together and forms the earth and Shu. After giving them birth, it continues 
to surround and hold together the world. A tum  first exists in the same 
formlessness as Nun. He remains as an egg until he brings forth Shu. Although 
he creates Shu, he himself needs him as an appropriate place for himself.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Shu divides the formless Nun and opens space for Atum to manifest himself 
as the sun.
Spell 80 dem onstrates the physical considerations at work in Nonad 
cosmology. Nun as water is formless, instable, and dark. As water, it prevented 
the formation of the sun. The sun was understood as fiery by the Egyptians, 
making air the proper medium for the sun. Air is also understood as the 
principle of life. In the cosmic order, air was seen as the product of the sun, as 
the sun granted life to the world.
pLeiden 1350:
Amun theology unified the two principles of the Heliopolitan system 
into the h idden  god Amun. In his hiddeness he was the source of the 
formlessness of Nun. But his own hiddeness gave him the potential for 
m ultiple manifestations in the sun and stars and throughout creation. His 
manifestations were linked as a series of emanations:
No one knows the forms of he who fashions himself,
A perfect pattern, come about from the holy influx,
He who made his own images, who formed himself by himself,
Complete manifestation, who made his own heart joyful.
He who bound the waters with his body
In order to cause his egg might become in his secret inside.
Model of models, the likeness of birth
Completing himself, [. . .] true [. . . j , fashioner of the forty, (ch.
40)35
Chapter 40 the hidden deity emanates in different forms from his original 
hidden formlessness. His first image shows only in the darkness of Nun. 
N un provides the m aterial for the egg, which marks a second and more
tr a n s la te d  from the text of Gardiner, art. cit.
See appendix for a copy of Gardiner's Hieroglyphic text and transliteration by the author.
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defined stage of emanation. Egg imagery is brought over from Heliopolitan 
theology and is an intermediate stage to the birth of the sun.36 The sun is the 
greatest manifestation of Amun. pLeiden shares the imagery of the binding 
of the egg w ith the Coffin Text Heliopolitan account (see above). The same 
imagery is carried over into the Theban temple texts of the Ptolemaic period 
(Theban text 283).
A m un's hiddeness is such that it allows him to be the true reality 
behind many and varied manifestations. He is the true reality behind the 
N un and the sun, which makes him  prio r to the two principles of the 
Heliopolitan system. In his emanation as Ogdoad, he is boundless; as sun, he 
is bound. He is fiery sun and watery Nun. As the sun, he is light; as Nun, 
darkness. As Nun, he is hidden and as sun he is the most manifest.
The Ogdoad is your first becoming,
That you might complete them when you were alone.
Your body was hidden among of the elders 
You were hidden as Amun before the gods,
Only that you might make your becoming as Ta Tenen
In order to give birth to the primeval Nonad as your first primeval
Nonad. (ch. 80)
In addition to the sun egg, Nun produces Ta Tenen, the primal or literally the 
"uplifted" earth. In pLeiden, Amun produces both earth and egg by binding 
and forging (pi. 4.2,10). The order of production of earth and sun egg is not 
indicated, but when the sun rises in its splendor, the earth is there to receive 
its light.
The sun himself is joined together in his body 
He is the elder in Heliopolis.
He is called Ta Tenen,
^ h e  egg for the sun is borrowed from Atum theology cf. Coffin Text 714.
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Amun who came forth from Nun.
His image is the upper part,
His other becoming was among the Ogdoad.
The prime one before the primeval Nonad, begettor of the sun.
He completed himself as Atum, one flesh w ith him.
He is the lord to the limit, originator of being, (ch. 200)
Chapter 200 explicitly invokes Atum as a manifestation of Am un in order to 
subsume Nonad creation under the power of Amun and the Ogdoad.
pLeiden presents both a theological and a physical account. It presents 
teachings of the hiddeness and unknowability of Amun, but it also teaches 
the production of egg in the water, a biological analogy for physical growth 
and change. At the same time it teaches the physical transformation of the 
waters into earth and sun through binding. The A m un theologians took 
over the physical accounts of the creation of the Nonad and the role of Shu in 
the world. But for the Nonad theologians, the waters had to be driven back by 
Shu to make room for the sun and the world. For the Amun theologians of 
pLeiden, the waters were bound into the sun-egg. They taught that the Ogdoad 
supplied the material for sun, a new doctrine of elemental transformation, 
driven by Am un's ability for multiple manifestation.
The Egyptians did not have a concept of m atter in the technical sense 
that the Greeks would develop. They did not develop distinctions between 
matter as substance in potency or matter as substance without quality as Aristotle 
and the Stoics would. Nevertheless they do present an analysis of the heaven 
and earth into a common pre-cosmic material. They presented in mythic 
terms the forces behind the formation of heaven and earth and they traced 
their development in stages: 1) the waters of Nun 2) the fiery sun 3) air 4) the 
earth and heaven.
The Amun theologians had succeeded in reducing creation to a single
14
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principle. Their single principle also served the substance of the world. They 
d id  not teach creation ex nihilo in the sense that the Christian apologists 
w ould later develop in the second century. Rather they taught creatio ex deo 
and a world of deus in omnibus.
Thales
Thales of Miletus, traditionally know n as the first philosopher, began 
his active life toward the end of the seventh century B.C.E.37 Thales' interest 
in astronomy has been attested since the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.E. Herodotus 
recorded Thales' prediction of a solar eclipse (Diels, A.5) and Plato related the 
story of his fall into a pit while observing the heavens (Diels, A.9). It is a 
humorous story, but it does testify to Thales reputation for astronomical interest. 
Later witnesses also report Thales' geometrical skill in measuring the height 
of the pyram ids from their shadows (Diels, A.21). In Plutarch he also was 
reported to have travelled to Egypt w here he derived his w ater cosmology 
(Diels, A.11 A.14). His Egyptian journeys and learning were also recounted in 
later sources which added Babylon to Thales' itinerary.
W hether he travelled to Egypt or not, Miletus had sufficient contact 
w ith Egypt to allow him  contact with Egyptians ideas (see above).38 His
37Kirk and Raven, p. 74. The only firm date in Thales' life is the eclipse that he was 
reported to have predicted in 585 B.C.E.
“ Alan Lloyd discounts the reports of Thales' journeys as a later invention based upon 
the observation of similarities in Thales' water cosmology, astronomy, and geometrical interest 
with Egyptian and Babylonian thought. H e also noted that H erodotus makes no mention of 
Thales' journeys to Egypt and argues that Herodotus' silence is a "surely conclusive refutation" 
because "had he known it, he would certainly have told us because he was obsessed with the 
question of the Egyptian legacy to Greece." Lloyd also argues that Thales speculation concerning 
the sources of the N ile do not indicate an Egyptian journey, "since Miletus w as a sea-port with 
intimate Egyptian connections and masses of information on conditions there must have been 
available to  all" (op. cit., pp. 52ff.). Lloyd's first argument begs the question, "the reports are 
false because they are inventions." The reports could be inventions, but that is precisely what 
is at issue. The second argument is weak because it is from silence. There could be many reasons
15
\
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
speculation about the sources of the Nile indicates that he had knowledge and 
interest about Egypt. His interests in astronomy and geometry make it difficult 
to believe that he would not have sought out information from Egypt since as 
a Milesian he had opportunity to gain it, either by visit or report.
Despite their brevity, Aristotle's comments in the Metaphysics are the 
best surviving account of Thales' cosmology:
Thales, the founder of this kind of philosophy, said that water 
was the principle (therefore, he asserted that the earth was upon 
water), probably taking this supposition from the observation 
that all nourishment is moist and that heat itself arises from this 
and lives by this (the principle of all is that from which things 
arise), for this reason he took this supposition and because the 
seeds of everything have a moist nature. (Diels A.12)39
Of Thales' cosmology, little is known other than that he derived the world 
from water and taught that the world continued to float on water. Water by 
Aristotle's account seems to have continued as a life force in the world. 
According to Aristotle, Thales came to the conclusion that moisture produces 
heat and is the seed of all by observation of nutrition and reproduction. Kirk 
notes that Aristotle's language is speculative, preventing firm attribution of 
the reasoning to Thales.40 Nevertheless, the biological analogy for the cosmos
of the kind Aristotle attributes to Thales, a biomorphism if you will, would be
why Herodotus did not mention Thales' journeys to Egypt. He could have been unaware of 
them, or he could have neglected to mention them because his discussions of Thales occur in 
connection with Lydia and not when he is discussing the legacy of the Egyptians. Lloyd's last 
argument makes the case that the question of a journey to Egypt is irrelevant to the question of 
the influence of Egyptian thought on Thales.
^dAAa 0aAfjs pev o xfjg xoiaiixqs apxriyos <|>i/\.ocjo<t>ias uScop e iv a i <t>t|aiv (5io m i  if|v  
yfjv e<{>' ooaxos d.7re<j>aivexo eiva i), AaPcbv iacos xqv fo7r6Ar|\J/iv xauxt|v eic xou ndvxcov opav xqv 
xpo<)>f|v bypav ouoav m i  aiixb xo 0epp6v £k xoiixou yiyvopevov m i  xoiixcoi £«v (xo 5' e£, ox> 
yiyvexai, xoox' £cm v apxq 7ravxcov), 5 ia  xe 5f) xouxo xf|v u 7t6 A t | i| / i v  AaPcbv xauxt|v m i  5 ia  xo 
Tidvxcov xa onep n a xa  xqv 0ucriv uypav exeiv- Text by Herman Diels and Walther Kranz, Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin: Weidmann, 1951, p. 77.
^Kirk, p. 93.
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consisten t w ith  T ha les ' successors, A nax im ander and  A naxim enes. 
Biomorphism figures in A naxim ander's cosmogony from the seed secreted 
from the infinite and in the figure of fire growing around air as bark around a 
tree (see below). Anaximenes calls air "the soul of the universe" (see below). 
Biomorphism in Thales would also parallel Egyptian use of biological analogy 
in cosmic eggs and w orld soul. Thales' cosmogony from w ater and the 
suspension of the earth upon waters show close parallels to Egyptian cosmology. 
Thales' process of the generation of the world is not preserved, which prevents 
closer comparison with Hermopolitan creation.
A naxim ander
Anaximander, also of Miletus, was reported to have been a follower of 
Thales and to have reached his sixty-fourth year in 547/6 .41 He followed 
Thales in biomorphism but shows clearer similarities to Am un theology than 
Thales. Anaximander's interests in the rest of the world are demonstrated in 
the report that he was the first of the Greeks to draw a map on a tablet (7uva2,, 
Diels, A.6) w hich may indicate A naxim ander's borrow ing of Ancient 
Mesopotamian m ap and writing technology.42 Likewise he is credited with 
introducing the Greeks to the yvcopcov for the purpose of telling time, itself a 
Mesopotamian and Egyptian tool (A.l).
Anaxim ander followed Thales in theorizing concerning the origin of 
the world, but he rejected water as first principle in favor of a more abstract 
notion, the infinite:
41Diels, 12A1, cf. Kirk and Raven, p. 100.
Charles Kahn, Anaxim ander and the Origins o f Greek Cosmology N ew  York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960, p. 82-84; Kahn draws comparison to a Persian period circular 
map from Babylon that shares features with Agathemerus description of Anaximander's map. 
In each map, a circular earth is surrounded by one river and cut in two by another river.
17
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A naxim ander . . . said that the infinite was the principle and 
element of beings . . . .  He says it [the infinite] is neither water 
nor any of the things which are called elements, but some other 
infinite nature from which all the heavens and the cosmoi in 
them came about. From them the things which are have their 
genesis. Corruption goes into the same by necessity. For they 
give justice and recom pense to each other for the injustice 
according to the order of time. (Diels, A 9 a and B l)43
Anaximander's infinite is unbounded both in its extent and in its form. The 
Greek term a7reipov, can be derived as a privative from 7repas, "end" or "limit," 
meaning endless or limitless.44 It can also be understood as a privative from 
the word Treipco, pierce or traverse, meaning the intransversable.45 As for its 
use in Anaximander, Aristotle records that he described it as "deathless and 
indestructible" (Physics iii.4, 203 b 13 f.) which suggests the sense of limitless.
Cornford rejects the interpretation of the dforeipov as spatially infinite, 
arguing that the 6th century is too early for such a notion. He argues instead 
that dfteipov means endless in the sense that a sphere and spherical motion 
are endless. He argues that Anaximander's airetpov should be understood as 
a sphere.46 Cornford's argument is curious in that the notion of the sphere is 
at least as abstract as the notion of extension without limit and would seem to 
require greater geometrical sophistication. Cornford's interpretation is also 
contrary to the testimony of Theophrastus who reports that Anaxim ander's
43’Ava£ipav5pos . . . apxf|v xe m l  crtoix,eiov eipt|ice tgov ovtcov to  &7reipov, 7rpwxos 
tou to  xouvopa Kopicras xfjs dpxf|S. A iyti 5’ auxfjv pf|T£ uScop pf|T£ aWo xi xuv tcaAoupEvcov 
eiv a i axoixeiwv, aAA’ fexepav x iva  <t»UCTiv d.7reipov, 4E, rj? djravxas ytvEcrGai xous aupavous icai 
tow; ev aiixois Koopoos- 42, a>v 8e f| yevecris 4axi xois o w i ,  m l  xf]v 00opav els xaoxa yiveaGai 
Kaxa to  xpewv- SiSovai yap auxa, 5ikt|v m l  x ia iv  aAAf|Aois xfjs aSitdas m x a  xfiv xou xpovou 
xa^iv. Diels, op. cit., p. 83.
44So Cornford, op. cit., 176-178.
45So Kahn, op. cit., p.232
^Cornford, op. cit., p. 175ff.
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oareipov was infinite "in form and in size" (Kara eiSos Kai piyeGos, Diels, A 
9 a). Egyptian A m un theology also dem onstrates the understand ing  of 
boundless expanse at a period far earlier than Anaximander. pH arris from 
the Ramasside period describes Amun as "w ithout limit in his w idth and 
breadth." The concept was current in Amun theology in Anaximander's time 
as the text was preserved into the 6th century and inscribed on the temple at 
el-Hisbe.
A naxim ander's phrase "contains and governs all" itself echoes Amun 
theology. pLeiden describes Am un as existing beyond the limits of Nun, 
which itself surrounds the world. In Coffin Text 80, N un surrounds and 
binds together Shu, who then binds together the sun.
A nother sense of a7retpov is indefinite in kind, most clearly attributed 
to A naxim ander by Theophrastus as preserved by Simplicius (Diels, A.9a): 
the infinite's "nature is indefinite (aopicrrov) both in its kind and in its size." 
As we saw according to Simplicius, the (foreipov had an indefinite nature, 
"other than water or any element." Kahn has argued that elemental powers, 
such as wet, dry, light, and dark are the beings "from which the things which 
are have their genesis. Corruption goes into the same by necessity" (see 
above).47 If so, the d,7reipov is the indefinite principle of the elemental qualities. 
Its indefiniteness allows it to be transformed into any quality. In this respect 
the d.7reipov is again parallel to Amun of pLeiden: the hidden, characterless 
principle which can transform itself into the elements of the cosmos.
A naxim ander's cosmogony proceeded in stages of separation, first 
separation from the infinite, then separation into realms of the cosmos:
47Kahn, op. cit., 182 f.
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He says that that which is productive (yovtftov) of hot and cold 
was separated from the eternal at the genesis of this cosmos and 
that from this a ring of fire grew around the air which surrounds 
the earth  like bark around a tree. The ring was broken and 
closed into circles producing the sun, the moon, and the stars.
(Diels A.10)48
A crux for interpretation is formed by the yovipov, that which produces hot 
and cold (Diels, A. 10). Anaximander (or Theophrastus) rather mysteriously 
used the w ord yovipov, "productive," w ithout identifying that which is 
productive.49 One hint Anaximander gives is in the description of its secretion, 
djroKpivexai, a term which can describe the production of eggs.50 Flame both 
grows from the yovipov (from "this," "this" referring back to the yovipov) and 
flame grows around the air51 "as bark around the tree." Its proximity to air 
and the figure of bark would seem to indicate that flame grows from the air, 
making air equivalent to the yovipov as the source of flame. Air also surrounds 
earth, and possibly has produced it as the cold earth in balanced opposition to 
the fire on the outside.52 Under this interpretation, the yovipov, the hot and 
the cold of the first clause are concretely identified as the air, fire, and earth in
“' f y r i a i  5 e  t o  d ie  x o u  a i 5 i o u  y o v i p o v  G e p p o u  x e  m i  \ | / o z p o O  m x a  x f ] v  y d v e c r i v  x o u § e  x o u  
K o c r p o u  d , 7 r o K p i 0 f i v a i  m i  x i v a  d ie  x o i i x o u  <t>A.oyos c r O a i p a v  7 r e p i 0 u f |v c u  x w i  7 re p i  x f i v  y f j v  a d p i  w s 
x o k  S d v S p to i  0 A .o i 6 v  r j a x i v o s  d T t o p p a y e t c r r i s  m i  d s  x i v a s  aT to ieA .e i< j0 e i< JT |S  k u k A.o u s  u T t o a x f i v a i  
x o v  n k i o v  m i  x f i v  a e A . f |v r |v  l e a i  x o i> s  a a x d p a s .  D i e l s ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  8 3 .
49Kirk takes the yovtpov as a vague expression used by Theophrastus to cover his own 
doubts about Anaximander’s first stages of cosmogony, p. 133. Kahn agrees that yovipov is 
probably not original but from Theophrastus. The term is found elsewhere in Theophrastus. 
Kahn believes the idea is old.
“ Kahn, p. 156, makes the connection of a 7tOKpivexai to the secretion of eggs, arguing for 
generation in a biological terms and not by vortex motion. Both Kahn and Kirk (p. 132) cast 
doubt on the w itnesses to its circular motion in ancient sources and the interpretation of vortex 
motion in Anaximander by Cornford.
51On the meaning of d tp  in Anaximander, see Kahn. Kahn credits Anaximander with 
changing af|p from its epic sense of "mist" to its more general sense of "air" (pp.143-154).
“ Anaximander included the sea in the realm of the earth (Diels, A.27).
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the second clause. The reading is also consistent w ith A naxim ander's 
cosmology, in which air acts as the mediator between the realms of hot and 
cold. It opens to allow heat and light through to the lower realms and as it 
feeds the fires of the upper realms.
The air-egg in Anaximander's cosmology probably derives from the 
air-egg of Egyptian Heliopolitan creation as we saw it explained in the Coffin 
Texts, while A naxim ander's d7reipov resembles Am un in its infinity and 
indeterminacy. As we also saw, the Hermopolitan Amun theology took over 
elements from the Heliopolitan creation account, including the cosmic egg. 
Anaximander probably came to know a syncretistic Amun theology.
Additionally, Anaximander's teaching of the governance of the world 
by justice is prefigured by the cosmic role of Maat, truth, in Egyptian thought. 
Like Alien, Maat has a judicial role, serving to adjudicate disputes, even the 
dispute between the god Osiris and his brother, Seth. In addition, she is the 
balance in the universe between the forces of being and destruction, serving 
as an aid to the Sun in his nightly struggle with Nun and darkness.
Anaximenes
Of Anaximenes' life little more is known other than that he was a 
Milesian and follower of Anaximander. Anaximenes simplified the system 
of Anaximander by doing away with the mysterious infinite, substituting for 
it infinite air:
Anaximenes the Milesian, son of Eurustratus, com panion of 
Anaximander, says the underlying nature was one and infinite, 
just as Anaximander did, but he did not say it was indefinite as 
Anaximander did, but that it was definite, namely it was air. It 
differed in rarefaction and in density through all substances. 
Rarefied, it becomes fire, condensed, it becomes wind then cloud,
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still further condensed, it becomes water, then earth, then stones 
and other things come about from these. (Diels A.5)53
Similar to the water and the infinite of his predecessors, Anaximenes used air 
for original matter, surrounder and supporter of the earth. Air was indefinite 
enough to fulfill Anaxim ander's requirements of being a hidden base for 
other manifestations, but it is more intuitive and physical than Anaximander's 
undefined infinite.
Theophrastus' account of elemental transform ations w ould seem to 
provide the outline of a cosmogony similar to Anaximander's. Anaximenes 
dispensed w ith the infinite and argued that density was the dynamic force 
rather than tem perature.54 Air rarefied on one side and condensed on the 
other produced a realm of fire on the outside and a realm of earth and stones 
on the inside. Air, wind, and clouds remained in the m iddle.55 So understood,
53-Ava^i|ievr|s 5e Eupuaxpaxou MiA/qcnos, exalpos yeyovdts ’Ava^ipavSpou, p iav  pev 
ra t auto? xqv wrotceipevTiv <t>uaiv ra t &7reip6v 0t|ctiv cooTrep etceivos, oiitc aopiarov 8e clamp  
etceivos, aXXa. &piapevqv, aepa Aiycov ai>xf|v SiaOepeiv 5e pavoxT|xi r a t 7tuicv6 xt|xi r a x a  xas 
oiicrias. r a t  apaioupevov pev 7rup yiveaGai, 7ruKvoiipevov 8e avepov, e ixa  ve<t>os, exi 5e paA.A.ov 
u5wp, eixa yflv, e ixa  XiGous, xa 5e aXXa i\c xoiixcov. Diels, op. cit., p. 91.
54Anaxim enes provided an argument by the example of breath upon the lips (Diels,
B .l) .
55A different account of Anaximenes' cosmogony is preserved by Pseudo-Plutarch:
Everything came about by its [air's] condensation and subsequent rarefaction.
M otion exists from everlasting. As air w as felted, earth, which is flat, came 
about first, therefore by this account it floats upon air. The sun, moon, and stars 
have the beginning of their generation from earth. For he said that the sun was 
earth. By the speed of its motion and strong heat, it becam e kindled (Diels 
A.6).
yevvdaGal xe ra v x a  ra x a  x iva  7cukv&xjiv xouxou teal 7raA.1v apaiaxriv. xf|v ye 
ptjv kivt|ctiv aicovos wrapxeiv- 7uA.oitpevou 8e xou aepoj 7rpc6xriv yeyevfjaGai 
A.eyet x-qv yfjv 7rA.axeiav paA.a- 810  r a l  x a x a  Xoyov axtxfiv ^7ro%eiCTGai xdti 
aepi- x a l  xov rjA.iov x a i xf)v aeA.Vjvqv r a l  xa A.oi7ra a axp a  xf]v apxT]v xqs 
yeveaecos exeiv dx yfjg. a7ro<t>ai.vexai youv xov fiA.iov yfjv, 8 1a  Se xqv o^eiav  
Kivriaiv r a l paA’ iravoos Geppqv xauxt|v Kauaiv A.a|Beiv. Diels, op. cit., p. 91.
In this cosm ogony, air condenses to its limit. The final stage of condensation is earth, which
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Anaximenes' cosmogony is sim ilar to Anaxim ander's, minus the indefinite 
boundless. Anaximenes begins w ith the air egg which produces both fire and 
earth.
Anaxim ander also modified the biomorphism of his predecessors to a 
more anthropom orphic picture:
Anaximenes the Milesian, son of Eurustratus asserted that air 
was the principle of beings; for from it all things arose and into it 
they dissolve. "As our soul," he says, "being air controls us, so 
also wind and air contains the whole cosmos." (Diels B.2)56
Anaximenes in m aking the hum an soul the model for the cosmos opened 
new vistas in cosmological exploration that were to have profound impact 
throughout Greek philosophical tradition.
The notion of air as a soul at work in the world bears striking similarity 
to the account of the air god Shu which we saw in the Coffin Texts. Shu was 
not only the first creature of the world, but was also described as Ba soul 
whose strength supports heaven above earth. As we also saw, the Hermopolitan
theologians took over many aspects of H eliopolitan thought. As a result,
produces heat and fire by its motion. The accounts of Pseudo-Plutarch and Theophrastus cannot 
be harmonized as Kirk tried to do. H e interpreted Theophrastus' version as the account of 
normal processes of the world and Pseudo-Plutarch's as the account of cosm ogony (p. 152). 
However, the physical processes involved in Pseudo-Plutarch's account are distinct from those 
in Theophrastus.' In Theophrastus' account rarefaction produces heat; in Pseudo-Plutarch's 
motion does. The M ilesians and later Greek philosophers do not present different natural 
processes in cosm ogony and in the course of the world. Cosmogony is presented as the natural 
forerunner of the natural course of the world.
Worse still, the accounts bear irreconcilable contradictions. Pseudo-Plutarch claims that "sun 
w as [composed of] earth." What sense would this make in the Theophrastus version where fire 
and earth stand in opposition to each other by their defining characteristics, namely their 
densities?
Since we must make a choice, we should follow the more generally reliable Theophrastus, and 
accept an account of cosmogony according to progressive separation of opposites from air.
^A va^ip^ vris Eiipocrxpaxou M iA'qoios apxT|v xcov ovxcov d ep a  d7re<t>rjvaxo- etc yap  
xouxou 7ravxa yiyvecrBai lcai ei$ aiixov 7raA.1v dvaAueoG ai! oiTov f) rj/uxh- 0'HO'W. fl "niiexepa afip  
o r o a  ouyKpaxei f |p a s, m i  oAov xov icoapov 7rveupa m i  af|p  TrepiexeiS.’ D iels, op. cit., p. 95.
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Anaximenes could have gotten his ideas of air as a soul in the world directly 
or indirectly from either a Heliopolitan or a Hermopolitan source.
Looking back over the three Milesian cosmologists it is possible to trace 
their work as a progressive developm ent in understanding or interpreting 
Egyptian thought, from Thales' adoption of the physical aspect of Nun, to 
Anaxim ander's appropriation of the hiddeness of the boundless Amun and 
then to Anaximenes' account which unified the hidden cosmic force and the 
human soul in the form of air.
W hat the M ilesians learned from the Egyptians w ould serve as the 
framework for cosmological speculation in the Greek w orld for centuries. 
The proposition that the world came into being from the same material that 
it would perish into would be accepted by almost all the Greek philosophers 
in general terms, although the unity and the sufficiency of m atter would be 
challenged. Matter was here to stay as a principle of cosmogony and cosmology. 
The old succession myth, by which Zeus had defeated and left his progenetors 
powerless, had gone the way of Ouranos and Kronos. The teaching of a finite 
world springing from and supported by an infinite source would become a 
point of contention, as some taught infinite worlds. The anthropomorphism 
of cosmos, and the relation betw een the cosmic macrocosm and hum an 
microcosm would continue to serve as a basic analogy of cosmology.
The ways in which the Milesians departed from the Egyptian thought 
would serve as points of departure for further cosmic speculation in Greece. 
A naxim ander and Anaximenes were more physicalist than the Egyptians. 
The Egyptians d id  not educe universal physical properties to explain 
transfo rm ations, w hereas A nax im ander and A naxim enes explained 
transformations on the basis of differences in tem perature or density. The
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Milesians also modified the Egyptian and Greek mythic habit of collocating 
many explanations by introducing a quest for a single explanation. Each of 
the Milesian cosmologists sought to establish his own principle as the one 
explanation of the origin of the cosmos in preference to that of his predecessors. 
The speed at which new cosmological speculations were produced left the 
Egyptians behind.
Nevertheless, the Egyptians had provided a larger yet more unified 
world view than previous Greeks had known, which the Milesians could use 
and develop. It was larger than Hesiod's three realmed w orld of heaven, 
earth, and underworld and more unified in its single cosmic principle and in 
the continuity from origin to present course. The Milesians got a basic plot 
structure, characters, and settings from Egypt, but changed the dramatic action. 
The changes focused on the mechanics of the physical operations. Together 
w ith their refusal to syncretize one account of creation w ith another, these 
changes led to a scientific revolution.
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Chapter 2, M atter in  Plato, Aristotle, and Their Successors: Eternal realm of 
change or passing illusion
As we saw in chapter 1, the Milesians developed the notion of a single 
m ateria l/d iv ine source of the world under influence from Egypt. It was a 
world governed by order, but destined to return to its origins. They did not 
distinguish the m aterial for the world and the agent of creation, because the 
original agent of creation could transform itself into the requisite material for 
the cosmos. The principle of being manifested itself in the changes in the 
world.
Parm enides of Elea in Southern Italy (born ca. 510 B.C.E.)1 drove a 
wedge between being and change which the Egyptians and Milesians did not 
recognize. His view that being and change were antithetical undid the system 
of the Milesians which was predicated upon a single principle of being and 
change. They were happy to see change as the prerogative of being. Parmenides 
argued that being was "ungenerated and imperishable, entire, unshakable, 
and endless, it neither was nor will be, but is now, whole and together, one 
and continuous."2 To be is to be eternal, timeless, and unchangeable.
After Parmenides no Greek philosopher could unite being, unity, and 
change in the way that the Milesians had. According to Parmenides, the
‘Kirk and Raven, op. cit., p. 263 f.
2«S dyevr|tov eov icai avc6A.e0p6v ecm v, 
t a n  yap oi3A.opeA.es xe icai axpepes x|5’ axeA.ecrxov 
oi35e 7t o i ’ f|v oi35' ecrxai, ene'i vuv ecm v opou nav, 
ev, crovexes- Diels, B 8 , 3-6 a, p. 235.
For comment, see Kirk and Raven, p. 273 ff.
For a recent and extensive bibliography on Parmenides, see Scott Austin, Parmenides: Beings, 
Bounds, and Logic, N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
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world was one undifferentiated reality. All change and plurality were illusory. 
Parmenides' work immediately effected a multiplication of material principles 
in Empedocles, Anaxim ander, and the atomists, as they tried  to by-pass 
Parm enides' conclusion by introducing a plurality of m aterial principles.3 
Subsequently, Parm enides' w ork led to finer distinctions in the notion of 
being. Plato's distinction between true being versus phenomenal being denied 
the reality of the realm of change. Aristotle's act-potency distinction allowed 
him to find being in becoming. The Stoics adopted a categorical distinction of 
being to distinguish the one material substance of the cosmos from its qualitative 
changes.
Surprisingly, even among Platonists in the following centuries, the 
Stoic and Aristotelian views of matter and the ontology of the realm  of becoming 
carried the day. Yet, Plato's dualism  continued in a m odified form in the 
teachings of the Neopythagoreans.
N either Parmenides nor his followers had a notion of m atter as an 
unqualified ontological principle distinct from form. Such a dualism  would 
be developed by Plato and Aristotle. To consider the developm ent of the 
notion of matter as a distinct ontological principle, we will pass over Parmenides 
and his followers and proceed directly to the realm of change in Plato, Aristotle, 
the Stoics, and their followers.
Matter in  Plato
One of the great ironies of the history of Greek philosophy is that one 
of the m ain sources for the understanding of the doctrine of m atter in later
3For the effects of Parmenides teachings on Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists, 
see Kirk and Raven: "Each of these system s is, in its own way, a deliberate reply to Parmenides," 
p. 319. On Empedocles in particular, see pp. 323-25. On Anaxagoras, see pp. 368-70. On Zeno's 
effect on Anaxagoras, see pp. 370-72. On the atomists, see pp. 404-409.
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Greek philosophy d id  not believe in the stuff himself. Even though Plato's 
(428/7-348/7B.C.E.) Timaeus  was one of the key texts informing the Middle- 
Platonist and N eoplatonist notions of matter, there is no m atter in Plato's 
system. I say this not just because he antedates Aristotle's development of the 
notion, and not just because for Plato the physical world is mere appearance. 
Physical bodies are not even what they appear. Bodies are twice removed 
from true being in that they are only constructs of phenomenal mathematical 
figures. They are mere constructs of mere phenomena.
The depth of Plato's idealism  has been overlooked from antiquity. 
Among the M iddle-P latonists and N eoplatonists, P lato 's  position  was 
assimilated to Aristotle's. They assumed that Plato's receptacle of change was 
matter in  the Aristotelian sense and they freely glossed the term as m atter.4 
Although most recent commentators have come to accept that the Aristotelian 
notion does not fit the text of the Timaeus,  m odern commentators have not
"Aristotle first m ade the identification of P lato's receptacle and his matter (de  
Generatione et Corruptione B 1). The M iddle-Platonist Plutarch, de Iside 372 E (matter is the 
7rav5 ex.es) and Albinus, D id a ska liko s , ch. 8  followed suit, see below.
Plotinus makes the same identification (Enneads 2.4.1,1).
Also Calcidius in his commentary on the Timaeus, 308, ed. John Wrobel, Platonis Timaeus, 
interprete Chalcidio cum eiusdem commentario, Leipzig: Teubner, 1876, p. 336 f.
The identification was preserved into the medieval period in Bernard of Chartres' commentary 
on the Timaeus, Glosae super Platonem, ed. Paul Dutton, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1991, c. 8 , 127f., p. 222.
Recent conveyors of this tradition include I. M. Crombie. Crombie regards the receptacle as a 
constituent of things and an active player in the cosmos, Plato's Doctrines, London: Routledge, 
1963, pp. 219 f. He argues that the designation space should be taken metaphorically because 
the receptacle can move, cf. p. 223. But for Plato takes the notion of the receptacle moving is in 
philosophical terms a "Cambridge change." The receptacle m oves as phenomena enter and 
leave it. It remains without change.
Plato identifies the receptacle as space. It is the necessary location for m ovem ent and change, 
but it remains unaffected by change. Neither does it enter into composition as Aristotle's matter 
does. Plato has no doctrine of act-potency composition, central to Aristotelian doctrine of matter 
(see below).
Cornford agrees that the receptacle is that in which change occurs, not that from which change 
occurs,P lato's Cosmology, London: Paul, Trench,Trubner, 1937, p. 181.
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accepted that Plato constructed bodies and their properties solely from 
geometrical figures.5 As if moved by pity, they have contributed other entities 
to Plato's rather empty ontological plate. Some have added simple bodies 
from w hich to construct the elements. Others have looked to recurrent 
properties distinct from  the triangles which come and go in unexplained 
relationship to the geometrical figures.6
5Morrow accepts the picture and calls the triangles elements, but offers no explanation 
of the ontological status of the triangles. "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus," S tud ies  
in Plato's M etaphysics, edited by Reginald E. Allen, London, Routledge & Kegan, 1965, pp. 
421-437, p. 427 He takes the powers of the elements as primitive conditions faced by the demiurge, 
which the demiurge arranged, but in no way created, p. 431.
‘There is no need to multiply entities, not only beyond need, but also beyond the strict 
divisions of the text. Plato outlines three genera, forms, imitations, and space. Cherniss adds a 
fourth, the determinate characteristics of phenomena that enter and leave the receptacle. They 
are distinct from the forms, which are "emphatically said not to enter anything," and the 
phenomena that are "the apparent alterations of the receptacle as a result of their continual 
entrance into it and exit from it," "A Much Misread Passage of the 'Timaeus,'" American Journal 
o f Philology 75, 1954, pp. 113-130, see p. 128 f. Republished in Harold Cherniss, Selected  
Papers, ed. Leonardo Taran, Leiden: Brill, 1977, pp. 346-363.
Allan Silverman, "Timaean Particulars," The Classical Q uarterly  n. s. 42, 1992, pp. 87-113, 
tried to balance a desire to keep the primitives of Plato's ontology to three w ith a desire to 
construct elements so as not to be stoicheia  or syllables, Silverman develops a rather elaborate 
ontology: 'T he reflections or recurrent attributes are consequences of the mere existence of the 
receptacle and the Forms. The geometrical configurations provide dimensional cross sections of 
tim e and space and thereby provide places for the recurrent attributes to enter and exit the 
receptacle," p. 94. H is elem ents are composites of properties and regions of the receptacle that 
are "construct(s) of the receptacle and a geometrical configuration" p. 95.
Silverman acknow ledges that he has no explanation for the coincidence of properties and 
particular geometrical configurations: "He [Plato] is saddled with the inexplicable coincidence 
of geometrical bodies occupying space and properties entering and exiting the place defined by 
those bodies." p. 112. At that point Silverman abandons his first concern, by positing an infinite 
number of primitive phenomenal coincidences. He also neglects Plato's statements that properties 
follow the geometrical constructions of the elements, see below.
The relation between geometrical structures and properties is not coincidental or inexplicable, 
see below.
The composite nature of the elements he uses to justify his construction is a non-problem. Plato 
says elements are constructed from triangles, which are themselves not simples. Therefore, the 
elements are not syllables.
Gill used the same concern for the non-simplicity of the elements to justify importing simple 
bodies into Plato's ontology. These simple bodies are the components of the elements: "A simple 
—  whatever it turns out to be — will be called by its name a " t o  t o i o u t o v . "  It is like a form 
because it shares the same nature but is distinct from it because it constantly moves around
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None of these systems fits Plato's explicit threefold ontology: forms, 
phenomena, and receptacle. Neither do they take into account Plato's analysis 
of the properties of the elements in terms of the shapes and sizes of their 
geometrical structures. By so doing they miss Plato's mathematical idealism. 
I use the term idealism in the sense that physical bodies are derived from 
non-physical principles, in Plato's case geometrical.
elem ents and properties as constructed from triangles alone
In the Timaeus,  Plato divides everything into three genera: the forms; 
the phenomena; and the receptacle:
It m ust be adm itted  that one has the form  of sameness, 
ungenerated, and indestructible, receiving nothing else from 
elsewhere into itself, neither going into another, it is unseen and 
otherwise unsensed. It is this which intellection is allotted to 
examine. A second [genus] is homonymous and similar to the 
first, sensible, generated, tossed constantly, arising in a place (to7tco) 
and then destroyed from there, grasped by opinion together with 
sense. A third genus is that of space (xwpaj) which never receives 
corruption, but provides a seat for all that has generation. It is 
itself reached by a certain bastard reason without sensation, hardly 
reliable, to which we look in a dream and say that it is necessary 
for every being to be in a place and to occupy space, and that 
there is nothing which is neither in earth nor in heaven. (52 A 
1-B 5; cf. 52 D 3; 50 D l)7
through space," "Matter and Flux in Plato's Timaeus," Phronesis 32,1987, pp. 34-53, see p. 51. 
To escape a non-problem, Gill imports an entity that contradicts Plato's ow n classification. If it 
is a body in space it is in the realm of becoming. It can neither be simple nor unchanging like a 
form.
7opoA.oyr|x£ov ev pev e iv a i xb icaxa. xaiixa eibos £xov> dy£vvt|xov icai avcoAeGpov, 
oiixe els econo elabexopevov aAAo aAAoGev ouxe aiixo els aAAo 7roi Iov, aopaxov be icai a  A. A. cos 
avala0r|xov, xouxo o bf] vor|cris eiArixev e7naK07ceiv xo be opcovopov opoiov xe exelvcp Seuxepov, 
aiCT0T)xov, yevvrixbv, 7re<|>opT|pevov d e l, yiyvbpevov xe ev x iv i xo7rcp icai 7raA.1v eiceTGev 
a7roAA.upevov, 5d^r| pex’ ala0i]aecos 7repiAT|7rxdv xplxov bfc an  yevos ov xo xfjs X“ Pa S a e l, 
<J>0opav o\> TipoaSexbpevov, ebpav 5e Tiapexov baa exei yeveaiv Ttaaiv, auxo be pex' avaia9r|a las  
arc xov Aoyiapw xivi vo0co, poyis m axov, xrpos o 5f) x a i 6veipo7roA.oupev pAe7covxes teal bcipev 
avayK aiov e iv a i 7rou xo ov a7rav ev xivi xotko Kai icaxexov x“ pciv xiva, xo be pf|x' ev yfj pf|xe 
7tou icax’ oupavbv oubev eivai. ed. John Burnet, Platoni Opera, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902.
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The forms are true beings. They remain forever and unchangeably what they 
are. Phenomena come and go as mere shadows of the forms. They are the 
realm  of becoming which Plato refers to sim ply as generation (yeveais). 
Generation is the effect of the forms in the receptacle (50 C 7). The receptacle 
does not change itself, neither does it have its ow n character. It only appears 
to become that which enters into it:
It always receives all things, but it does not ever in any way take 
a form similar to any of the things which enter into it. It remains 
as a tablet for every nature. Moved and shaped by the things 
w hich enter it, it appears to be changed by them  at different 
times—those which enter and leave are always imitations of the 
true beings, im pressed by them in a way that is both am azing 
and difficult to understand. (50 B 8-C 6)8
Plato identifies the third genus as space (52 D 3). The receptacle is not a 
material substrate which enters into composition with the phenomena. It is 
merely a stage for all the world. Motion "appears" in the receptacle as 
phenomena come and go. The receptacle itself remains unchanged. It does 
not enter into composition with the phenomena which appear in it. Plato 
lacks a doctrine of act-potency such as Aristotle has to explain such composition.
Plato expressly denies that the elements are constructed from the 
receptacle:9
88€xeTai te yap a d  ta  navta, m i  pop<>f|v ouSepiav note oi>8evi tcov eiatovtcov 
opoiav eiA.r|()»ev ouSapfj ouSapoos- dKpayeiov yap Oocrei navti xeita i, Kivoiipevov xe m i  
Sia<TXT)pati£6pevov uno tcov eiaiovtcov, <t>aivetai Se 8i’ diceiva dAAote aA.A.oiov ta  Se eicnovta 
Kai e^iovta tcov ovtcov aei piptjpata, tvncoGevta an’ autcov tponov tiva. Suo^paatov Kai 
Gaopacjtov.
9so Cornford, loc. cit.
Richard Mohr, "Image, Flux, and Space in Plato's Tim aeus," P hoenix  34, 1980, pp. 138-152, 
contrasts the Platonic receptacle with Aristotelian matter in five ways:
1) The receptacle is not a material cause out of which objects are made, pp. 147 f.
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Therefore, the m other and receptacle of the visible becoming 
and of everything sensible, let us not call neither earth nor air 
nor fire nor water, neither is it w hat arises of these [elements] 
neither is it that from which these [elements] arise. (51 A 4-6)10
Plato's first bodies are the Empedoclean elements: fire, air, earth, and 
water. As "pure, first bodies" (dKpaxa Kai 7rpcoxa CTtopaxa, 57 C 7), they 
cannot be said to be mixed or constructed from other bodies. They serve as
the ingredients for the construction of the body of the cosmos (32 C 5). Even
though there are no bodies below them and those above them are constructed 
from them, Plato refuses to grant them the status of true elements, or even 
syllables, as he puns the literal sense of stoixeia: letter (48 B 8 f.). That is to say 
they are neither simples nor are they constructed from simples. (Still, for 
ease of reference I will use the common term elements. Plato terms them the 
four kinds [yevr]]). Even though they are constructs, they are the first bodies, 
because they are constructed from non-bodies. They are formed from four 
different solid figures which are themselves formed from triangles:
First, it is at least clear to everyone that fire, earth, water, and air 
are bodies. Every form of body has depth. Further, it is always 
necessary that depth includes the nature of the plane. The flat 
base of the plane is composed of triangles. (53 C 4-8)11
2) The receptacle is not a principle of individuation, pp. 148 ff.
3) The receptacle is not a subject of predication, pp. 150 f.
4) The receptacle is not a substrate for change, p. 151.
5) The receptacle is not a principle of existence, p. 151.
105 io  Sfi t f i v  x o b  y e y o v o x o s  o p a x o u  K a i m iv x co s a icr0T|xoO p r )x e p a  K a i im o S o x r iv  p ijx e  
y fjv  irp xe  d e p a  in jx e  7r0 p p ^ x e  uScop A iycopev , piyxe o a a  e x  xouxcov pi^xe dE, wv x a u x a  y e y o v e v
n n p c j x o v  p e v  5 f j  7 r0 p  K a i  y f j  K a i  \> 5cop  K a i  a f | p  o x i  a c o p a x a  io x i ,  S f jA o v  t t o u  K a i  
T t a v x i -  x o  5 e  x o v  a c o p a x o s  e i 5 o ?  7 r a v  K a i  p d G o s  e x e i .  x o  5 e  p d G o s  a o  naaa  a v a y K T )  x f ) v  
€ 7 U 7 re 5 o v  7 rep ie iA .T |< |> ev a i ( jn i c r iv  f]  5 e  o p G fj x f j s  £ 7 U 7 re 5 o o  p a a e c o s  £ k  x p i y u v c o v  a u v e a x r |K e v .
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The triangles are themselves constructed from angles (57 D 1) and presumably 
from lines. The triangles move and change in the realm  of becoming and 
must therefore be imitations of mathematical forms. Thus, the elements are 
constructed from mathematical phenomena which are themselves constructed.
In the analysis of bodily properties which follows, Plato traces all the 
properties of the first bodies to their shapes, sizes, and m utual interactions. 
He analyzes weight, mobility, hardness, wetness, and heat all in terms of the 
relative sizes and the shapes of the elemental bodies. There are no bodies nor 
bodily p roperties w hich Plato does not trace back to his geometrical 
constructions.12
Fire is the smallest and sharpest body, which explains its movements:
The sharpest form belongs again to fire, the second most to air, 
and the third most to water. Since of these all, the one having 
the fewest bases m ust be the most mobile, because it is most 
incisive, and sharpest of all in everyway. Further it is the lightest, 
because it is constructed from the smallest parts. (56 A 5-B 2)13
Earth is the opposite. It has the largest particles and largest base making it the 
most stable and unmovable of the elements (55 D 8-E 3). The other elements 
are more mobile than earth and less mobile than fire.
Fire's mobility has consequences of its own as it helps to determine the 
heat of fire:
12The properties are not distinct from bodies, otherwise none of Plato's analysis would  
make sense, contra Silverman (see above); also contra Cornford, w ho takes "the contents of the 
figures as qualities or 'motions and powers.'" op. cit., p. 229.
13m i  t o  p e v  S ^ u x a x o v  a u  7n )p i, t o  Se S eu x ep o v  a e p i ,  t o  Se x p ix o v  u S a x i. x a u x ' o u v  of] 
T tavxa , t o  p e v  e%ov 6 A.iyicrTas pricreis eiiicivriTOTaTov avayK T | 7re0 u ic e v a i ,  xpTiTiKooxaxov xe ica i  
o ^ iix a x o v  o v  7r a v x r | Travxcov, £ x i xe dA.a0 p6 x a x o v , i E, 6 /\.iyurxcov a u v e a x o s  xdjv auxcov  pepcov
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First, knowing its division and incision which befalls our body, 
let us see by investigating here why we say fire is hot. Almost 
everyone feels it as a sharp effect. Those who remember the 
origin of its shape must consider the fineness of the sides, the 
sharpness of the angles, the smallness of the parts, and the speed 
of its travel by which it always quickly cuts that which with it 
comes in contact when it is strong and sharp. Because most of 
all that nature and not any other divides and chops up our bodies 
into small pieces. (61 D 5-62 A 5)14
By contrast, hardness results from the large and firm square base of 
earth's cubic structure (62 B 8-C 2). Wet bodies have relatively small bodies, 
which are displaced by larger bodies as they sink (62 A 6 ff).
Plato's account of weight depends upon the sizes of the elemental bodies. 
He argues that the most stable bodies seek the most stable part of the cosmos, 
the center. Their size and immobility allows them to force the smaller and 
more mobile particles to the outside. Thus, earth occupies the center of the 
cosmos and fire is displaced to the outer edge (63 D 1 ff.). Taking the center 
position is what it is to be heavy and being displaced to the outside position is 
what it is to be light.
Plato also examines the interactions and composition of the elements 
in the same terms as the shapes and sizes of the elements. It should be clear 
enough that the regular shapes are the basis of the properties of the elements. 
But what about the properties found in the pre-cosmic stew, before the demiurge 
constructed the regular geometrical forms? The traces of the elements in the 
pre-cosmos have proven intractable for exegetes. The existence cf the properties
147 rpcoT ov  |n e v  o u v  f |  7 ru p  G e p p o v  A i y o p e v ,  i S c o p e v  co5e C T K O 7ro0vT es, r p v  S i a t c p i c x i v  K a i  
x o p r i v  a i i x o u  7 te p i  t o  c r c o p a  f jp c b v  y i y v o p e v r |v  £ v v o t |0 e v T e s .  o n  p £ v  y a p  o ^ u  n  t o  7 r a 0 o s ,  7 r a v T e s  
a ^ e S o v  a i c r G a v o p e G a -  t t ] v  5 e  A.e7TTOTT|Ta tc o v  7tA .eupcdv  K a i  y c o v ic o v  d ^ u T - r iT a  tc o v  T e p o p ic o v  
o-p iK p o T T )T a  K a i  T f js  p o p & $  t o  T a x o s ,  o i s  7 td c r i  a p o S p o v  o v  K a i  T o p o v  d ^ e c o s  t o  7 c p o c jT u x 6 v  a t i  
T e p v e i ,  A .o y iC T ieo v  a v a p i p v g c j K o p e v o i s  t ^ v  t o o  o x n p a T o s  a i iT o O  y e v e a i v ,  o n  p a A ic T T a  e K e iv T | 
K a i  oi»K  <xAAt| <t>ocris S i a K p i v o u a a  f |p w v  K a T a  a p i K p a  T e T a  a c o p a T a  K e p p a T i ^ o w a .
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prior to the construction of the elements has led commentators to posit the 
independence of properties from bodies.15 If the properties can exist before 
the elements, then properties appear independent of the elemental bodies. 
Properties independent from bodies are unsatisfactory, unjustified by the text, 
and unnecessary.
I believe that the same analysis of the properties holds in the pre-cosmos 
as in the cosmos. Pre-cosmic properties of weight, heat, wetness all follow 
from the relative sizes and the shapes of the elemental traces found in the 
pre-cosmos. The properties are not any more independent than they are in 
the cosmos. In the cosmic order, the elements have regular sizes and shapes 
and thus, determinate relations one to another, allowing the construction of 
an orderly cosmos. In the pre-cosmos, the properties follow from the relative 
sizes of the bodies, even though the bodies have not yet been given regular 
sizes and shapes. Thus, no regular relations between properties or cosmic 
order is possible.
pre-cosmic choas
Plato characterizes the precosmic realm of becoming as existing without 
similar powers or without balance:
The nurse of generation was made wet and fiery and received 
the shapes of earth and air and suffered whatever consequences 
follow these, and appeared variegated to sight, and because it was 
not filled by similar or balanced powers, it was not balanced in 
any of its ways, but unevenly balanced everywhere, it was shaken 
by them and as it was moved, it shook them as well. The things 
w hich w ere m oved w ere constantly borne elsew here and 
separated, as things shaken by winnowing fans and by tools for
^Independent properties in pre-cosm os turn up in the interpretations of Cornford, 
Silverman, and Cherniss.
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the w innow ing of grain and the dense and heavy things are 
winnowed out and the thin and light things are carried to another 
place. Thus the four elements were shaken by the receiver which 
m oved like a tool for shaking. It divided the most dissim ilar 
from  each other more, while it drove the sim ilar together. 
Therefore, each had a different place, before the universe, which 
was ordered out of them, came about. The universe before this 
one contained all of these things w ithout reason or measure. 
Before the universe was begun to be ordered, fire, water, earth, 
and air, each having the vestiges of itself, and disposed in every 
possible way as is the likeness of everything when god is absent 
from it. Thus, the things which were were first shaped by forms 
and numbers. God composed them into this universe as beautiful 
and as excellent as possible from that which was not so. (52 D 
4-53 B 6)16
The powers were not regularized by regular shapes for the elements. Neither 
was an overall cosmic balance to be found. Nevertheless, there were traces of 
the elements and their properties. What precisely the traces are, Plato never 
says. But it is most consistent with the rest of the Timaeus  to read them as 
irregular bodies. The great disorder that Plato describes indicates that they 
were not just slightly deformed figures, but a great variety of dissimilar shapes 
jostling each other in the absence of any clear direction.17
16xf|v Se 5fi yevecrecos xiGfjvTjv bypaivopevr|v m i  7n>poupevr|v Kai id s  yfjs xe m i  aepos 
poppas 5exopevT|v, m i  b a a  dXXa  xouxots 7ra0T| aove7rexai 7raaxouaav, 7ravTo5a7rr}v pev iSeiv 
<t>aivea0ai, 5 ia  Se t o  pf|0’ opoicov Suvapecov pi^xe taopp67rcov ep7rip7r/\.aa0ai m f  oioSev auxfis 
icroppo7reiv, d k \ '  avcopaAcos 7rdvxr) xaAavxoupevT|v creteaGai pev bri eKeivcov ai5xf|v, Kivoupevriv 
S’ au  7rdAiv ex e iv a  creieiv xa  Se Kivoupeva aAAa aAAooe del bepeoGai Siaxpivopeva, dxT7tep 
xa l>7ro xcov jrAomvcov xe Kai bpyavcov xcov 7repi xfjv t o o  crixou m G apcnv aeiop eva m i  
aviKpcopeva xa  pev rruKva m i  (3apea aAAr], xa Se p ava  m i  mu<|>a els exepav i£ei 0epopeva 
eSpav- xoxe obxco xa  xexxapa ydvr| creibpeva bnb  xfjs Se^apevfjs, Kivoupevris aioxfis oiov  
opyavou creiapov 7rape%ovxos, xa pev avopoioxaxa 7rAeiaxov ad xa a<t>’ abxcov opi^eiv, xa Se 
opoioxaxa paA iaxa eis xauxov cruvcoGeiv, 5i6 Sf) Kai xcopav xaOxa aAAa dAAr|v ia^eiv, jrpiv 
m i  xo 7rav e£, auxcov SiaKoapTiGev yeveaGai. Kai xb pev Sf) 7ipo xouxou 7rdvxa xaux’ ei%ev 
aAoyoos m i  apexpcos- oxe 5’ d7te%eipeixo mcrpeiaGai xo 7rdv, 7t0p 7rpcoxov Kai uScop m i  yf|v 
Kai aepa, txvr| pev exovxa auxoov axxa , Ttavxaitaai ye pf]v S iaK eipeva okrirep eiKos exeiv  
<x7rav oxav d7ifj xivos Geos, ovxco 5r| xoxe 7re0UKOxa xaOxa 7rpcoxov Sieaxxipaxtcraxo eiSeai xe 
m i  apiGpoTs. xo Se fj Suvaxov cos KdAAicjxa a p ia x a  xe IE, ov% obxcos exovxcov xov Geov aioxa 
cnm axavai.
17Steven Strange, "The Double Explanation in the Tim aeus,"  Ancient Philosophy 5,
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If we take the elemental traces for bodies which have not yet been 
regularized, the analysis which Plato applied to the cosmic properties still 
holds. H eat results from the sharpness and speed of the smallest particles. 
Larger particles display the firmness and immobility of earth. The weight of 
the various bodies also follows from their relative sizes.18
But in the absence of regular cosmic and elemental structure, the traces 
of elements behave erratically. Without regular bodies, there is little regularity 
found in "sim ilar powers." Fieriness would not consist in the regular shape 
of a pyramid, but in relatively small and sharp pieces (53 A 8).
Since the cosmic sphere had not yet been constructed, there was no 
center point in which the largest bodies could congregate. As a result they 
were free to congregate anywhere, without a clearly dem arcated region as 
earth has in the present cosmos. Similarity of sizes would tend to draw  like 
to like, but w ithout regular structures the similarity of the pre-cosmic bodies 
is only partial. As a result they continue to move and shake.19
The dem iurge imposed order by limiting the number of shapes to four 
basic kinds, which allowed predictable interactions and recombinations and
determinate regions to be established. Necessity existed before and after because
1985, pp. 25-39, n. 14, argues that the pre-cosmic particles m ust have weight to make the 
winnowing basket analogy (52 E-53 A) work. To have weight, he argues, they must "resemble 
fairly closely the regular geometric shapes" the demiurge gives them, p. 33. I find no basis for 
this. W eight fo llow s from the relative sizes of the particles and the tendency for like to go to
like. There is no need for much regularity in Plato's account of weight.
18Plato does not analyze the particles in this way in the pre-cosmos, but it is more 
consistent to maintain the same analysis of the properties in the pre-cosmos and cosmos than to 
import a new set of independent properties into the ontology.
19According to Cherniss, pre-cosmic motions are the comings and goings of imitations in 
the receptacle, 'T he Sources of Evil in Plato," The Proceedings o f the American Philosophical 
Socie ty  98,1954, pp. 23-30, p. 25.
Glen Morrow says that the pre-cosmic motions should be attributed to a soul, which the demiurge 
trains into the cosm ic order. "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's 'Timaeus,'" in R. E. Allen, 
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1965.
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the demiurge is working with a plurality of bodies in space.20 Of necessity 
some are smaller, sharper, and faster than others.
After the cosmic ordering, that necessary interaction finds reasonable 
limits and governance:
Because he wished everything to be good and nothing to be bad, 
to the extent possible, god took the whole which was visible but 
which was not quiet but moved discordantly and without order, 
and led it to order from disorder, judging order to be better than 
disorder in every way. (30 A 2-6)21
There was a limit to his work. The material realm was governed by necessity 
as well as by reason. Necessity was imposed upon it by the limitations of the 
spatio-temporal world of change, and the world was subject to change, struggle, 
and ultimately corruption. The cosmos itself and the celestial bodies were 
eternal because they were the direct work of the demiurge (41 A 7 f., cf. 43 A 
2), but on the level of the microcosm, the struggles in the m aterial realm 
would eventually lead to the corruption of each body, including the human 
body.
The hum an has two natures (42 A 1 f.): a soul made by the demiurge 
and descended from the stars; a body made by the created gods. Human 
suffering and death result from the soul being placed into a body (42, 44, 81 C).
[The gods] taking the deathless principle of the mortal animal, 
imitating their own demiurge, they borrowed from the cosmos 
parts of fire and earth, water and air, which would be repaid.
They joined them together not with the unlooseable bonds by
“ on necessity, see Strange, Mohr, and Silverman, art. cit.
210 o u A .T |9 e i.s  y a p  o  0 tbs  a y a G a  p e v  T r a v t a ,  p A a u p o v  5 e  p r |5 e v  e i v a i  l c a i a  S i i v a p i v ,  o i 'n c o  
8 f |  7 r a v  o a o v  r j v  b p a t o v  m x p a A a p c b v  o i> x  T i c j u x i a v  a A A a  K i v o u p e v o v  7 rA r |p p e A c b s  K a i  
a t a K T c o s ,  e i s  t d ^ i v  a u t o  r j y a y e v  4 k  x f js  a t a x i a s ,  f |Y T |c r d p e v o s  t K e i v o  t o u t o u  7 id v tc o s  d p e i v o v .
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which they themselves were held, but they fused them together 
w ith bonds invisible because of their small size. From all they 
finished each body as a unit and bound the cycles of the immortal 
soul into a body of ebb and flow. Those which were bound to a 
river neither controled nor were controlled, but are borne by 
force and bore others by force, so also the whole animal moved, 
unordered  w herever it happens to advance and unreasoned 
because it has all six motions [i.e., up and down, forw ard and 
back, right and left]. (42 E 7-43 B 2)22
The soul has its own perfect circular movement but it is buffeted by the erratic 
motions of matter. In the struggle against contrary motions, the body eventually 
gives out (81 C). Upon the corruption of the body, a soul trained by reason 
returns to the stars, while an evil soul, forgetting its own origins, descends 
further into existence as a beast (42 B).
Aristotle
A ristotle (384/3-322/1) said from the beginning that m atter was not 
knowable in itself (Metaphysics, 7.10, 1036 a 9-10). Given the disputes that 
have arisen among his 20th century interpreters, it seems Aristotle has been 
completely vindicated on this point. The medieval scholastics defined matter 
as pure potency in the category of substance23 or in  a m odern restatement,
a Kai AaPovxes aGavaxov apxf)v 6 vr|Xo\) t^cinv, pipodpevoi xov crdexepov 5t|pioupyov, 
Trupos Kai yfjs uSaxos xe Kai depot; and  xou Koapou Savei^opevoi popia « s  d7ioSo0T|crbpeva 
itdA.iv, els xaijxov xa  Aappavoptva auveKoAAcov, o\> xois dAbiois ois abxo'i cruvelxovxo Secjpols, 
aAAa Sid apiKpoxt|xa aopaxois 7ti>kvois yopdois cnmfjKovxes, ev iE, ditavxcov a 7tepya^6 pevoi 
acopa eKaaxov, xas xfjs aGavaxou \j/uxns Ttepiooous eveSouv els entppoxov acdpa Kai aTtoppuxov. 
a i S  e ls 7toxap6 v dvSeGeiaai noAuv olix’ dKpaxouv oux’ dKpaxovvxo, p la  5e edepovxo Kai 
edepov, dxrxe xo pev oAov KiveiaGai C^ov. axaKXtos pf]v 07tri xdxoi xpoievai Kai aAoycos, ta s  
IE, a.7tdCTas Kivf|CTeis exov-
“ Aquinas said that prime matter was commonly understood as potency in the category 
of substance: id communiter materia prima nominatur, quod est in genere substantiae ut potentia 
quaedam intellecta praeter omnem speciem et formam et etiam praeter privationem, quae tamen 
susceptiva et formarum et privationum, (Unica Quaestio de Spiritualibus Creaturis, 1 co.).
The Cambridge Commentary on Aristotle's P hysics  defines matter sim ply as pure potency:
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pure indeterm inacy.24 The traditional view has been challenged in the last 
half century by those who argue that there is no prim e m atter in Aristotle. 
King, Charlton, and Jones each argue that only substances are subjects 
(\)7TOKei|ieva) for change and that the four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) 
are the lowest and prim ary subjects for change.25 The revisionists have
made persuasive challenges to the philosophical plausibility of the traditional
Materia secundum  se est pura potentia, id est, neque actus, nec aliquid ex potentia et actu 
com positum . H aec assertio est tarn Peripateticae quam  Patonicae scholae com m unis, 
(Commentarii in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Cambridge, 1592 ,1, 9, 3,1).
24Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., "Matter and Predication in Aristotle," The Concept o f Matter, 
ed. Grnan McMullin, Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1963, 99-113: "Aristotle removed from it all 
determinations and so  all direct intelligibility," p. 99.
John J. FitzGerald, "'Matter' in Nature and Knowledge of Nature: Aristotle and the Aristotelian 
Tradition," T h e  Concept o f M atter, pp. 79-98: "We have seen that Aristotle distinguished  
between primary matter, the first subject of coming-to-be, unique in its sheer indetermination, 
and nature-matter (second-matter), the first subject of coming-to-be, not simply, but as this or 
that distinctive natural product (element, compound or organism)," p. 95, cf. p. 85,88.
Norbert M. Luyten, O.P., "Matter as Potency," The Concept o f Matter, pp. 122-133: "This pure 
indetermination of primary matter must be seen in its connection with determination. We might 
call it the constitutive of fundamental inadequacy of substantial determination. Expressed in a 
more concrete way: a material reality is w hat it is in such a w ay that it bears in itself the 
possibility of sim ply not being what it is," p. 128.
“ H. R. King sounded the opening salvo of the forty year war in 1956 in "Aristotle 
without prima materia," Journal o f the H istory o f Ideas 17,1956, pp. 370-89. He argued that, 
'T he notion of a characterless matter dropping one form and taking on another is a travesty of 
his doctrines of becoming,potentiality," p. 375. H e said there w as no first matter except the 
four elements. 'T hey are 'as one,' the underlying, common matter of all composite bodies. But 
specifically, this first matter is differentiated into four elements, each different in nature, but 
each sharing a contrariety in common w ith another and each capable of generation from the 
others. And it is just because these elements are 'simple,' having no com posite body of their 
own, that Aristotle can make them receptive of any and all form," p. 384 f. King does not 
explain how sim ple bodies can share properties and it looks like a contradiction in his 
interpretation.
Wm. Charlton in an appendix to his Commentary, Aristotle's Physics, Books I and II, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970, also said that the four elements were prime matter. He denied the need 
for any substrate to persist through change: "We do not say that the first thing has passed 
away into nothing, but into the second, and w e say that the second has come into being, not out 
of nothing, but out of the first. Yet we cannot say that there is something that remained throughout 
and underwent these transformations, unless w e can find som e description under which this 
thing can be identified throughout," p. 140. See also "Prime Matter: A Rejoinder," Phronesis 
28,1983, pp. 197-211, in which Charlton focuses on the readings of disputed passages.
See also B. Jones, "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter," The Philosophical Review  83,1972, pp. 
474-500, who also denies the existence of a remnant through change.
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interpretation, but their readings of the text of Aristotle have not borne up 
under criticism.26
C. J. F. Williams and D. Graham have taken a new tack. They agree 
that the traditional interpretation is the best reading of Aristotle, but they 
agree with the revisionists that the traditional doctrine of m atter is inconsistent. 
They lay the blame squarely on Aristotle, saying that Aristotle's account was 
problematic from the beginning.27
Graham 's careful studies bring forth the incoherence of the traditional 
account. Graham stated that Aristotle's account of matter is inconsistent, for 
it teaches that m atter exists as a definite substratum  for substantial change 
while also teaching that matter is indefinite. If indefinite, m atter cannot be 
understood as a substratum. Moreover, if it is indefinite, to posit its existence 
as a substratum  merely begs the question that change requires a substrate:
Likewise, if prime matter is to function as a bona fide substratum
it m ust have some features in virtue of which we can explain
26F. Solmsen in "Aristotle and Prime Matter," Journal o f the H istory o f Ideas 19,1958, 
pp. 243-52, challenges King's interpretation of the texts, but does not address King's philosophical 
challenges to the notion of prime matter.
See also A. R. Lacey, 'The Eleatics and Aristotle on Some Problems of Change," Journal of the 
History o f Ideas 26,1965, pp. 451-68.
H. M. Robinson in "Prime matter in Aristotle," Phronesis 19,1974, pp. 168-88, defends the view  
that "prime matter is nothing other than a potentiality," p. 168. He directs a defence against 
Charlton's denial of persistence of matter through substantial change based upon the texts of 
A ristotle.
*C. J. F. Williams in an appendix to Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 211-219, also rejects Charlton's interpretation. He also argues that 
what is not actual is nothing, therefore Aristotle's notion of matter as a being in potency is a 
misconception, p. 219.
Daniel Graham in 'T he Paradox of Prime Matter," Journal o f the H istory o f Philosophy 25, 
1987, pp. 475-90, says: 'T he opponents of prime matter have a legitimate basis for criticizing 
the tradition, for there is something fundamentally wrong with the doctrine. Given Aristotle's 
assumptions and commitments, the doctrine of prime matter is not only dialectically inevitable 
but also systematically incoherent," p. 476. See also Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987, particularly chapter 8 , 'The Paradoxes of Substance," pp. 207-232.
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the change. It m ust be something. If prim e m atter has no 
characteristics besides the powers—which are not essential to it, 
since it need not have any given pair of them—it is essentially 
indeterm inate.
For the Eleatic then, prim e m atter is a nothing, a mere f latus  
vocis invented ad hoc to save appearances. It is a something-I- 
know-not-what conjured up to beg a question. (Graham, 1987, p.
228)
In effect Graham is accusing Aristotle of playing a metaphysical shell game.
He says that there must be a substrate for change, but when you ask him to
produce that ultim ate substrate for change, he shows you an absolutely
indeterminate and unknowable substrate. The cup is empty.
Graham is right to challenge the notion of a pure potency and matter as
absolute indeterminacy. I agree with Graham that there are no such things as
pure potencies in reality, but also I do not think there are any in Aristotle.
The notion of a pure passive potency makes no sense. A passive potency
is the ability to suffer change. That ability like all others must be the ability of
a subject. In the case of a passive potency, it is the ability of a subject to suffer
change. There are no such things as pure potencies floating around
independently. They are not even imaginable, much less possible. There is
no ability to die apart from a living creature which can undergo that change.
Potencies rest in subjects and are not indefinite. They are determinate
abilities of a subject. Water can be made into definite things based upon what
it is now. I can boil it and make it air (according to the Aristotelian science)
but it has no indefinite potency to be made into anything we might imagine.
In Aristotle's science, it can never become the matter for a planet or a star.
I believe the traditional account has gotten the definition of m atter
exactly backwards. Rather than potency in the category of substance (ouaia),
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
matter is substance (xo5e xi) in potency,28 as Aristotle states in Metaphysics H 
1, Suvdpei xo5e xi. Stated this way around, Aristotle's doctrine avoids the 
inconsistencies which Graham and the revisionists have pointed out.
M atter is an composite which can be analyzed from substance. It is 
substance in potency and has to be understood in the analysis of substance. 
As Suvdpei xo5e xi, m atter does what Aristotle asks of it. It serves quite 
nicely as a substrate for substantial change.
The substantial form is the organizing principle of the substance. Matter 
is that which is organized. That which is organized can be organized otherwise, 
resulting in a substantial change. The organization has changed but that 
which is organized remains. That is the sense in which m atter is a substrate 
for substantial change. We will look first to the analysis of substance, then to 
matter as substrate, and finally to the ultimate substrate, prim e matter.
m atter in  the analysis of substance
Matter is that which is arranged and ordered by form. It is not the 
arrangement by itself, therefore it both accepts and needs arrangement. As 
such it is in potency: "I call matter that which is not substance in act, but is 
substance (xo5e xi) in potency" (Metaphysics H. 1,1042 a 27 f.).
Aristotle gives several examples of composite substances in the near 
context: a road is "wood or stone laid out in a certain way;" "a house is bricks 
or boards laid out in a certain way;" "ice is water hardened in a certain way;" 
"harmony is a certain mixture of high and low tones;" wind is "a movement 
in a quantity of air;" a calm is "an evenness of the sea" (Metaphysics H. 2,
MI use the translation "substance" for xo5e xi because in this context Aristotle is discussing 
in what sense matter can be said to be substance (oxxria). T o8 e xi is used as a designation for the 
category of substance in both the Metaphysics and in the de Anima: Met Z 4, 1030 b 11, Z 13, 
1038 b 24, A 2,1069 b 11, N  2,1089 a 11, b 32; de Anima A 1,402 a 24, A 5,410 a 14, B 4,416 b 13.
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1043 a 7-11,23-25.). Wood, stone, and bricks are obvious materials, but Aristotle 
also explains that w ater can be material for ice, tones are the material for 
harmony, air for w ind and the sea for a calm. In each example, the matter is 
that which is arranged in a certain way to produce that which is being defined.
Aristotle provides a threefold analysis of substance: (1) matter is substance 
in potency; (2) form  is substance in act; and (3) the composite of form and 
matter is substance as independent existent (Metaphysics H 1,1042 a 26-31; H 
3, 1043 a 30 f.). The composite substance is matter arranged by an actual form. 
Although the substance can be analyzed as form and matter, it would be a 
mistake to distinguish numerically form and m atter. They are one: "The 
final m atter and the form are one, one in potential and the other in act" 
(Metaphysics H 6,1045 b 18 f., cf de Generatione et Corruptione 320 b 14).
They are distinguished as act and potency, not as two independently 
existing things. There is only one independently existing thing: the composite. 
Aristotle explains that they are one in number but two in account (Physics A  
7,190 b 20 ff.).29 They are two in account because the being of the form is not 
the being of the matter. I take it that by this he means that the being of the 
matter can persist through a substantial change, which is the end of the being 
of that particular substantial form.
Even though their beings differ, neither form nor m atter can exist 
independently. Composite form will always be in matter, and matter will 
always exist in composition with one form or another.
^W illiam s, art. cit., p. 217 f. tries to make the separability of form and matter into 
Frege's sense/reference distinction. But Aristotle's distinction is based not in a referential, but 
an ontological difference. Although he says that form and matter are different in account 
(Xoyco), he bases the difference in account on the difference of being between the form and matter.
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matter as substrate
M atter serves as the substrate for substantial change, but matter is never 
an independent substrate. Even as substrate, m atter is in composition with 
form. A substrate is that which persists (1) through a change from one opposite 
to another or (2) from the lack to the presence of a feature or (3) from a 
presence to a lack. Aristotle developed the notion of a substrate by observation 
of accidental change. White does not simply become black. A white surface 
becomes a black surface. There is a surface which persists through the change. 
In accidental change, the substance is the obvious substrate. But what happens 
when the substance changes? Aristotle refuses to accept that it arises from 
nothing and vanishes into nothing. It m ust arise from  something. For 
Aristotle this means both that something was there which has now become a 
new substance and that something of the old substance persists in the new 
substance.30
Aristotle develops the notion of substrate for change in the first book of 
the Physics. He explicitly states his use of analogy in applying the notion of 
substrate to substantial change:
The underlying nature is understood by analogy. As bronze is to 
a statue or wood to a bed or matter which is formless is to anything 
else which has form (before it receives form), so the underlying 
nature is to substance and to the particular and to being. (Physics 
A 7,191 a 8-12)31
“ Charlton tries to draw a firm distinction between the upokeimenon and the upomenon. 
H e takes the upokeim enon as the substance from which change arises exclusively, and the 
upomenon as that which persists through change, Charlton, 1970, p. 131 f. Aristotle however 
does not observe a strict distinction in his use of the term upokeimenon.
31cos yap 7rpos avSp iavxa xaAicbs f| 7rpos kAivt|v ^ijAov fj 7rpos xwv aAAcov xi xwv 
e%ovxcov popOi'iv [f] uAt| icai.] xo apop^ov t 7tpiv Aapeiv xfiv pop<t>Tiv, ouxcos auxT] 7tpos 
oucriav e%ei icai xo xo8 e xi icai xo ov. ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.
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In accidental change, the subject for change is clearly composed between 
substance and accidental feature which changes. Aristotle uses the term 
wroKeipevov (substrate) to refer to the composite of substance and accident:
It is necessary that something always is a substrate, that which 
becomes and even if this is one in number, formally (eiSei) it is 
not one (I say that "formally" and "in account" (Aoyco) are the 
same). For the being of the human and the being of uneducated 
are not the same, and [after the change] one remains and the 
other does not. (Physics A 7190 a 14r-18)32
Even though the person and his educational status are numerically identical 
in the substantial unity of the person, they are not the same formally. The 
being of each is distinct. To be hum an is not to be educated or uneducated 
and, therefore, the educational status of a person can change, while remaining 
human. Since their being differs, Aristotle can distinguish between the 
substance which remains (to wropevov) and the accidental form which does 
not. Together in composition they are the subject of change, the U7roKei|ievov. 
The same distinction applies analogously to substantial change:
Everything comes to be from a substrate and from form (|i6p<t>T|).
For the educated person is somehow composed of the person 
and being educated. For you will analyze the whole into accounts 
of each. It is clear that when things become, they are composed 
of these. There is a substrate which is one in number and formally 
two (first there is the person or the gold or in general, the 
numerically distinct matter. For it is more particular and it is 
not accidental that that which becomes becomes from it. The 
privation or the opposite form is accidental). (Physics A 7 190 b 
19-27)33
^oxi 5ei xi d el U7roiceicx0ai t o  yiyvopevov, icai t o u t o  ei icai apiGpcI) eaxiv  ev, a \X  
eiSei ye o\)% £v' t o  yap ei8ei Adyca icai Aoyco Tauxov oii yap xaoxov t o  dvGpconcp icai t o  
apoucrco t iv a i. icai t o  pev wropevei, x6 S ox>x wropever
o x i  y i y v e x a i  7r a v  eic xe t o o  w r o ic e ip e v o u  ica i xfjs pop^'ng1 a o y ic e ix a i  y a p  o  poucnicot;
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Here Aristotle draws an analogy, made obscure because he mixes the analogues 
together. The form which changes is either a privation or an opposite form. 
"Opposite form" should be understood as a term only in the accidental change 
analogue. Aristotle makes it clear a little later that the com ponent with 
matter in the case of substantial change is the privation of the new substantial 
form (191 a 14). When Aristotle says the subject is composed of matter and 
privation, p rivation  must be understood not absolutely but in relation to the 
new substantial form. The subject for change is composed of matter and the 
privation of the new substantial form. Whatever the m atter is beforehand, it 
cannot be the same substance which it is to become without contradicting the 
genesis of a new substance. At the same time the privation cannot be absolute, 
because there is no matter without some form. The plant is generated from a 
non-plant, namely a seed, not from something absolutely formless.
Aristotle uses the term i)7roice'i|Lievov both for the whole substance out 
of which the new substance is made and for the material component alone 
which persists through change (e.g., Physics A 7,190 b 2 & 14).34 For clarity I 
will refer to the composite \)7roice'ipevov as "subject" and refer to the material 
component as "substrate."
Before and after substantial change, matter is the Suvapei xo5e n .  It is 
that which is potentially both substance and privation. It can become a new
substance and it can subsequently lose its new substantial form.
avBpcoTtos avGpomou m i  poucmcoO zpdnov xiva- SiaAiicreis yap [xoi>s Amyous] els xous 
A.6 yoDS xous diceivcov. SfjAov oov ojs ylyvoix' dv xa Yiyvopeva die xouxwv. eaxi 5e xo pev 
wroiceipevov apiGpco pev ev, eiSei 8 e Siio (o pev yap  dvGpcoiros m i  o xpuuos m i  oAco? fi uAr| 
dpiGpiynY Y®P t l  pdAAov, icai oi> m x a  auppepr|ic6 s aiixou YiYvet a i to  Yiyvopevov- t] 
5e (JxepT|cris m i  f] dvavxlcoais croppeprims)-
34Alan Code, 'T he Persistence of Aristotelian Matter," Philosophical S tud ies  29,1976, 
pp. 357-67, distinguishes "the primary substratum of the change" (matter) from "the substratum 
of the change" (lack and matter), p. 364.
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Aristotle states in quite general terms that all change is from a being in 
potency. He includes substantial, quantitative, qualitative, and locomotive 
changes in the dom ain of his principle:
Since being is double, everything changes from being in potency 
to being in act, as from w hite in  potency to w hite in act.
(Metaphysics A 2,1069 b 15 ff)35
White doesn't come from just anything, but only from that which is potentially 
white. In Aristotle's analysis, it comes only from its opposites or from something 
in the middle (1069 b 3 f.). In this case opposite should be taken quite broadly, 
in the sense of opposites as those "differences of a genus which cannot exist in 
the same subject together" (Metaphysics A 10,1018,26 f.) and not in the more 
narrow sense as the greatest differences of a genus (27 f.). Aristotle doesn't 
mean that black only comes from white and vice versa, bu t that white can 
come from its direct opposite (black), from alternative colors (reds and blues), 
or even from the absence of color (white smoke in clear air). In the last case, 
colored is the opposite of colorless. In short, white must come form something 
that is not white, but of the same genus as white. It m ust be from some 
surface, colored or colorless. It does not come from sound or from another 
genus (Metaphysics A 2,1069 b 5).
Aristotle argues that since change is from opposites, there must be a
i)7ro K e i|iev o v  for the opposites. Opposites cannot produce each other because 
they are not potentially each other. White cannot be black and black cannot 
be white, but there can be a surface which can be white or black. The surface is
i 8e 5ixxov xo ov, pexafktAA.ei 7rav die xoO Suvdpei ovxoj eis xo evepyeia ov (oTiov
ck /Veutcou Suvapti t is  xo evepyda A.t\>KOV . . .). ed. W. Jaeger, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957,
p. 244.
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the i)7roKei|ievov for the two opposites in a change. M atter as substance in 
potency m ight or might not be the new substance. It can be the substance if so 
informed. It can also be w ithout the new information i.e., privation of the 
new substance which allows it to be the subject of the generation for the new 
substance and the subject of its eventual decay (Metaphysics H 11042 b 2).
prime matter
As Suvdpei xo5e xi, m atter is determined by the substance to which it is 
in potency. The analysis of a substance can be repeated through the various 
things out of which a substance is made:
Earth is not yet a statue in potency, but only after it changes, will 
it be bronze. It seems that we say it is not "this" bu t "of that 
stuff," as a boat is not wood but wooden, neither is wood earth 
but earthen. Again, by the same token, earth is not another 
thing but "of that stuff." Always the thing in potency is that 
which is just posterior, as the boat is not earthen, nor earth, but 
wooden. This is the boat in potency and the matter of the boat, 
both in general and this particular wood of this particular thing.
If there is something first, of which is no longer said as the "of 
that stuff," this is prime matter. (Metaphysics 0  7,1049 a 17-25)36
The boat can be analyzed first into wood as its m aterial component. The 
material component itself can be analyzed into its material component: earth. 
The process of analysis is repeatable because we are dealing with material 
which persists through substantial changes. As such it can be understood as if 
it were an independent substance, until one reaches the final step.
“ dxTTtep f] yfj oimco a v S p ia s  S u vap ei (peTapaA.o8cra yap  e o r a i  eoiice 8e o
A.eyopev e iv a i  oi3 x65e aAA’ d iceivivov — o iov  t o  k iP c o t io v  oii E,vA.ov aAAa ^uA.ivov, ouSe t o  
■^uA.ov yfj aAAa ytj'ivov, 7raA.1v -q yf| e i o u tc o s  pq aA.A.0  aA.A.a e ice m v o v  —  d e l eiceivo Suvapei 
anhas  t o  utJTepov d cm v. o iov  t o  k i P c o t i o v  o ij  yq'ivov ouSe yfj aAAa %dA.ivov t o o t o  yap  
8u vdp ei k i P c o t i o v  icai ■uA.-q Kipcouou aoTT|, 6,7rA.cos pev t o O  ourA-ws t o u S i  Se t o 8 i  t o  E,8A.ov. ei Se 
t i  ecTTi 7rpcoTov o  pt|KeTi tc a f  aA.A.0  A.eyerai diceivivov, t o u t o  7rpcoTTi uAri’ e d .  Jaeger, p .  186.
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At the final step one asks w hat the elements are m ade of and the 
answer is a very indefinite "of that stuff." When one can no longer analyze 
the material further, then one has reached prime matter. For Aristotle, that 
occurs when one reaches the level of the elements. All bodily differences can 
be traced to the elements, because they are the most basic bodies. Once you 
have reached them, there can be no further analysis to other independent 
materials. Because the elements can change into each other, they have a 
common material which is water in potency and air in potency, etc.
Prime matter is simply the elements in potency, nothing more, nothing 
less. The elements in potency are not pure potency. They are in potency to 
each other. They are not absolute indeterminacy; they have determinate 
potencies. They can be made into each other but not just into anything else in 
the hierarchy of bodies. Earth must first be made into bronze or another 
suitable material before it can be made into a statue (Metaphysics 0  7,1049 a 
17). The potency of the elements is further lim ited in that they cannot be 
made into the celestial bodies.
Prime matter is not extension.37 Matter is the elements in potency, not
^Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space, and M otion : Theories in antiquity and their sequel, 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988, has given a very detailed argument for matter as 
indefinite extension in antiquity. Sorabji has found in Simplicius an interpretation of matter as 
indefinite extension, which he sees as more advantageous than the traditional view of prime 
matter as an ultimate indefinite subject. Sorabji does not feel that Aristotle went as far as to 
teach matter as indefinite extension, because he never makes the claim explicit. Sorabji’s main 
objection to traditional prime matter is that it leaves us w ith an ultim ate subject that is a 
"certain I know not what," to borrow Locke's phrase, (pp. 3-5) In Sorabji's interpretation 
Simplicius invites us to think of indefinite extension, "What is left in our thoughts is the extension 
of the table but with its particular feet and inches ignored." (p. 7) Sorabji argues that matter 
understood as indefinite extension has the advantage over traditional matter of being "perfectly 
familiar." (p. 8 ) But indefinite matter is no more familiar in the world than pure potency. I can 
think of the extension of the sofa without attending to its exact measurements, but this indefinite 
extension exists only in m y thoughts. In the world the sofa exists with its own very definite 
extension.
Several other scholars have made similar claims about indefinite extension in recent years but 
applied them to Aristotelian matter:
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extension. In recent years extension has been taken up  as an alternative 
definition to m atter as pure potency. But it is not consistent with the text, in 
which Aristotle denies that matter is body or space:
They err who make a single matter besides the ones mentioned, 
which is both bodily and independent. For it is impossible for 
this body to be sensible contrariety, (de Generatione et Corruptione 
B 1, 329 a 8-13)38
Neither is matter a plane:
It is impossible for the nurse and prime matter to be geometrical 
planes. We say that there is some matter of sensible bodies, but 
it is not independent, but always exists with contrariety, from 
which the elements come about, (de Generatione et Corruptione 
B 1,329 a 23 ff.)39
J. W. D ye goes as far as to call matter body in "Aristotle's Matter as a Sensible Principle," 
International Studies in Philosophy 10,1978, pp. 59-84. "The form of these elementary substances 
consists in irreducible tactile qualities, attached to an existing body; so if the form be abstracted, 
just body remains —  pure space-filling extension," p. 70. But Aristotle specifically denies that 
prime matter is body, (de Generatione et Corruptione B 1, 329 a 8-13, see below). It would mean 
that transformation between the elements w as not a substantial change.
S. Cohen cites extension as one of several essential determ inations o f  matter. Matter is 
"essentially spatially extended and capable of motion and rest, for it w ill never be asked to 
become som ething that is not spatially extended or that is not capable either of moving or of 
being at rest," in "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Material Substrate," The Philosophical Review  
93,1994, pp. 171-94, see pp. 179 f. But just because matter must be possibly extended, does not 
mean that it must itself be extended. Prime matter is the four elem ents in potency, each of 
which must be extended. Matter is a body in potency, not body.
R. Sokolowski in "Matter, Elements, and Substance in Aristotle," Journal o f the History of 
P h ilo so p h y  8,1970, pp. 263-88, maintains that: "the matter left over is som ething bounded by 
determinate dimensions. In itself it does not have any specific dim ensions, but it is capable of 
receiving them, i.e., capable of being marked off into determinate sizes." p. 277. His view of 
matter as an indeterminate "fill" comes closest to Sorabji's interpretation o f Simplicius.
38dAA' oi pev iroioovxes piav \Ar|v 7rapa xa eipT)peva, xauxr)v 5e awpaxiicriv icai 
X,(opiaxf|v, dpapxavoixjiv- aSuvaxov yap aveu dvavxicoaecos elvai xo acopa xouxo ai<j0r|xf|$' 
ed. Charles Mugler, Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966, p. 46.
^dSiivaxov 5e xf)v xi0qvr|v m i xfjv iAt|v xtiv 7rpc6xr|v xa e7U7re5a eivai. fipeis 5e 
<t>apev pev elvai xiva iAr|v xoov acopaxcov xcov aia0T|x&jv, aXXa xauxqv ou xwpiaxqv a \K  del 
pex’ dvavxidxrecos, ££, fjs yivexai xa mXoupeva axoixeia. ed. Mugler, p. 46.
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Since it is not body or space, it has been argued that m atter is indefinite 
extension.40 That so lu tion  seem s w orse than  the p roblem  of pure 
indeterminacy. Indefinite extension has the same problems of indeterminacy 
which afflict pure potency, with the added bonus of paradoxical relation of 
extension and indeterminacy.
If prim e matter is taken as the elements in potency, it is also body in 
potency (5uvdpei owpa, de Generatione et Corruptione B 1 329 a 33), as the 
elements are the first bodies. All bodily forms including extension will follow 
the potency to the first bodies. All bodily differences reduce to the four opposites 
(de Generatione et Corruptione B 2, 330 a 24 f.) and m atter is the \)7r o K e i | i e v o v  
for the four opposites (de Generatione et Corruptione B 1,329 a 30 f.). Extension 
must be included as a bodily difference. As a quantity it will follow the 
substantial forms of the elements:
I call matter that which by itself is neither said to be substance, 
nor quantity nor any of the other categories by which being is 
divided. There is something of which each of these is predicated, 
whose being is distinct from each of the categories. For the other 
categories are predicated of substance, and substance of matter, so 
that as the final thing it is neither substance nor quantity nor 
anything else. (Metaphysics Z 3, 1029 a 20-25)41
Extension follows the substantial form of the elements, it does not precede 
them. As Aristotle observed, a change in extension results from the substantial 
change of water into air. A container of water will burst when boiled due to
40Sokolowski, loc. cit., argues for matter as indefinite extension. Although Sorabji finds 
matter as indefinite extension in Simlicius, he does not believe that Aristotle drew the same 
conclusion, op. cit., p. 1 2 .
41Aeyco S’ \5A.t|v fj m 0’ auxr|v p-qxe xi p^xe 7roaov ptjxe aAAo pr|8ev Aeyexai ols 
wpicrxai xo ov. ecrxi yap xi ica0’ ox> Kaxriypeixai xobxcov etcaaxov, <a xo elvai exepov icai xwv 
icaxTiyopicov tKdaxri (xa pev yap aAAa xfjs ouoaas xaxriyopeixai, auxr| Se xfjg uAtis), ooaxe xo 
eo%axov ica0’ auxo oxixe xi ouxe t t o c t o v  otixe aXXo oiiSev eaxiv.
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the expansion of the air which follows substantial change (de Caelo 3.7).
Bodily qualities belong to the substance. Prime m atter cannot have any 
bodily differences of its own, including extension. If matter were a body, then 
two bodies, m atter and element, w ould occupy the same space. If prime 
matter were a body, then it would be in space. Aristotle expressly states that 
any thing which is in space, is one of the elements (de Caelo 3.6).
Finally, extension does a poor job of serving as the subject for change, 
because extension will change as a consequence of substantial change.42 The 
larger extension of boiled w ater follows upon the substantial change into air 
and cannot be its subject, because it does not persist through change.
In the end the view of prim e m atter as extension is undertaken to 
rescue matter from the shadows of pure potency. I think this is an unnecessary 
step, given that prim e m atter can be understood as the elements in potency. 
Were Aristotle asked to show what he meant by prime matter, he would only 
need produce a pot of water. There is nothing more to understanding prime 
matter than realizing that the water can be made to boil and change into air.
As with other substances Aristotle analyzed, the elements are composed 
of form and matter. If they were not, they would have no potency for change. 
Unlike the other substances, there is no perceptible subject for change. Wood 
is perceptibly m ade of earth, but there is nothing perceptible below the level 
of the elements and their m atter is imperceptible as Aristotle acknowledged 
(de Generatione et Corruptione B 5). Nevertheless that there is such a thing 
as water in potency is as obvious as the rain which falls on your head. Rain 
w ater comes from air which is water in potency. Prime m atter is no more
“ Sorabji considers this objection, op. cit., p. 13.
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mysterious than the ability of air and the other elements to change into each 
other.
Stoics, M iddle-Platonists and Neopythagoreans
In the centuries that followed, Aristotle's doctrine of m atter had a 
profound impact upon both the followers of Plato and upon the Stoa. So 
m uch so that, even am ong Platonists, Plato's own doctrine was radically 
modified in an Aristotelian direction. The impact is evident in the universal 
acceptance of the term "matter." Of course, the notion went through change 
in its new habitats, but something of the Aristotelian substance in potency 
remained, along with the analysis of change to a basic substrate. Nevertheless, 
there was a group that preserved the Platonist mathematical idealism: the 
Neopythagoreans.
Stoa
The Stoa's sim ultaneous reliance on and modification of Aristotle's 
cosmology has been presented in careful philosophical and textual detail by 
Hahm. H ahm  argues that the Stoa depended on Aristotelian argumentation 
and notions, but differed from Aristotle inasm uch as they sought a more 
general consensus of philosophical views. They introduced a unified theory 
of nature based on biological models whereas Aristotle had distinguished 
sciences and methods.43 There is no need for us to go over in detail the same 
ground which has been so well covered by Hahm, although some of high 
points of the Stoic doctrines of matter and the cosmos will serve to illustrate
43David Hahm, The Origins o f Stoic Cosmology, Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1977. For example on the Stoic archai, Hahm argues that the Stoics took the venerable 
notion of the cosmos as a living being, turned to Aristotle's biology for guidance and adapted his 
notion of an active and passive principle to the tw o principles of the cosmos, p. 47.
54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
their key role in Greek natural thought.
Although the influence of Aristotle's theory of m atter is apparent in 
the Stoic version, there are significant differences. The Stoics agree that matter 
is w ithout its own quality and passive. Rather than Aristotle's substance in 
potency, Stoic matter was substance:
It appears to them that there are two principles of all things, the
active and the passive. The passive is qualitiless substance, matter.
The active is reason in matter, god. (Diogenes Laertius, 7.134; 44
g ) 4 4
The substitution of substance for substance in potency has some interesting 
consequences for the Stoic system. First, it implies the substantial unity of all 
things. Next, since matter is substance, there are no immaterial substances. 
There is no Aristotelian generation in the world, just a continual process of 
qualitative changes in the one eternal material substance:
Zeno said this essence was finite and that it was the single, common 
substance of all that is. It is also divisible, and changeable forever.
Its parts change but do not perish, as if they were consumed from 
existence into nothing. As of innumerable different wax figures, 
he did not perceive any proper form or figure or any quality at 
all of the matter fundamental to all things, although it was always 
and inseparably joined to some quality. Because it is without 
arising just as it is w ithout perishing, since it does not subsist 
from the non-existent neither is it consumed into nothing, it 
does not lack spirit or vigor eternally, to move it rationally, 
occasionally wholly but usually partially. (Calcidius, in Timaeum 
292; Long and Sedley 44 D)45
^AoKti 5’ a in o is  apxas e iv a i t g o v  o A .co v  5u o , t o  t t o i o u v  icai to  7raaxov. to  pev ouv 
Tfdaxov e iva i tf|v  a 7roiov ouaiav xf)v uA.r|v, t o  5e 7roiouv t o v  ev ai>Tf) Aoyov t o v  0eov. ed. A. A. 
Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, v. 2: Greek and Latin Texts, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 265.
45Zeno hanc ipsam  essentiam  finitam esse dicit unam que earn com m unem  om nium  quae 
sunt esse substantiam, d ividuam  quoque et usque quaque mutabilem. partes quippe eius verti sed
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Like Aristotle, Zeno (331/30-233/2 or 231 B.C.E.) taught that matter was 
joined inseparably with active principle. The Stoa adapted the Aristotelian 
doctrine of categories to their own purpose, changing the description of the 
categories in the process. For Aristotle's ten categories, they substituted four, 
substance (i.e., matter), quality (the active force), relation, and place.
Creative fire was the active element and god of the Stoic cosmos:
The Stoics assert that god is intelligent, a creative fire, proceeding 
methodically to the generation of the cosmos, ^ having contained 
in itself the rational seeds by which everything comes about 
through fate. God is a spirit pervading the entire cosmos while 
participating in appellations according to the changes in matter 
through which it has gone. (Aetius 1.7.33; Long and Sedley 46 
A)46
Occasionally fire moved the cosmos totally resulting in eK7n3p«cris. Even in 
its total dominance, the active quality of fire still existed in m atter as its 
substance. Active quality did not displace matter as substance, rather it took 
over from more passive qualities.
They use "the cosmos" in three ways: for god himself, the
peculiar quality  in all substance, who is im perishable and 
ungenerated, since it is the demiurge of the cosmic order, who in 
the cycles of time draws to itself the entire substance and gives it 
birth again from itself. They also call this cosmic order "cosmos,"
non interire, ita ut d e existentibus consum m antur in nihilum . sed ut innum erabilium  diversarum  
etiam cerearum figurarum, sic neque formam neque figuram nec ullam om nino qualitatem propriam  
fore censet fundam enti rerum  om nium  silvae, coniunctam  tam en esse sem per et inseparabiliter 
cohaerere alicui qualitate. cum que tarn sine ortu sit quam  sine interitu, quia neque d e non existente 
subsistit nec consum etur in nihilum, non deesse ei spiritum  ac vigorem  ex aeternitate, qui m oveat 
earn rationabiliter totam  interdum , non num quam  pro portione. Long and Sedley, p. 267.
* 0 1  Zxwikoi voepov Geov d,7ro0atvoviai, 7t0p xexvncov o5w Pa5i£ov in \  yevdcrei Koapoo, 
epj.7repieiA.r|tt»6s < xe>  7ravxas xous CT7reppaxiKous A.oyou? Ka0’ oils a n a v x a  icaO' eipappdvT|v 
y ivexa t, icai 7rveupa pev dvSifjicov 5 i’ oAoo xoO Koopou, xas 5e Ttpocrriyopias pexaA appavov  
tcaxa xas tfjs  fAqs, 5i’ fjs KexcopqKe, 7rapa/\Ad^eis. Long and Sedley, p. 271 f.
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and third they call that which is composed of both. (Diogenes
Laertius 7.137, Long and Sedley 44 F)47
While the Stoics d id not share A ristotle's belief in the eternity of the 
present cosmos, they agreed on the eternity of the cosmic cycle and the eternity 
of forms. Form s d id  not always exist in act but sometimes only as Aoyoi 
(T7rep|iaTiKOi. By means of categorical distinctions of being, the Stoics succeeded 
in presenting a monistic account of the cosmos as one material substance, in 
which god and matter were not substantially distinct.
M iddle-Platonists
Middle-Platonists all looked to Plato's Timaeus  for their cosmology, but 
they saw there rather different things. Some saw the Timaeus  as a myth and 
the teaching of order draw n from disorder as a figure draw n by Plato for 
educational purposes. They accepted Aristotle's arguments for the eternity of 
the cosmos. They accepted the Aristotelian notion of m atter as "body in 
potency." Others took a more literal reading of the Timaeus  and held to 
creation in time. Their reading left them with the difficult task of explaining 
the pre-cosmic chaos in the receptacle.
eternal cosmos
Among those who taught the eternity of the cosmos was Albinus, who 
lectured to Galen between 149 and 157 C.E.48 He had a modified Aristotelian
^Aeyouai Se k o c t p o v  xpixco?' autov xe t o v  Geov t o v  etc xfjs &7racrr|S oiiaias iStcos noiov, 
os 5i| d<t>0apTos £cra icai dyevT|Tos, STiiiioupyos u v  tt|s  Siaicoa|iT|CTecos, xaxa xpovcov 7roias 
nepiooous avaAiaiccov ei? eaDxov xf|v a7taorav ouaiav icai 7raA.1v it, eauxou yevvcov icai ai>TT]v 
Se t t ) v  5iaK6apr|criv [ t w v  aaxdpcov] Koapov elvai Aeyooai- icai xpixov t o  CTOveaxTiKos it, 
ap0o"tv. Long and Sedley, p. 268.
^Dillon, op. cit., p. 267.
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Among those who taught the eternity of the cosmos was Albinus, who 
lectured to Galen between 149 and 157 C.E.48 He had a modified Aristotelian 
view of matter as potential for body which influenced his reading of Timaeus:
1) It is fitting for the all-receiver, matter, if it is going to receive 
all forms, that it not have the nature of any of them, but that it 
be without quality and formless so as to be the receptacle of forms.
2) Thus, it is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, it is body in 
potential, as we understand that bronze is a statue in potential, 
because once it receives the form, it is a statue. (Didascalicus 8,
163,4 ff.)49
Sentence 1 echoes the description of the receptacle in the Timaeus  "without 
quality" and all-receiver (51 A 1-3, 50 D 4-E 1, and 4-5). Sentence 2 hearkens 
back to Aristotle's description of matter in de Generatione et Corruptione (B 1, 
329 a 33). In the collocation of the two doctrines, Plato's receptacle loses its 
independence and becomes part of an Aristotelian composite substance, because 
it is no longer an independent body, but merely a body in potential.
Apuleius of Maudera, born ca. 123 C.E., famed for his novel The Golden 
Ass, held doctrines similar to Albinus.50 On the question of matter he takes a 
position sim ilar to A lbinus', although he does not quote the Aristotelian 
formulation. In de Platone (p. 312, Clouard), he argues that matter is neither 
corporeal, as it lacks the properties of bodies, nor incorporeal, because it always 
exists in bodies. Apuleius argues for the eternity of the world along Aristotelian
‘“Dillon, op. cit., p. 267.
49npocrrjicei 5e tcai xfj 7rav8exei vA-T], ei peAA.ei icaxa 7rav 5e%ecT0ai x a  ei5r|, pr|6e|iiav  
auxcov (|>6cnv e^ eiv  [b7roicei(T0ai], aAA.a aTioiov xe e iv a i  icai a v e iS e o v  7rpos i)7toSox,fiv xcov 
eiScov- xoiaiixri S  o u a a  oiixe a w p a  a v  eirj oiixe acrcopaxov, 5 u v a p e i 5e atopa, ws icai xov 
XaA,ic6v U7raicoi3opev 5u vap ei av S p ia v x a , 5 iox i xo ei5os Se^dpevos a v 5 p ia s  ecrxai. ed. John 
W ittaker, Paris: B elles Lettres, 1990, p. 20.
b i l l o n  argues that there is no evidence for the existence of a school of Gaius that 
included Albinus and Apuleius, op. cit., p. 340.
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lines, proceeding from its incorruptibility to its non-generation (p. 314 ff.).
temporal creation
Plutarch (born ca. 45 C.E.), the best known and best preserved of the 
Middle-Platonists, shows the familiar syncretism of Middle-Platonism between 
Pythagoreanism, Stoicism, and the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.51 Plutarch's 
syncretism delves into Greek, Egyptian, and Iranian mythology. He understands 
Plato's receptacle as matter. Like the Neopythagoreans, Plutarch teaches 
opposite principles, the one and the aoriston dyad (de Defectu Oraculorum 
428 F). But unlike the Neopythagoreans and Plato, Plutarch does not teach 
that matter is derived from prior principles. Matter stands between the one 
and the dyad, unified by the one and made many by the dyad (429 C). He 
teaches that both matter and soul are ungenerated, eternal principles.
The substance and matter from which the cosmos came about 
did not itself come about. It always lay subject to the demiurge 
for arrangem ent and ordering and for making it like him as 
much as it was possible to subject it. For generation was not 
from nothing but from that which was not well or sufficiently 
disposed, as in the becoming of a house, garment, or statue. The 
state before the generation of the world was disorder. Disorder 
was not bodiless, unmoved, or soulless, but it had an unformed, 
unstable body and confused, irrational movement. This was the 
discord of the soul which did not have reason. God did not 
make the bodiless into body neither did he make the soulless 
into soul. Just as we do not expect the harmonic and rhythmic 
man to make voice or motion, but to make voice harmonious 
and movem ent rhythmic, so god him self made neither the 
tangible and resistant body nor the imaginative and mobile powers 
of the soul, (de Animae Procreatione in Timaeo 5, 1014 B 2-C
51On the life and times of Plutarch, see Dillon, op. cit., pp. 184-192.
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3)52
The presence of a soul in the pre-cosmos is apparently  P lutarch 's own 
innovation. He teaches that m atter/soul dualism is a prim itive eternal with 
which the dem iurge must deal. The untrained soul produced the disordered 
motions of the pre-cosmos. Through training in the forms, the dem iurge 
brought the world soul into the well-ordered motions of the cosmos. His 
explanation of the training of the cosmos in terms of harmonics is suggested 
by the description of the motions of the pre-cosmic disorder in Timaeus  30 A 
as inharmonious (7iATi|Li|LLeAcos).
Plutarch teaches that matter is qualitiless and could not have motions 
w ithout the influence of a soul. M atter is "formless and unshapen" and 
"devoid of its own quality and power" (dpop^ov m i  d a x TlM -artaTov ... 7racrr|t; 
7roi6xT|TO? Kai Suvapecos oiK eias epqpov, de Atiimae Procreatione in Timaeo 
1014 F 2-4, ed. Hubert, p. 149 f.). Throughout he makes reference to matter as 
body. Most of the Middle-Platonists insisted that matter was not body, but 
body in potency just because it had no qualities including bodily (see above). 
Plutarch does not make the same point, so his doctrine of m atter draws closest 
to the Stoic doctrine of body without quality.53
“ xqv 5’ ouoxav Kai uAt|v, fjs ydyovev, ou yevop£vr|V aAA’ 07TOKei.pevT|v del xu 
6r|pioupywds 8id0eaiv Kai xa£iv auit|V Kai npos abxov e^opoiuaiv us Suvaxov rjv ep7rapacrxeiv. 
oi) yap c k  xou pr| ovxos f| yeveais aXX  £ k  x o u  pt] icaAus m .t|5 ' iKavus exovxos, us o rn a s  Kai 
ipaxtou Kai avSpiavxos. aKocrpia yap f)v xa  7tpo xfjs xou Koapou y tv e a tu s - aK oapia S' o u k  
aawpaxos ouS’ dKivr]Xos ouS’ atyuxos AAA.’ apop<|>ov pev Kai aauaxaxov xo crupaxiKov epnAriKxov 
Se Kai aAoyov xo k i v t | x i k 6 v  'l%ovoa- xouxo 8’ r|v avappoaxia \|/uxfjs o u k  exouat|s Aoyov. o yap 
Geos ouxe acopa xo aaupaxov ouxe tyuxf]v to  a\|/uxov ^oiTicrev, aAA- u a 7rep appoviKov avopa 
Kai puGpiKbv ob buvfiv jroteiv ou8t  k i v t i c t i v  dppeAfj 8 e (tiuvqv Kai Kivr|cn.v eupuGpov a^ioupev, 
ouxus o Geos ouxe xou aupaxos xo a 7ix6 v Kai avxixu7rov ouxe xfjs tyuxfjs xo bavxacxxiKov Kai 
k i v t ) x i k o v  auxos dmriTicrev. ed. C. Hubert, Plutarchi M oralia, v .  6.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1954, p .  
148.
MEven Plutarch's argument echoes Sextus' account of the Stoic v iew  that matter was 
motionless and unshapen (doxripdxicrxos) by itself and therefore required an active causal 
principle, Sextus M. 9.75
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
He also looks to Greek and foreign mythologies as expressions of his 
doctrines. He likens his opposite principles to O hrm azd and Areiman of 
Zoroastrianism (de Iside 369 E). He likens matter and forms to Isis and Osiris 
(de Iside 372 E-373 A). He looks to Hesiod for confirmation of the pre-cosmic 
chaos (374 C). Plutarch's colorful use of mythical material seems to have been 
an inspiration to the Gnostics who would follow. They adopted much of the 
same imagery and their reliance upon myth is well known.
Atticus (floruit 176 C.E. according to Eusebius) is reported by Proclus (fr. 
23) to have also held that pre-cosmic m atter was moved by an irrational soul 
before the forming of the world at which time the world soul was tamed by 
the dem iurge.54
M iddle-Platonists of both camps, eternal cosmologists and temporal 
creationists, all agreed that matter was eternal, distinct from forms, primitive, 
and irreducible. Their Aristotelian and Stoic understanding of matter modified 
the receptacle into a qualitiless material principle.
Pythagoreans
The Neopythagorean revival of the last century B.C.E.55 brought with 
it a revival of Platonic geometrical construction of the cosmos. Like Plato, the 
Neopythagoreans constructed bodies from geometricals. Like Plato they saw 
the physical world as a product of non-physical principles. Unlike Plato, they 
traced everything back to just two principles: the one and the infinite dyad. 
There was also a minority that went so far as to seek a principle behind the 
one and the infinite dyad. Calcidius explains the distinction:
^Dillon, op. cit., p. 247, on Atticus.
55See Dillon, op. cit., on the Neopythagorean revival and its influence upon M iddle 
Platonism, p. 117; p. 1£4 p. 341; p. 383.
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N um enius... said that Pythagoras called god singularity and matter 
dyad. That dyad which was unbounded and unproduced, he said 
became limited and generated: that is before it was adorned and 
w hen it was deprived of form and order, it was w ithout origin 
and generation. Once it was ordered and arranged, it was generated 
by the creator god. Thus, because the accident of generation was 
later, only as unordained and ungenerated should it be understood 
as being coeval w ith god, by whom it was ordered. But some 
Pythagoreans did not follow the force of reason and believed that 
the unbounded and immeasurable dyad was established by the 
unique singularity as it departed from its own nature and moved 
into a state of duality, (in Timaeu m 295)56
Numenius (second half of second century C.E.) introduces a distinction between 
being produced (genita) and being generated (generata). Duality is unproduced 
by god in its unformed and unlimited state. Once it is ordered and limited, 
then it can be said to be generated. Numenius' terminology is distinct, but he 
is in accord w ith Plutarch and Atticus' theory of tem poral creation from 
disordered matter.
C alcid ius' (first half of fourth  century) account originates from 
N um enius' own. N um enius, himself a dualist, attacked the monists for 
teaching that the one departed from its own nature. He charged that to depart 
to duality would contradict the nature of the monad.
Sextus Empiricus (ca. 250 C.E.) also notes the monistic teaching, but in
“ Num enius ... ait Pythagoran deum  quidem singularitatis [nomine] nominasse, siluam  
vero duitatis. Quam  duitatem  indeterminatem quidem  m inim e genitam , limitatam vero  
generatam esse dicere: hoc est, antequam exomaretur quidem formamque et ordinem nancisceretur, 
sine ortu et generatione, exomatam vero atque inlustratam a digestore deo esse generatam. atque 
ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum aequaeuum deo, a 
quo est ordinatum, intellegi debeat. Sed non nullos Pythagoreos vim sententiae non recte adsecutos 
putasse d id  etiam illam indeterminatam et inmensam duitatem ab unica singularitate institutam, 
recedente a natura sua singularitate et in duitatis habitum migrante. ed. J. Wrobel, Platonis 
Timaeus interprete Chalcidio cum eiusdem Commentario, Leipzig: Teubner, 1876, p. 324. 
Photostatic reprint, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1963.
On Numenius, see Dominic J. O'Meara, Pythagoras Revived: M athem atics and Philosophy in
Late A ntiqu ity , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 10-14.
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less tendentious terms:
Some say that the body is constructed from a single point. This 
poin t flowed and completed a line and the line flowed and 
completed a plane. This moved to the depth and generated three 
dimensional body. This party of Pythagoreans differs from that 
of the earlier ones. They m ade numbers from two principles, 
from the monad and the infinite dyad. Then from the numbers 
they made points, lines, plane figures, and solids. The new party 
fashions everything from a single point. (adversus Mathematicos 
10.281 f.)57
The sect Sextus describes originated everything from a single point. In addition 
to positing a single source, they also differed from the other Neopythagoreans 
in asserting the prim acy of geometricals. They overthrew  the elaborate 
hierarchy that the other Neopythagoreans used: monad, dyad, numbers, 
geometricals, and then sensibles (adversus Mathematicos 10. 258-262, 282). 
They started directly from the geometricals and from them they derived sensible 
bodies. It is significant that the geometricals needed the help of numbers to 
produce sensible bodies, but Sextus does not explain if the numbers themselves 
were derived.
To get the process going, the point flowed to duality. In the process it 
produced a line. The word flow (peiv) is the base of the compound word 
em anation (eppelv), used by the Neoplatonists. Unfortunately, becaused of 
the obscurity of the doctrine and the paucity of textual evidence, we have very 
little to go on to try to determine what caused the point to flow.
57xives 5' <X7r6 evos O T ip e io o  t 6  crupa 0am  m m crxaaGar xouxi yap t o  aripeiov puev
ypappfjv d7roxeA.eiv, xf)v 8e ypappfjv pueiaav evuTteSov 7roieiv, xouxo Se e is  pdGos Kivr|Gev t o
crwpa yevvav xpixtj Siaaxaxov. Sia0epei Se f| xoiaoxri xwv nuGayopiKcov crxdais rfjs xcov
7rpoxep&)v. etcelvoi pev yap etc Sueiv apxwv, xfjs xe povaSos r a i xfjs dopicjxou SuaSos, e7roiouv
xoOs apiGpoos, eit’ e k  x m v  apiGpuv xa aripeia Kai xas ypappas xa xe enineda axiipaxa K a i
xa CTxepea- ouxoi 5e and evos aripeiou xa 7ravxa xeKxaivoumv. ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 
Leipzig: Teubner, 1914, rpr. 1984, p. 360 f.
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Plutarch does record a moral interpretation of the departure. According 
to Plutarch some Pythagoreans taught that the departure from the monad 
resulted from presum ption, T6Ap.a (de Iside, 381 F).58 No one can say if 
Plutarch is describing the same doctrine Sextus did, or if there was a distinct 
group teaching a moral version of the departure of the one into duality. In 
any case it is hard to see whence TO^pa arose in the m onad. The theory 
merely moves unexplained diversity back into the monad itself.
We have much more evidence to go on in the case of a named monist: 
Moderatus of Gades (first century C.E.). M oderatus developed a notion of a 
unified account (Aoyos) which was the source of everything. Moderatus gives 
a much more detailed account than Sextus does. The theory is also quite 
distinct. Moderatus begins from a logos, not a point. Nothing emanates from 
the logos. It w ithdraw s, leaving behind a deprivation .59 M oderatus 
presupposes an initial complexity in the prim e "unified" logos which is 
separated out and accounts for the plurality in the cosmos.
M oderatus' analysis of origins from a prim e logos rather than the 
Neopythagorean One or point is hardly accidental. M oderatus understood
“A lso reported in Iamblichus, Theologoumena Arithm eticae, ed. Victorius de Falco, 
Stuttgart: Teubner, 1975, p. 7,19; p. 9,5-6.
Also noted by Proclus, in A lc ib ia d em  104 E, ed. A. Ph. Segonds, Paris: Belles Lettres, 1985, p. 
110.
For other references and a bibliography, see Segonds note, op. cit., p. 202.
“Eudorus, as quoted by Simplicius, records a similar teaching for the Pythagoreans: 
'The One, the principle of all leaves, and in another way the tw o opposite elements [the monad 
and the dyad] enter," Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros, ed. H. Deils. Commentaria 
in Aristotelem Graeca 9-10. Berlin: Reimer, 1882, p. 181, 22 ff.
Other monistic accounts include:
The anonymous account of Alexander Polyhistor preserved by Diogenes Laertius, I. 8.24;
Archainetus (w ho Thesleff takes as Archytas), Brotinus, and Philolaus preserved in Syrianus, 
In M etaphysica Commentaria, ed. William Kroll, Commentaria in Aristotelem  Graeca 6.1, 
Berlin: Reimer, 1902; Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts o f the H ellenistic Period, Abo: Abo 
Akademi, 1965, pp. 48, 56.
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
traditional Pythagorean numbers as mere illustrations of accounts and forms 
(In Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, 52 f.). Unfortunately that innovation has 
been overlooked by recent interpreters. Most focus on a fragment of Moderatus 
preserved by Simplicius, who relied on Porphyry for his information about 
M oderatus.60
If we look at the passage of Simplicius (sixth century C.E.), we see that 
the account comes in two distinct sections. The tone and terminology of the 
two sections are quite distinct. The ontology of the first section is expressed in 
terms of distinctions of the One. The second section refers to the unified 
account and the Xoyoi of the subsequent things. Given M oderatus' avowed 
preference for accounts and forms over numbers, it would seem that section 
two gives a more faithful representation of his teaching. Quite likely he did 
talk in terms of the One as other Pythagoreans did, but he gave greater 
importance to the account according to forms.
Rather than a Neoplatonic emanation from the One, Moderatus presents 
a cosmic fission of the prim e "unified logos." The fission is based upon a 
categorical understanding of being:
(section 1)
He asserted that according to the Pythagoreans, the first one is
“ E. R. D odds, "The Parm enides of Plato and the Origin of the N eoplatonic 'One,' 
Classical Q uarterly  22, 1928, pp. 129-142. D odds (after Zeller) understands Simplicius to be 
providing an account of Moderatus' teaching via Porphyry. H e quotes only section one and 
argues that Moderatus' reading of the Parm enides is the source of the "Neoplatonic" One, pp. 
136-140.
Philip Merlan, in The Cambridge H istory o f Later Greek and Early M edieval Philosophy; 
edited by A. H. Armstrong, London: Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 90-94, attributes 
both sections one and two to Moderatus, giving him credit for anticipating the "very backbone of 
the Plotinian system."
See also J. M. Rist, "Monism: Plotinus and Some Predecessors," Harvard Studies in Classical 
P hilo logy  69,1965, pp. 339-44.
So also Dillon, op. cit., 349.
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above being and every substance. They said the second one which 
is true being and intelligible, is the forms. The third, whatever is 
psychic, participates in the one and the forms. The final nature 
from this, which belongs to the sensibles, does not participate but 
is ordered according to the reflection of the former ones. It is the 
shadow  of m atter in them, the m atter of things which were not 
at first, m atter which was in the quantity of being and is even 
further inferior to this one. (Simplicius, In Physicorum A 7, 
230.36-231.5)61
(section 2)
In the second book of his work, "On Matter," Porphyry cites these 
teachings of M oderatus and writes: Unitary reason—as Plato 
som ew here says—having  w illed  the co n stitu tio n  of the 
generation of beings from itself, by self-deprivation it departed, 
taking away from the quantity of all things its own reasons and 
form s. This quantity he called unform ed, indivisible, and 
unshapen, rather receiving form, shape, division, quality, and 
every th ing  of this kind. (Simplicius, In Physicorum A 7, 
231.7-12)62
The original logos had all accounts unified into one, but it emptied itself of 
quantity. The logos then remained as the accounts of all things but without 
quantity. W hat it left behind was quantity without any other forms or Aoyoi. 
Simplicius is careful to distinguish the quantity of the fission from the quantity 
of things, which is always definite. The first quantity is absolutely indefinite. 
As the paradigm  for matter, it is also distinct from matter:
61o u t o s  yap Kara t o u s  nuGayopetous t o  pev rrpcoTov ev U7rep t o  elvat Kai 7taaav 
oucrlav d7ro(j)aiveTai, t o  Se SeuTepov ev, 07rep daTi t o  o v t c o j  6 v  Kai v o t i t o v ,  t o .  ei'Sri ((>r)aiv 
a v a i ,  t o  Se TpiTov, orrep eori t o  \J/uxnc6v, peTdxeiv ev6s Kai aSoov, rpv Se a™  
t o u t o u  TeAeuTaiav <t>ocnv t ^ v  t c o v  aia0T)Td)v o w a v  pr|5e peTe%eiv, aAAa K af ep0acnv eKeivcov 
KeKoapfjaGai, xfjs ev aiiToiis uA.r|s t o o  pf] o v t o s  7rpcoTcos ev t c o  noaco o v t o s  o o c t t i s  OKiaapa Kai 
eTi pdAAov u7roPePt|Kuias Kai d7ro t o u t o u .  ed. H. Deils, Berlin: Reimer, 1882, pp. 230 f.
62T a o t a  5e o  r io p iJ iT ip to g  i v  t w  S e u T e p c o  r i e p i  u A t i s  t o .  t o o  M o S e p a x o o  T r a p a x i G e p e v o ?  
y e y p a O e v  c m  " B o o A .r ) 0 e i s  o  e v i a i o s  A o y o s ,"  cos t o o  0 T | a i v  o  n A a T t o v ,  t t ] v  y e v e a i v  a«l)’ e a o T o o
t c o v  o v t c o v  a o C T T T ia a a G a i ,  K a T a  CTTept|CTiv a o T o o  e x c o p t |CTe T"nv  ^ o a 6 x r \ x a  7 r a v T c o v  a o T T ) v  C T T e p f |a a s
t c o v  a o T o o  A o y c o v  K a i  e i S c o v .  t o o t o  S e  7 r o a o T T iT a  d K a A e a e v  a p o p O o v  K a i  a S i a i p e T o v  K a i  
d a x r i p a T i a T o v ,  e 7 u 5 e x o p e v T | v  p e v T o i  p o p 0 f ] v  a x f j p a  S i a i p e c n v  7 r o i6 T T )T a  7 r a v  t o  t o i o o t o v . e d .
H. Deils, p. 231.
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This quantity, he said, and image understood by the deprivation 
of the unified account which received all the accounts of beings 
in itself, is the paradigm  of the matter of bodies. (Simplicius, In 
Physicorum  A 7, 231.15-18)63
Like the Stoic monism, M oderatus traces plurality back to categorical 
distinctions of being. Stoic matter is a single oucrta with a plurality of qualities. 
M oderatus, though, uses Aristotelian categories and traces difference to the 
category of quantity. In a unique twist, Moderatus teaches that the categories 
can be separated from each other into separate principles. His system is also 
notable for the complexity of its principle. The unified logos contains many 
separable accounts. Evidently M oderatus makes no attem pt to explain how 
the unified logos became unified. He takes it for a primitive condition and 
necessary to explain the material and formal diversity of the cosmos.
M oderatus leaves the only detailed account of Neopythagorean monism, 
which interestingly enough does lend itself to Numenius' polemic cited above. 
In departing from quantity, the logos does depart from its own nature, as 
Num enius charged. It is also evident that M oderatus had a rather weak 
monism. Even though he traced everything back to a single source, that 
source was not itself simple.
Given that they taught that all things including m atter derived from a 
single principle, did the monistic Pythagoreans teach creatio ex nihilo? Both 
Moderatus and the point-principle Pythagoreans taught that the first principle 
generated diversity out of its own nature. It was the abandoned quantity of 
the unified logos that was the principle of diversity and of matter in Moderatus'
“auxri 5e h 7roaotr|s, (J)T|cri, icai xouxo t o  ei5os to m xa  crxepT]cnv xoO eviaiou Aoyou 
vooiipevov t o u  7tavxas xous A.oyous xwv ovxcov iv  eaoxab 7repieiA.r|<l)6xos 7rapa5eiynaxd eaxi xfis 
xcov ocopaxcov \3A.T|s. ed. H. Deils, p. 231.
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system. That same quantity was part of the unified logos from the first. In 
the system described by Sextus, the point departed into the dyad. Diversity 
resulted from a change in the first principle. In this way the Neopythagoreans 
had returned to the Milesian notion that creation came out of the first principle. 
Change and diversity resulted from a prior potency for change in the monad. 
Theirs was a generation ex m onadi  not creatio ex nihilo.
It is not a far cry from Neopythagorean emanationism to the generation 
of m atter in Valentinian Gnosticism (of the early second century C.E.) in 
which matter results from a defect or a flaw in the fullness of the divine 
principles.64 Valentinian metaphysical views on first principles are spun in 
myth, but Hippolytus makes it clear that some Valentinians did teach that 
everything was generated from a single principle, the ungenerated Father, or 
the m onad.65 In this sense, Valentianism is monistic,66 although Hippolytus 
provides no explanation of the generation of plurality from the monad other 
than a biological analogy. The Father is perfect and productive (yovipov). He 
expresses (fipoepaAev) Intellect and Truth, which in turn generate Word and 
Life.67 In all, thirty divine principles are generated and are known collectively 
as the pleroma.
Matter results from the pain of Wisdom, one of the divine pleroma
MEinar Thomassen has argued for Neopythagorean influence on Valentianism in a paper 
presented to the Gnosticism and Neoplatonism group of the American Academy of Religion, in 
November, 1993, 'The Derivation of Matter in Monistic Gnosticism." Abstract published in 
Abstracts: American Academy o f Religion, Society of Biblical Literature, Missoula, Montana: 
Scholars Press, 1993, p. 52.
On the various sources for Valentinus, see the discussion of Gerhard May, Creatio ex Nihilo: 
The Doctrine o f 'Creation out o f N othing ' in Early Christian Thought, trans., A. S. Worall, 
Edinburgh: Clark, 1994, pp. 85-94.
65 Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium  Haeresium, liber 6.29.
“ So Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 2nd ed., Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1958, p. 105.
67Hippolytus, loc. cit.
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who tried to create without consort, in imitation of the Father's initial, unaided 
generation. Her creation is without form and imperfect and causes disturbance 
in the pleroma. To restore peace to the pleroma, the Father and Christ separate 
W isdom and her formless creation from the pleroma. W isdom 's fear and 
pain at the separation create psychic and material being respectively.68
Matter does not have its own independent existence as it does in Middle- 
Platonist dualism. As in monistic Neopythagoreanism, m atter is an accidental 
and undesirable byproduct of the plurality of first principles. Unlike creatio 
ex nihilo as it would come to be formulated, Valentinian m atter is neither 
intended nor in the control of the first principles. Its relation to the created 
world is also different. In Valentianism, m atter is ontologically prior and 
independent of the cosmos. As in Middle-Platonism, the dem iurge was faced 
w ith the limitations of matter in fashioning the cosmos. M atter is not the 
chosen venue of cosmic creation, rather the cosmos is the best that could be 
managed given the constraints of matter.69
common Greek positions
To recap the teachings on matter:
Plato: the receptacle, space, is the stage for change which happens among 
spatially distended images of the forms. Physical m atter as we know it is the
“ H ippolytus, liber 6.30-32.
See also Irenaeus's account of Valentianism, which is much more compressed, Adversus Haereses
1.2-4; 2.10.
In the untitiled Nag Hammadi treatise called by moderns On the Creation o f the World, matter 
is described as a shadow of the pleroma, 98.17-27 (a term also found in Moderatus, in Simplicius, 
In Physicorum, 231. 4-5, ed. Diels).
In the Tripartate Tractate also from Nag Hammadi, the Word, not W isdom, creates diverse 
matters, Nag Hammadi 1.5, 85.10.
“ on the Gnostic teacher Basilides, see below, chapter 4.
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geometrical ordering of these images.
Aristotle: m atter is substance in potency. Prime m atter is the analysis 
of the elements as they have the potency to transform one into another.
Stoa: matter is the characterless substance of the world, subject to different 
properties, heat, cold, wetness, dryness, etc.
Middle-Platonism: matter is body in potency.
Despite their manifold appearance, Greek philosophers from the time 
of Plato and Aristotle and into Late Antiquity shared some basic metaphysical 
understandings. They believed in the eternity of unchangeable being or beings. 
For the Stoics m atter was eternal, characterless, and in itself unchanging. 
Aristotle taught that forms and separate substances each in themselves were 
eternal and unchanging. For Plato the forms and the receptacle were both 
eternal and change only happened in the world of becoming which used the 
receptacle as a stage for its impersonations of the forms.
They all believed in the eternity of change. In the case of the Peripatetics, 
the unique cosmos and its life forms and processes were eternal. The Stoics 
also believed in an eternal succession of cosmoi, each one limited temporally 
and spatially, but throughout eternity, change within and between cosmoi 
continued. Even Platonists who believed in a temporal creation of one cosmos, 
as did Plutarch and Atticus, believed that change existed eternally before the 
cosmos in disordered movements of the world soul in the receptacle.
Everyone also agreed that one needed eternal distinctions in being to 
explain change, distinctions of active and passive principles. Minimally, the 
distinction could be merely categorical as in the Stoa, which distinguished the 
matter of the world as substance from the active and changing quality of the
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world. Plato and Aristotle distinguished forms from matter, but differed in 
the degree of distinction with regard to the independence of forms and receptacle 
or of form and matter.
Each school also recognized a moral crisis for the hum an trapped in 
m atter. M atter explained the potential for change in the w orld and was 
corruptible in its manifestations although eternal in itself and in these ways 
acted as the limit to the goodness of the world and the hum an condition. The 
material limitation was either to be accepted and endured or escaped.
The Christian teaching of creatio ex nihilo violated two of these basic 
metaphysical beliefs. It taught that change had a specific beginning, and it 
taught that no being in the realm of change was eternal. It is easy to see why 
the teaching of creatio ex nihilo was the object of scorn by the educated Hellenist. 
It is much more difficult to see why the Christians adopted such a radical 
position. This is especially true because one does not find the origin of the 
teaching where one w ould expect. If one looks to the Jewish, biblical, and 
Near Eastern background to Christian teachings, one does not find creatio ex 
nih ilo  expressly taught. On the contrary, one can only find expressions of the 
opposite. Early Jews and Christians both expressly state that God formed the 
w orld from formless matter. Philo, Justin M artyr and Hermogenes all make 
that point, the last m aking a strong exegetical case for his position from the 
opening of Genesis. Before we can determine why Christians formulated creatio 
ex nihilo, we need first to consider the background for Christian teaching in 
Early Judaism, the Hebrew Scriptures, and the Ancient Near Eastern world.
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Chapter 3, Cosmogony and Material in the Near East, Biblical Texts, and Early 
Judaism
In Egypt, natural and artificial images of creation exist side by side. 
They coexist even in the same text (Papyrus Leiden, see ch. 1). Amun brings 
forth by birth and by fashioning and even by speech.
In M esopotamia, nature and artifice become deadly enemies. In the 
Enuma Elish, natural causation begins all in the birthing of the gods. But 
nature in the persons of the primal mother and father is capricious, and soon 
nature threatens her own offspring. Only the work of wisdom and artifice of 
Ea saves the gods as he forms the hero M arduk and equips him with skilful 
weapons and magic. After the battle, the world is constructed in wisdom 
from the slain corpse of Tiamat, the natural progenerator of the gods. Artifice 
slays nature.
In biblical texts the trium ph of art over natural progeny is complete. 
Signs of the battle are merely faint traces. Word and wisdom predominate. 
Whereas production by birth precedes art in the Enuma Elish, in biblical 
accounts God's creative speech and work precede creation by b irth .1 Only
‘Claus W esterm ann in Genesis 1-11: A  Com m entary, trans. John Scullion, S.J., 
Minneapolis: Augsberg, 1984, pp. 26-39, in treating creation motifs in general distinguishes 
creation by birth from creation by conflict, creation by action, and creation by word.
Jon Levenson in Creation and the Persistence o f Evil, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988, 
traces the sublimation of creation by conflict to creation by sovereign word in the Bible.
I see creation by conflict as a secondary motif that develops in the Enuma Elish only as two 
other motifs, nature and art, collide. In the Enuma Elish nature precedes art, in the Bible the 
process is reversed.
Many have sought to distinguish between two traditions in Genesis 1, creation by word and 
creation by deed, see Westermann, op. cit., pp. 82 f.
Also on the contrast of creation by word and by deed, see W. H. Schmidt, Der Schdpfungsgeschichte 
der Priesterschrift, W issenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament 17, 
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener 1964, pp. 73-149. Schmidt develops the contrast through all 
six days of creation.
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after God speaks light into existence and fashions the heavens and uncovers 
the earth, does the earth "bring forth" vegetation. The seas and the sky teem 
with fish and birds. 'T hese are the generations of heaven and earth when 
they were created" (Genesis 2.4). They are all subject to the creative act of God. 
Although it is not yet an explicit doctrine, creation by artifice paves the way 
for creatio ex nihilo.
Biblical writings expressly teach neither creatio ex nihilo nor creation 
from a specific material. Early in the Common Era, when the Rabbis considered 
the question of w hat came before the creation, some said that the question 
should not be answered in public. Others read biblical passages fairly literally 
and said that the heaven and earth were created from waters or from chaos 
(tohuzvazvohu ). Other early Jewish writers who were more engaged by Greek 
Philosophy, such as Philo and the author of the deuterocanonical book, the 
Wisdom o f Solomon, accepted the Platonic position that the world was created 
from formless matter. No one form ulated a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. 
Some statements have been interpreted as teaching creatio ex nihilo (such as 
2 Maccabees 7.28 and Bereshit Rabba 1.9, see discussion below), but closer 
examination reveals that they are not making that claim, and no one presents 
any argum ent to support the doctrine.
No one in Early Judaism had the motivation to produce an argument
for creatio ex nihilo. The philosophically m inded writers would not have
flown in the face of philosophical teaching without cause. The more biblically
minded Rabbis even went so far as to disallow questions that went back before
the beginning of the world. They expressly forbad treading where biblical
The m otifs are dearly distinct, but their combination is fairly standard. It happens in Egypt 
(see ch. 1), the Enuma Elish (see below), and elsewhere in the Bible, Psalm  148.5 and Isa ia h  
48.13. W ord and building are both works of w isdom  and w e should be careful about 
overem phasizing the distinction.
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texts d id  not lead. Therefore, they w ould not have m ade such a bold claim 
about what d id or d id  not precede the heaven and earth, since scripture was 
silent therein.
To begin our examination of the teachings of the biblical writings and 
Early Judaism, we will go back to examine the biblical material by way of 
Babylon, in o rder to set some of the N ear Eastern context for the biblical 
materials.
Babylon
The creation of the world from waters finds its best expression in a late 
document. Even though the Enuma Elish represents the fullest expression 
of cosmogony from Mesopotamia or anywhere else in the Ancient Near East, 
it should not be universalized to a general Babylonian position or even worse, 
Ancient N ear Eastern position.2
The Enuma Elish itself is a late document by Mesopotamian standards, 
w hich presents a strong polem ical tone. Based on alleged ideological 
developments, the Enuma Elish was once dated to the old Babylonian period 
(early second millennium). However, Lambert has convincingly argued that 
the Enuma Elish should be dated to the late second m illennium .3 The 
Enuma Elish is not a speculative text. It has a strong ideological bent as it tries
2On the Enuma Elish  in general, see A lexander H eidel, The Babylonian Genesis, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
On its relation to the Bible, see W. G. Lambert, "A N ew  Look at the Babylonian Background of 
Genesis," Journal o f Theological Studies 16,1965, pp. 287-300.
For a full bibliography, see Claus Westermann, op. cit., pp. 70 f.
3W. G. Lambert, says that the Enuma Elish  should not be dated earlier than 1100
B.C.E., art. cit., pp. 297-8.
See also Tzvi Abusch, "Merodach," in Harper's Bible Dictionary, ed. Paul J. Achtemeier, San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985, p. 627.
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to establish Babylon's god, Marduk, as the chief of the Mesopotamian pantheon. 
Cosmogony is an ancillary concern of the text which focuses prim arily on 
M arduk's exaltation over the older gods. It served as a text in the cult, being 
recited year after year in the Babylonian New Year, A kitu ,  festival, presumably 
to renew M arduk's beneficent creation.
In the Enuma Elish, M arduk takes over from the old storm god, Enlil, 
as the most powerful god of the Mesopotamian pantheon. The succession of 
leading gods was not new. Enlil himself had taken over from his father Anu, 
the sky god. But w ith the Enuma Elish, Babylon, the center of the cult of 
M arduk, m ade a play for the center of the M esopotamian religion over the 
ancient center of Enlil's cult, Nippur.
The Enuma Elish's relatively late date and its own ideological angle 
recom m end caution against attributing its doctrines to early periods of 
Mesopotamian history. Its status as an internal cult document, which unlike 
Gilgamesh, never had circulation outside of Mesopotamia, should prevent us 
from freely seeking relationships to other Near Eastern texts.
This is particularly true in the case of the Enuma Elish's creation from 
the defeated Tiamat. Parallels have long been draw n between the Enuma  
Elish and biblical accounts. More recently Ugaritic materials have been added 
to the mix.4 In its association of the slaying of the sea deity narrative to the
4Gunkel in 1895 began a new era of biblical criticism based upon reading conflict and 
creation in the Bible as dependents of the Enuma Elish, Schbpfung und Chaos in Urzeit and 
Endzeit, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1895.
M itchell D ahood takes the Leviathen as prim aeval m ythical material that has been 
interspersed with historical material, Psalms II, 50-100, Anchor Bible, v. 17, Garden City, N.J.: 
Doubleday, 1968, 205-206.
For a very com plete study of the Leviathen material, particularly with respect to Ugaritic 
influences, see John Day, God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985.
Ugaritic parallels are also drawn by Cyrus Gordon in "Leviathan: Symbol of Evil," in B ib lica l
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creation story, the Enuma is unique.5 Mythological combat was known 
from Sumerian times in the form of Enki's combat with Kur, but it is not 
associated with creation. Likewise, the combat of Bel and the sea god Yam in 
Ugarit is not associated w ith creation. The Enuma Elish uses the threat of 
combat as the occasion for the older gods to cede all power to their young hero 
M arduk. His trium ph confirms his position as the lord and leads to his 
beneficent creation of the world as a temple for his senior gods and the creation 
of humans to serve them. In short the cosmic battle is introduced to explain 
the exaltation of Marduk. In examining the brief references to God's triumph 
over the Leviathan in the biblical passages, no context of creation should be 
assumed. Biblical texts as texts composed outside of the M arduk priesthood 
are more likely to reflect the general view of combat after creation known 
from Ugarit and Ancient Mesopotamia than the doctrine of the late and 
idiosyncratic Enuma Elish.
In this work we will examine the Enuma Elish simply as an expression 
of a shared cultural milieu where concepts of pre-cosmic oceans and divine 
architects were common property. We will not assume direct influence.6
M otifs, Cambridge, MA, Philip H. Lown Institute of Advanced Judaic Studies; Studies and 
Texts III; Harvard University, 1966, 1-9.
5Westermann notes that the cosmic battle is part of the creation story neither in Sumerian 
literature nor in Ugarit and therefore warns against presuming that the traces of conflict found 
in the Bible should be associated with creation, op. cit., pp. 30-33.
Contra Levenson, op. cit., pp. 12 f., w ho argues that the cosmic battle cannot really be distinguished 
from creation because they are part of the same perpetual tension between chaos and order.
6Westermann does not assert literary dependence of the Bible upon the Enuma Elish. 
Rather he looks to contact in the preliterate history of Genesis, p. 89.
Lambert, art. cit., pp. 293-296, also argues against any direct connection between the Enuma 
E lish  and the Bible.
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Enuma Elish: M arduk the king
M arduk was created by Ea and appointed by the gods to overcome their 
mother, Tiamat, the goddess of the sea who threatened them with destruction. 
The gods were bom  from Tiamat and Apsu, the salt and fresh waters which 
sorted themselves from an undifferentiated beginning (Enuma Elish 1.1-12). 
The differentiation of the waters into two bodies, salt and fresh, allowed 
biological generation. The fecundity of w aters had a long history in 
Mesopotamia going back to Sumerian times. In Sumerian, hum an semen is 
called water; procreation is called a-ri-a, literally the mixing of waters. Creation 
from the waters is a common theme in creation stories. Nammu, an ancient 
Sumerian goddess of the sea was called the mother of the heaven and earth.7 
Enki, the Sumerian god of water and wisdom, is one of the Sumerian creator 
gods.8 In the Enuma Elish, he retains a central role in the narration under 
his Akkadian appellation, Ea. He overcomes the first threat to the gods from 
Apsu by means of his knowledge of magic. Then he builds his temple on the 
Apsu, where he begets M arduk (Enuma Elish 1.47-85).
In the Enuma Elish the offspring of the waters produce so much noise 
that Apsu plots to destroy his offspring. A psu's defeat and death provoke 
Tiam at to threaten her children as well. The gods meet in assembly and 
promise M arduk the tablets of fate if he acts their hero. M arduk overcomes 
Tiamat by distending her body with the wind he controls and piercing her. 
From her body he constructs the heavens over the Apsu as a temple for the 
gods. In his construction of the w orld he acts just as the conquering 
Mesopotamian king, who returns from his conquests to honor the gods:
7Kramer, Sumerian M ythology, Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 
1944, p. 39.
8Kramer, op. cit., pp. 54-62.
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The lord stopped and inspected her [Tiamafs] body.
He divided the miscarriage and worked wonders.
He split her in two like a fish for drying,
And set up  half of her and overshadowed the heavens. 
He drew  the line and established guards,
And ordered them  not to let her waters out.
He crossed heaven and examined the sky.
He made the seat of Annugim m ud equal to that of Apsu 
He made it like the form of Apsu.
Eshgalla its equivalent he established and Esharra, 
Eshgalla and Esharra which he built in the heavens.
He settled Anu, Enlil, and Ea in their sanctuaries.
[Tablet 5]
He established stations for the great gods.
He returned the stars and erected the Lumashu 
He set the year, and drew  the plans. (4 .135-5.3)9
In constructing the world M arduk acts as baru, the Babylonian haruspex, "The 
lord stopped and inspected (baru, "to inspect" in the m anner of a haruspex) 
her [Tiamat's] body" (4. 135). He acts as an architect consulting the drawings 
(5.3), and he settles the gods into their new home.
M arduk's roles of conquering hero, tem ple architect, and haruspex 
coalesce because he is king. Each of these roles is preformed by the kings in 
their service to the gods. They build temples consulting both plans and omens 
and finally move the image of the god into his new home. These kingly 
activities can be witnessed early in dedicatory inscriptions of Gudea in the 
Sumerian period and late in those of Nabonaidus, the last king of Babylon. 
Although M arduk is the new lord of the gods, he still acts in piety toward his 
parents and in a kingly manner.
In the end, it is Ea's and M arduk's skill and art which overcome the
9For cuneiform text, see appendix.
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birth mother. In contrast to Egypt, where the birth of the gods leads to good 
things like the sun which gives life to the w orld, in Mesopotamia, birth is 
uncontrolled and leads to disorder and destruction. Nature tends to disorder 
and requires the strong guidance of a king. After all the Enuma Elish is not 
just about the exaltation of Marduk, it is a strong argum ent and model for a 
powerful king to bring order to a dangerous world. The king needs all the 
skills of seer, architect, fighter, and magician to protect the world from the 
forces of nature.
There is a profound ambivalence about the sea and the forces of nature. 
The sea is recognized as the ultimate source of life. It gives birth to the gods 
and its body provides the material for creation. The material source rather 
than being passive, is active and hostile and must be overcome and constantly 
governed, just as the myth of M arduk was recited year by year in the A kitu  
festival to reactualize his trium ph over nature.
biblical materials
Biblical texts nowhere state or argue for creatio ex nihilo. It is a doctrine 
which must be interpreted into biblical texts. In fact, biblical texts are strangely 
quiet about the material for the cosmos. They neither identify nor deny any 
material for the world. As in Egypt and Babylon, the waters do play a role in 
the creation. It is a theme most developed in Genesis and in Job, but also 
touched upon in other loci. However, in contrast to both Egypt and Babylon, 
Genesis prioritizes the art of God over the generative power of the waters.
Biblical materials are remarkably consistent in describing God's creative 
acts in terms of building, a motif which recurs in the Pentateuch, the Prophets, 
the Psalms and the Wisdom literature. Recent studies have also brought to
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light the view of the world as a temple,10 an aspect which biblical literature 
shares with Mesopotamian. In biblical literature, the building analogy would 
prove more fruitful than the biological in the consideration of the skill and 
knowledge demonstrated in the construction of the world.
As in Mesopotamia, the heavens and earth were viewed as a temple, 
i.e., a dwelling place for god. Isaiah 66 makes clear the view of the world as 
the divine palace:
Thus said Yahweh:
The heavens are my throne and the earth my footstool.
Where is the house which you built for me, and where is my 
resting place?
My hand made all these things, so that all these things came 
about, says Yahweh.
To this one I look, to the humble, the broken spirit, and the 
one who fears my word. (Isaiah 6 6 .1-2)11
The heaven and earth obviate any need for a human built house for God,
10JonD. Levenson, op. cit., pp. 78-99, argues for the temple as microcosm in biblical and 
post-biblical material.
L. R. Fisher, "Creation at Ugarit and in the Old Testament," Vetus Testamentum  6, 1965, pp. 
313-324, finds the tem ple as microcosm in the Enuma Elish, p. 318. His reading of Psalm  93 
provides an interesting parallel to the reading of Enuma Elish presented here. He finds in the 
Psalm, "conflict, kingship, order, and temple," p. 322.
Westermann, op. cit., p. 29, does not find Fisher's association of temple building and creation in 
the Enuma Elish persuasive, but he does not give any critique.
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because they are his temple.
A rchitectonic language carries over into the descrip tions of the 
construction of heaven and earth. Again from Isaiah:
Thus says God, Yahweh,
W ho created the heavens and stretched them  out, who 
hammered out the earth and its produce.
Who gave breath to the people upon the earth, and spirit to 
those who walk on it. (Isaiah 42.5)12
God's activities in creating the heaven and earth are terms used to describe 
the construction of the tabernacle and temple, which serves to reinforce the 
view of heaven and earth as a temple. The heavens are stretched out (D!l, Qi3) 
just as the tabernacle was (Exodus 33.7).
This view of the construction of the heavens finds a close parallel in 
the Enuma Elish, where M arduk spreads the heavens as a canopy (4.139, 
quoted above). Meanwhile, the earth is stamped dow n (S?p“l) as the overlay 
for the altar was (N um bers  17.3-4). More often the earth is described as 
having been founded (“10*’).13
Job gives the building analogy its most dramatic expression:
Gird yourself as a hero and I will ask you, and you will instruct 
me.
W here were you when I founded the earth? Tell me, if you 
have understanding.
Who set its measure, if you know, and who stretched a line 
across it?
12
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U pon w hat w ere its pylons sunk, and w ho p lan ted  its 
cornerstone?
When the daw n stars rejoiced together and all the children of 
God shouted,
And the sea was shut up with doors, as it burst forth from the 
womb.
As I placed a cloud as its garment, and darkness as its swaddling- 
band,
I set my limit upon it, and I placed bars and doors.
I said "this far shall you go, and no further. Here will your 
waves set themselves at their height." (Job 38. 3-11)14
Here we perceive the same ambivalence toward the force of the waters 
as found in Egypt and Babylon. The waters must be controlled in order to 
allow the earth to appear and give life. Job uses the building analogy to 
establish the superiority of divine knowledge over hum an. God's power and 
wisdom are demonstrated in his architectonic control of the waters.
Job is not alone in his use of the building analogy to develop the theme 
of God's wisdom. The themes of wisdom and build ing recur together in 
Jeremiah (10.12-13; 31.37; 32.17; 51.15-16), but attain their most poetic expression 
in Proverbs 8:
Yahweh possessed me at the beginning of his way, at the 
beginning of his works then.
14
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From old I was installed first from the beginning of the earth. 
When the depths were not, I danced, when the founts were not 
heavy with water.
Before the mountains were sunk, before the hills, I danced. 
W hen he had not yet made the earth and its exterior, and the 
top of the dust of the world.
W hen he established the heavens, I was there, when he set the 
limit on the face of the depth.
W hen he bound the clouds above, and fixed the founts of the 
depth,
W hen he set his law on the sea, that the waters should not 
violate its decree,
W hen he set the foundation of the earth, I was w ith him as an 
advisor.
I was a delight every day, I laughed before him the entire time.
I laughed in  the whole of the earth and my delight was with 
the hum an children. (Proverbs 8.22-31)15
Wisdom is personified and set with God in the construction of the heavens, 
earth, and depths.
The most familiar passage concerning creation is also the most difficult 
to understand. Genesis chapter 1 has been interpreted both as teaching creatio 
ex nihilo16 and creation from chaotic waters.17 The theological difference
15
:T«n r^&an nip iDii rrefcn rrirr
I T  •• J T  ▼ J ♦ V |\V  A I ”  J ‘ •• • t |  TV T  It
:pjpoip.n ,rpp3 n?i»o 
:D^ ~H3D3 rip nianrrrip'
T r n r t i n  riibaa’3a4? o n n  Ditpa
n'inas? ®#t) 'niinrn f i»
:Dinn ipinaA rg ogb?»tfi3pna
:Dinn nirs? nfha b^TaaJTD,’pnb' ibaip 
r 'a -n p s? ,!  mb d t o  ~ ip n  \Q*b i a f e b  
] ip a  n r is n  t p a n o f a  i p r a  
vsaV npnba" br i or oW rtf nrrojj 
1 a i Q i x ' i i - m * P"ik bans npnWa
IT  T  /*• I
cf. Proverbs 3.19.
16Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A  commentary, trans. John H. Marks, 2nd ed, Philadelphia:
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can be traced to a difference in readings of the sequence of the first three 
verses of Genesis}9 Traditionally verse 1 and 2 of Genesis 1 were read in 
sequential order. First, God created the heaven and earth (i.e., the universe) 
and they were in a dark and chaotic state until God created light. At least 
from the time of Rashi (Commentary , ad loc.), commentators have questioned 
the sequential ordering  of verses 1 and 2. Rashi and  m any m odern 
commentators read verse 1 as a temporal clause, "In the beginning of God's 
creating heavens and earth." Verse 2 follows either as the main clause or as a 
continuation of the tem poral clause. In either case verse 2 describes the 
chaotic state of the waters, upon which God begins to act in verse 3 by creating 
light.
The traditional ordering reads:
In the beginning God created heavens and earth,
2) and the earth was empty and void.
Darkness was upon the waters and the divine wind stirred upon
the depth,
3) and God said let there be light, and there was light.19
The alternative reads:
Westminster Press, 1972, p. 49.
17E. A. Speiser, Genesis, Anchor Bible, vol. 1, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1964, p.
13.
lsFor an extensive discussion and bibliography concerning the sequence of the first three 
verses, see Westermann, op. cit., pp. 93-98. Westermann takes verse 1 as an independent sentence, 
but separates it from the rest of the narrative as a heading, p. 94. This leaves the w a w  (and) at 
the beginning of verse 2 to hang on nothing. Neither the traditional nor temporal-clause reading 
of verse 1 leaves verse 2 dangling in this way.
19
:pan n*n awn nx n'ribx *na rraftna 
n'7ibn mn oinn 'isrbv •ntfm Vdi ’inn rirrn nxm
VI -  J  I A 1 J** I “  |  V  V I T  / T  I T  I V  T  T
:D’Qn nanin 
n i N - r n
I * 11“  A J  * I \  • VI /  ~
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In the beginning o f  God's creating heavens and earth,
2) the earth was empty and void, etc.
or:
In the beginning o f  God's creating heavens and earth,
2) the earth being empty and void,
darkness being upon the waters and the divine w ind stirring
upon the waters,
3) then God said let there be light, and there was light.
According to version one, God first creates the world which is dark and 
empty and light follows as the second act of creation. Version two and three 
both suggest that the darkness and emptiness of verse 2 are prior to the first 
act of God's creation: the formation of light. As such, the pre-cosmic waters 
would be a precondition to God's acts of creation.
In the attem pt to discern w hether verse 1 should be taken as an 
independent sentence or as a temporal clause, much discussion has focused 
on whether the first word, rPttfNIS, is construct or absolute. If it is construct, 
the clause is temporal. If absolute, it introduces a main clause. Morphologically, 
it is impossible to tell. has the same form in both construct and
absolute states. Some have argued that it is a construct because it does not 
have an article,20 but the mere absence of the article is not decisive. The 
absence of an article can indicate either a construct or an indefinite noun.
Even if verse 1 is read as a temporal clause, verse 2 cannot describe a 
state of affairs which is prior to the creation of heaven and earth. Verse 2
“ So Speiser, op. cit., p. 12.
See the bibliography in Westermann, op. cit., pp. 95 f.
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begins w ith a noun followed by a preterite tense verb. That should indicate 
action which precedes or is concomitant with the previously described action. 
But verse 2 cannot describe action that is prior to verse 1 because it describes 
the state of the earth and that cannot precede the creation of the earth. Thus, 
verse 2 describes a state which is concomitant with verse 1: i.e., the state of 
the earth at the instant of creation. A close parallel is found at the beginning 
of Genesis chapter 2:
4) On the day in which Yahweh God made earth and heavens,
5) no plant of the field was yet upon the earth and no green of 
the field had yet sprouted because Yahweh God had not sent 
rain upon the earth and there was no human to work the land,
6) and a fount went up from the earth and watered the face of 
the land,
7) then God formed a hum an from the dust of the land.21
Verse 4 is a temporal phrase describing the creation of the earth, followed by a 
description of the initial incomplete state of the earth (vv. 5-6), followed by a 
subsequent act of creation (v. 7). Chapter 1, verses 1-3 have a parallel structure: 
a temporal clause (v. 1), followed by a description of the empty state of the 
earth (v. 2), followed by the next act of creation: the creation of light (v. 3). In 
each passage, the second verse describes the condition of that which was created 
in the first verse, and must therefore be concomitant or consequent upon the 
first verse. The verb in Genesis 1.2 is a preterite indicating concomitance with 
21
:DinBh p »  D,ni?K rnrr n to  ova 
nno rnfen atosrbzn p t a  rrrr bnannfen rpfc i 
ra cnai pan-Vy b'nWrniT T&orTa^a nai’
\  “ I I “  |  • “  J T  T  » |  V T  T  “  • Vt <T  t • t • « AT I •
npbm pNrrp  
ra»a ns i^ nbixrnabatf biNrfriN n 'ih r*  mrrSa”!
\  T  “  I / -  • -  T  T  • :  J T  |  • T  T  T  T  I T  V * ? !  T  ! V • “
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verse 1. The verb in  Genesis 2.5 is imperfect, indicating a consequential 
state.22
Read in this way Genesis 1 neither affirms nor denies creatio ex nihilo. 
The empty state of verse 2 is not prior to creation. On the other hand, the text 
does not explain the origination of the waters. The waters may have always 
been present and the empty earth was created in their midst: creatio ex aquis.
Just as easily, verse 2 could describe the first created state of both the 
earth and the heaven. As heaven and earth of verse 1 describe the created 
universe, verse 2 describes the state of that universe. The lower part of the 
universe, the earth, is empty and void, because it is covered by waters. Once 
the waters are cleared from it plants begin to grow upon it (Genesis 1. 10-11). 
The heaven is dark  and watery. The heaven has not yet been formed as the 
firmament between the waters (Genesis 1. 6-7).
W hile Genesis 1 nowhere describes the creation of the waters, they do 
not play the active role they do in Mesopotamia. Instead they are subject to 
division and gathering by God into the super-and sub-caelic waters and into 
the seas. They do not bring forth life except at the command of God, in direct 
contrast to the priority of the fecundity of the waters in the Enki myths and 
the Enuma Elish. In Genesis, biology follows artifice. The trium ph of artifice 
over nature provides the material for the doctrine of creation from nothing, 
but it had yet to find expression.
Some passages, like the passage from Job 38 quoted above and Genesis
^ p e ise r , op. cit., p. 12, also notes the parallels betw een Genesis 1.1-3 and Genesis 
2.4-7. He argues that Genesis 1.2 and Genesis 2.5-6  are both parenthetical clauses, but does not 
note the sequence of tenses.
Westermann is not fond of the parallel. He argues that the Genesis 1.1 differs from 2.4 b "inasmuch 
as 2.4 b gives an indication of time and is saying something different from v. 7," p. 97. But 
Genesis 1.1 also has a time word and it also says something different from v. 3.
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1, appear to presuppose the existence of waters at the foundation of the earth. 
Given the N ear Eastern parallels, it would seem to be quite natural to take 
waters as the prim e material for the creation. On the other hand, Proverbs 8 
makes it clear that wisdom was with God before the waters.
In fact the biblical literature presents a range of views: from the hostile 
forces of w ater in Job 38, which demonstrate the closest parallel to the Enuma  
Elish; to the passive waters of Genesis 1, where the fecundity of the waters 
follows God's art (in contrast to the order of the Enki myths and the Enuma  
Elish); to the preexistence of wisdom in Proverbs.
Even in Job 38, God's construction over the waters does not parallel the 
Enuma Elish in that the construction does not follow upon battle with or 
slaying of the waters. In fact it is the abiding presence of the power of the 
waters which speaks to the ingenuity of God's design.
The building analogy would seem to imply the use of building materials, 
as it does in the Enuma Elish and even in Plato's Timaeus, yet biblical accounts 
are silent about the material for creation. Although depths can be interpreted 
as the material, nowhere are they or anything else explicitly identified as the 
material for the cosmos. The closest to an expression of creatio ex nihilo is 
found in the w isdom  passage from Proverbs 8 quoted above, which puts 
wisdom before the depths. It does not go as far as ex nihilo. It does teach that 
even the waters are subject to divine wisdom, but the priority of wisdom over 
the ordered manifestations of sea, earth, and heaven does not imply creation 
without any m aterial or chaotic origin. Verses 27 to 29 make clear that it is 
the ordered forms of the depths which wisdom  helps to establish and to 
demarcate. W isdom was present before the ordering of heaven, depths, and 
earth, not necessarily prior to any chaotic stuff. The text is not discussing the
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presence or absence of any disordered or hostile material. It tells us nothing 
about the material for creation, only its wise construction.
post-biblical and deuterocanonical texts
Among tw entieth century scholars, creatio ex nihilo has sometimes 
been attributed to some figures of Early Judaism, but the texts cited to support 
such attribution are ambiguous at best, while in other places, creatio ex materia 
is clearly stated. The alleged statements of creatio ex nihilo do not display the 
sufficient clarity or argumentation that would have been required to establish 
a completely novel idea. Creatio ex nihilo would have been a unique position 
and could never have been justified w ithout considerable explanation or 
argumentation. A priori, we should be suspicious of the single line statements 
that are supposed to represent the first expressions of creatio ex nihilo.
non-rabbinic Early Judaism
Hellenized Jews could easily accept the common Greek teaching of the 
qualitiless m atter.23 The w riter of the Wisdom o f Solomon, dated to the 
reign of Caligula, 37-41 C.E. by David Winston,24 clearly accepted the notion 
of creation from matter:25
“John MacDonald, The Theology o f the Samaritans, London: SCM Press, 1964, p. 118-123, 
argued that Marqah, the fourth century Samaritan thinker, was so Hellenized as to develop an 
emanationist theory of creation.
MacDonald's view  has not been supported in a recent study of Marqah, Alexander Broadie, A  
Samaritan Philosophy, Leiden: Brill, 1981, p. 81.
2,|David Winston, The Wisdom o f Solomon, Anchor Bible Series, Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1979, p.3.
“So Winston, art. cit., p. 192.
Also Winston, W isdom , pp. 38-40.
Contra J. Reider, The Book o f Wisdom, N ew  York: Harper & Brothers, 1957, p. 145. He argues 
that as a Jewish text Wisdom o f Solomon m ust have tacitly held that a creatio ex nihilo
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For your omnipotent hand found no difficulty even in creating 
the world from formless matter. (Wisdom o f Solomon 11.17a)26
There are no examples of writers from the period challenging the prevailing 
opinions by introducing creatio ex nihilo. Sometimes 2 Maccabees 7.28, dated 
between 78 and 63 B.C.E. by Jonathen Goldstein,27 is cited as an example, but a 
close reading does not support the assertion:28
I pray you, son, look to heaven and earth and seeing everything 
in them, know that God made them from non-being, and the 
hum an race began in the same way. ( 2 Maccabees 7.28)29
Non-being refers to the non-existence of the heavens and earth before God's 
creative act. It does not express absolute non-existence, only the prior non­
existence of the heavens and earth. They were made to exist after not existing. 
The use of eic ook ovtos in this relative sense can be found in Aristotle who 
refers to the generation of a new substance eK ouk ovtos (de Generatione 
A n im a l iu m  741 b 22 f.), although he denies that something can come from
absolutely nothing (Physics 187 b 26 ff., for discussion see below, chapter 4).
occurred before the stated creatio ex materia because the author could not have accepted the 
Greek notion of eternal, formless matter. At best this begs the question. At worst it ignores the 
evidence for creatio ex materia found in Midrash and Philo.
26ou yap f|7ropei q  7ravxo5uvap6s aou xtip  
m i  K tiaaaa  xov Koapov e^ d|io<t>ou uAtis.
ed. Alfred Rahlfs, Sep tuag in ta , Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1935.
^Jonathen Goldstein, Second Maccabees, Anchor Bible vol 41A, Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1983, p. 83.
“ Wolfson, P h ilo  1, pp. 302-3, holds that the text is inconclusive with respect to creatio  
ex nihilo.
^a^ico ere, xetcvov, dva|3A.e\|ravxa eig xov oupavov m i  xfiv yf)v m i  xa ev avxois navxa  
iSovxa yvcovai oxi ook IE, ovxwv dxoiriaev a iix a  o Geos, Kai xo xuv dvGpcoruov yevos ouxco 
yivexai. ed. Alfred Rahlfs.
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Philo
Creatio ex nihilo has long been a debate in  Philonic scholarship.30 
Wolfson tried  to settle the debate by com paring the teachings concerning 
matter in Plato and Philo, whose career probably ended before 40 C.E.31 Wolfson 
claimed that Plato taught two types of matter, "matter in which" (the receptacle) 
and "m atter from which" (the elements). Wolfson then proceded to cite texts 
which show that Philo taught that space (the receptacle) and bodies were 
created (de Opificio Mundi7.29; de Confusione Linguarum 27.136). Therefore, 
Philo w ould have taught the creation of both kinds of matter.32
However, Wolfson's argument misses the mark, because his distinction 
of "m atter from which" and "matter in which" cannot be supported from the 
text of Plato. As we have seen, Plato d id  not use the term matter, and it is 
m isleading to apply it to the receptacle. The receptacle does not change into 
anything, but merely provides a locus for change. Plato also argued that the 
four traditional elements were not elemental bodies, but w ere constructed. 
They are not prime m atter for Plato.
There is also no indication that Philo distinguished "m atter in which" 
from "m atter from which." Philo seems to have understood m atter in Stoic 
terms, as a passive principle in contrast to intellect as an active principle:
^toavid W inston has argued that Philo does not teach creatio ex nihilo  in "Philo's 
Theory of Cosmogony," Religious Syncretism in A ntiqu ity , ed. B. A. Pearson, Missoula: Scholars 
Press, 1975, pp. 157-171. W inston cites several Philonic texts that state that God creates from 
formless matter (de Opificio M und i 2.8, de Specialibus Legibus 4.187) and argues that matter 
could not have been created from nothing because it is "unlovely" and a principle of disorder in 
Philo's cosmos. Philo also expressly denies that anything can com e about from non-being and 
pass into non-being (de Aeternitate M undi 5).
31 Wolfson, P h ilo , p. 4.
32W olfson, P h ilo , pp. 303-309.
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For Moses having reached the very summit of philosophy and 
learned of the most useful and essential things of nature, knew 
that it was most necessary that among beings there be an active 
and a passive cause, and that the active cause, the intellect of all 
is most pure and unmixed, greater than virtue, greater than 
understanding , greater than  the good itself, and than the 
beautiful itself. The passive is soulless and motionless of itself, 
but when moved and shaped and ensouled by the intellect it 
changed into the perfect work, this cosmos, (de Opificio Mundi 
2.8-9)33
Philo description of m atter parallels that of the Stoics of Diogenes Laertius' 
account (Long and Sedley 44 B, quoted above, chapter 2).
The best textual evidence for uncreated matter comes from Quis Rerum 
Divinarum Heres Sit, where Philo explicitly excludes m atter from the things 
God praises at the consummation of creation. God praises all the things 
which he has created, but Philo notes that does not include matter:
There is nothing of value among material things with God. He 
communicates the same art to all, equally. Concerning which 
it says in the holy scriptures, "God saw all that he had made, 
and behold they were very good" (Genesis 1.31). Those things 
which received the same praise from the Praiser are of completely 
equal value. But God did not praise the m atter which was 
fashioned, which was without soul and wayward and dissolute, 
even corrupted by itself, uneven and unequal, but he praised 
his own artful works which were perfected according to one 
equal, even power and similar, or even the same, understanding.
(Heres 159 f.)34
“ Mcouofjs Se m i  <t>i/Vocro(t>ias in' ai)xf)v <ti0daas dtcpoxri'ca m i  xpT|crpois x a  noXXa m i  
cjuveicxiKCoxaxa xcov xfjs <]>ucrecos a v a S i8 a x 0 eis eyvco 81), oxi d v a y m io x a x o v  ecm v  ev xois oucri 
xo pev e iv a i Spaaxi^piov a ix io v , xo Se 7ra0 T)x6 v, m i  oxi xo pev 8 pacrxr|piov 0  xcov oAcov votjs 
ecrxiv eiAiKpivecjxaxo? m i  dicpai<i>ve<Txaxos, Kpeixxcov f| apexf] m i  Kpeixxcov f| e7ri(jxf|pr| m i  
Kpeixxcov f} a iixo  xo a y a 0 o v  icai a u x 8  xo icaA6 v, xo 8 e 7ra0T|x6v a\|/u%ov Kai aK ivrixov 
eauxoO, Kivr)0ev 8 e m i  axT|paxicy0ev Kai \|/uxco0ev vno xoo vou pexepaAev ei? xo xeAeioxaxov 
epyov, xovSe xov K oapov ed. Leopold Cohn, Philonis Opera, v. 1, Berlin: Reimar, 1896, p. 2 f.
^ x ip io v  8 ' ouSev xcov ev iiA ais 7rap a 0ew- 8 1 0  xfjs a u xf|s  p exe8 coKe 7ia a i  xexvris e^ 
icrou. irapo m i  ev ie p a is  ypa<i>dis A eyexar "eiSev 0  0eo? x a  7ravxa o a a  e7roiriaev, Kai i8ou
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All that God has created is good and praiseworthy. M atter is the source of 
corruption in the world and it is not praiseworthy because it is not created. 
Despite his many borrowings from the Stoics, Philo has retained the dualism 
of Plato, and like Plato makes eternal and intractable m atter the source of 
difficulty and necessity in the world. Difficulty and evil does not flow from 
the source of good and reason. It is not from God.35
KaAa Atav," xa 5e xou aiixou xuyxavovxa twatvou ra p a  xw em nvouvxi 7ravxcos eaxiv iaoxipa. 
eTrqvecre 5e o 0e6s ou xqv 8TipioupyTi0eicrav uAtjv, xf)v a\|/i>xov Kai 7rAT|HpeAfj Kai SiaAuxriv, 
2xi 5e 00apxr]v eauxfjs dvcopaAov xe Kai aviaov, aAAa xa  eauxou xe%viKd epya Kaxa piav  
IcrT|v Kai 6paAf|v Suvapiv Kai dmaxTjpTiv opoiav Kai xf)v atixfiv d7ioxeAecr0evxa. ed. Paul 
Wendland, Philonis Opera, v. 3, p. 36 f.
“Richard Sorabji has also argued that Philo taught creatio ex nihilo, at least in one 
text, in Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in A ntiquity and the Early Middle Ages, 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 203-209. Sorabji interpreted a passage from 
Philo's de Providentia  to say that, "There was no period of idleness w hen matter already 
existed, but God had not yet imposed order" (p. 206). De Providentia  1.7, in Aucher's Latin 
translation of the Armenian, certainly does appear to teach that God created form in matter 
without time preceding the ordering of the cosmos. But given that he saw matter as motionless 
in itself, it w ould have been atemporal before it had form. Philo said that time was created 
with the cosmos, so the cosm os could still have been constructed from a motionless, timeless 
matter.
However, Sorabji's reading is not supported by C. Hannick's recent German translation of the 
Armenian published in Baltes, D ieW eltentstehung des platonischem Timaeos nach den antiken 
Interpreten, I, Leiden: Brill, 1976, p. 89.
Naturally there are great difficulties in dealing with Latin and German translations of an 
Armenian version of Philo's lost Greek original. Those difficulties become apparent when dealing 
with the question of creation ex nihilo.
Later in book one of de Providentia, Philo affirms creatio ex materia. In chapter 20, he notes 
that Plato and M oses both taught creation from prior material:
Haec Plato a D eo facta fuisse novit; et materiam per se ornatu carentem, in 
mudo cum ornatu ipso prodiisse; hac enim erant primae causae, unde et mundus 
fuit. Quoniam et Iudaeorum Legislator Moyses aquam, tenebras, et chaos dixit 
ante mundum fuisse. Plato autem materiam. ed. Mireille Hadas-Lebel, Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 1973, p. 146.
In chapter 23 Philo lists the four causes of creation, one of which is matter:
Verum enim vero creationis eius pulchras asseruere causas: nempe Deum, A  quo; 
materiam, Ex quo; instrumentum, Per quod. Instrumentum autem Dei estVerbum.
Ad quid denique? utsitargumentum. Creaturarum ergo causa estDeus, ut Creator: 
corruptionis autem, ut Iudex. ed. Hadas-Lebel, p. 148.
The apparent contradicitions have led Henry Chadwick to suspect de Providentia  1.7 has been
93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
M idrash
M idrashi m36 by their very nature show great care to follow the biblical 
text, bu t this is especially true when dealing with creation, where the Rabbis 
were careful not to go beyond the biblical text as they understood it.
The collection of M idrash on Genesis, Bereshit Rabba, was probably 
compiled and w ritten in its present form around 400 C.E.37 The Rabbis to 
whom the individual Midrashim are attributed are dated by their generations 
in two major divisions, the Tannaim and Amoraim. The former are thought 
to be before 220 C.E. and the latter are between 200 C.E. and 500 C.E.38
As we shall see, in discussing the creation of the world three overriding 
concerns surface again and again. 1) The Rabbis were concerned not to inquire 
about things before the beginning (Bereshit Rabba 1.10).39 2) They were studious
in their opposition to any attribution of helpers to God in the creation (Bereshit
reworked by Christians, "St Paul and Philo of Alexandria," Bulletin o f the John Rylands 
L ibrary  48,1965-66, pp. 286-307, p. 292, n. 6. It is also possible that something has gotten lost in 
all the translations. Given the obscurities of the various versions and the manifest contradictions 
in Aucher's translation, if Sorabji's interpretation is followed, it seem s better to rely on other 
portions of the Philonic corpus.
As Sorabji admits, "Outside the de Providentia, Philo does not always stick to the view  that 
matter has a beginning," op. cit., p. 208.
"Alexander Altmann, "A Note on the Rabbinic Doctrine of Creation," Journal o f Jewish 
S tud ies  6 /7 , 1955-56, pp. 195-206, recognizes that many of the Rabbis did not teach creatio ex 
n ih ilo , but he finds it in Bereshit Rabba 1.9. For discussion, see below.
David Winston, 'T he Book of W isdom's Theory of Cosmogony," H istory o f Religions 11,1971, 
pp. 185-202, argues that the Rabbis did not teach creatio ex nihilo, see below.
^See Jacob Neusner, Midrash an Introduction, Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1990, p. 143. 
According toNeusner, Bereshit Rabba came to a close within 50 years of 400 C.E.
MSee Hermann Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, N ew  York: Harper, 
1931, pp. 107-134. Strack dates the second generation of Tannaim to ca. 90-130 C.E. and the 
third generation to ca. 130-160. He lists seven generations of Amoraim, from 210-476 C.E.
^On the limits of acceptable speculation, see David Halperin, The Merkabah in Rabbinic 
Literature, N ew  Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1980, p. 53. Halperin argues 
that the Gnostics served as a warning to the Rabbis concerning the dangers of speculation about 
cosmogony.
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Rabba 1.3, 1.14). 3) Likewise they warned against ascribing an evil material 
origin of the cosmos.
The existence of material at the beginning of the world was within the 
realm of acceptable debate. The scriptures could be interpreted to teach the 
creation of all the visible world including the waters. But there was no need 
to affirm creatio ex nihilo. In fact the injunction against prying into what 
came before kept one from inventing a theory of creatio ex nihilo. Creation 
from a passive material already avoided concerns 2) and 3). To go beyond that 
and posit creatio ex nihilo would be in  danger of violating concern 1) by 
speculating about the origins beyond scriptural warrant.
The Early Jewish writers, who were more philosophically inclined than 
the Rabbis, were quite comfortable adopting the least threatening philosophical 
position, creation from formless matter, the position chosen by both Philo 
and the author of the Wisdom o f Solomon.
The Rabbis' concern about going back before the origin of the world was 
expressed in the Talm ud in the form of a dialogue w ith the chief of all 
Hellenizers, A lexander himself:
He [Alexander] said to them, "Were the heavens or the earth 
m ade first?" They [the elders of the Negev] answ ered, 'T he 
heavens were made first as it says: 'In the beginning God created 
the heavens and the earth.'" He asked them, "Was light made 
first or darkness?" They said, 'T here is no solution for this 
thing. If they said to him that darkness was made first, as it is 
written, 'A nd the earth was chaos and darkness' and then 'God 
said let there be light and there was light,' they thought perhaps 
he w ould ask, 'W hat is above and what is below and w hat is 
before and what is after.' (B. Tamid 32 a)40
40
n ^ n n  ix - a a  a w  n o x  p a n  in  n ^ n n  i*n23 | r 6  m u
}7]b -iqn p a n  o w n  na d t6 n  rywmawa?
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The question of the priority of light or darkness appears to be one which 
would have been a point of conflict between the Rabbis following the Genesis 
narrative and Greek philosophers who taught that darkness was a deprivation 
of light and only explicable in terms of light. The Rabbis avoid the question 
of priority not because they could not answer it but because they felt themselves 
being draw n into a progression of questions which would lead them back 
before "In the beginning." In two questions they have progressed from the 
origin of the heavens, the work of day two of creation, to the creation of light, 
the work of the first day, and there was no place left to go next, so they broke 
off the debate altogether.
The same concern not to go above, below, before, or after is expressed 
in the Midrash. Rabbi Yona (A 5)41 in the name of Rabbi Levi (A 3) taught:
Rabbi Yona said in the name of Rabbi Levi, "Why was the 
world created by Bet? [2 the first letter of Genesis] What is Bet?
It is closed on its sides and open in its face. Thus, you have no 
authority to preach what is above, what is below, what is before, 
and what is after." (Bereshit Rabba 1.10)42
•na’ai nna nb pa an an'ra *6 n aa  ym ia r6 nn *022 
n m  "(®m mai inn nn*»n p a m  2*nsn n^nn anaa ym n'b 
no 'bvvb Tia xnb'i ■’"120 v n  ma vr na*n 
nma*? nai cna^ na naa1? nai nbv nb
Babylonian Talmud, v. 19, N ew  York: Otzar Hasefarim, 1965.
The Babylonian Talm ud  w as probably completed in the mid-sixth century, Strack, op. cit., p. 
71.
41I.e., fifth generation Am oraim , see Strack for these and other generational 
identifications, loc. cit.
42
□ino nr '2 na ,'22 aV?s?n an2D Ha*? b^ 'n dbd rav *n 
n ^ a 1? na arm1? man ^  |*»a -p  vaa^a mnai im s a
mna^ nai n'isb na naa*? nai
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Note that it also prohibits speculation about what comes after. In contrast to 
Stoic speculations concerning cosmic cycles and infinity of worlds, no 
speculation went to what worlds came before or after. Speculation about the 
plans and purposes of God were engaged in but not about worlds or about 
matter and its roles.
The Rabbis forcefully denied that God had active helpers in creation, be 
they angels or cosmic powers. Rabbi Lulyani bar Tavry in the name of Rabbi 
Isaac said that both sides of the Rabbinic argument as to whether the angels 
had been created on the second or fifth day made the point that angels provided 
no assistance for the creation of the heavens and the earth on the first day 
(Bereshit Rabba 1.3). Rabbi Akiva (T 2) noted that the heaven and earth were 
specifically marked as objects in the first verse of Genesis lest any one could 
say that they had aided in creation (Bereshit Rabba 1.14). The Rabbis were 
loath to have anyone ascribe divinity or glory due to God to other agents. 
Their arguments could apply to Greeks (philosophically minded or otherwise), 
Iranians, Gnostics, and Christians.43
They did not go so far as to deny that God had used matter, even evil 
matter, in creation. They warned against making the statement but did not 
deny it outright:
Rab said, "Let him have none of 'your great goodness' (Psalm 
31.20), in the manner of the world, as the king of flesh and 
blood who built a palace in a place of sewers, filth, and garbage.
Would not anyone who came and said, 'this palace is built in a
ed. J. Theodor, Berlin: Itzkowsky, 1912, p. 8.
“ Winston has argued that the opponents in these various debates included Gnostics 
and Manichaeans, p. 187-91.
Hans-Friedrich Weiss also points to Gnostics as the oponents and draws parallels to the Christian 
response to the sam e opponents, Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Hellenistischen und 
Paldstinischen Judentums, Berlin: Akademie, 1966, pp. 86-92.
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
place of sewers, filth, and garbage' suffer injury. Thus, would 
not anyone who comes and says 'th is world is created in the 
m idst of chaos (1PD1 in n )  and darkness' suffer injury."
Rabbi Huna in the name of bar Qapora said, "Were it not written, 
how w ould I interpret 'God created the heaven and the earth' 
from these: from 'the earth was chaos, etc.'" (Bereshit Rabba 
1.5)44
The parable only serves to warn against making the ascription. It is inadvisable 
to make the statem ent even if it were true. Obviously the best policy is to 
avoid such speculation altogether. There was no proof that they could bring 
to deny such a claim. The parallel between "sewers, filth, and garbage" and 
tohu wawohu (17131 17111) shows that the latter no longer had the sense of 
"emptiness and void" as they did in Genesis, but had taken on a more corrupt 
aspect (hence the translation "chaos").
Rab H una (T 5),45 in the name of bar Qappara (T 5), felt that on the 
basis of Genesis 1.2, creation from chaos had to be accepted, even though he is 
hardly enthusiastic in expressing it. He shares the concern about speculation 
about w hat came before the world and does so only on the basis of the biblical 
text.
As for visible elements before the foundation of the world, opinion
cm nan -|^n c b m  ani33 ,-pia 3n nas V? w  naa 21 
ais^ a? **73 .n n ’oni na»am p o n  oipos p 'ra  nai3 
ira nvmoni na»am p o n  aipos rri33 it p ^ a  nai*? 
"jinn an33 nrn c6is>n nai*? jo  aint? ^  bz -p ,anana oaia 
anap ”13 ob» aim “i .anana D3is 13’a -pirn inai inn 
a w n  na o ^ a  anai naia*? nttfaa a^ td  nann 'b-b'H 
■i3i inn nn*»n p a n  }a ,jn ]a p a n  nai
ed. Theodor, p. 3.
45I.e., fifth generation Tannaim.
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although divided, stayed within the bounds set by Scripture. Yehuda bar 
Simon (bar Pazzi of Lydda, A 4) used other biblical passages to explain how 
the heavens and the earth were created:
Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Simon, "From the 
beginning of his creation of the world is 'H e reveals the obscure, 
etc.' (Daniel 2.22), as it is written, 'In the beginning God created 
the heavens,' and it is not interpreted. How is it interpreted?
By these words: 'W ho stretched out the heavens as a veil'
(Isaiah 40.22). 'A nd the earth,' and it is not interpreted. How is 
it interpreted? By these words: 'As he says to the snow, become 
earth, etc.' (Job 37.6). 'And God said let there be ligh t/ and it is 
not interpreted. How is it interpreted? By these words: 'He 
w rapped himself in light as a garment'" (Psalm 104.2). (Bereshit 
Rabba 1.6)46
In the Talmud (Yerushalmi Hagigah 2.1) Rabbi Yehuda bar Pazzi (A 4) presents 
a similar exegesis, presenting the biblical texts according to a natural progression 
of transformation from the original waters:
Rabbi Yudah bar Pazzi preached that at the beginning, the 
universe was waters upon waters. What is the proof. "And 
the spirit of God was borne over the waters" (Genesis 1.2). Then 
he made it into snow, "casting its ice as morsels" (Psalm 147.17).
Then he made it into earth, 'T o  the snow he says 'become 
earth'" (Job 37.6). And the earth stands upon the waters, "In 
order to spread the earth upon the waters" (Psalm 136.6).47
46
■6: Kin arvna nSmno pn® ,ma  m m  ,m\ nraa 
,an® o w n  na on^a ana n®ana t d i  m  anp®» 
p ®  .an*® a'n p a n  nai d®b? pna noian an® p®  
na ,rp on^a man ,'iai p a  nn laa1’ zbvb ® ]bnb an® 
na'wa na naisj en® p^a ,an® xb'i
Talmud Yerushalmi, v. 4, Jerusalem, 1966.
Talmud Yerushalm i probably took its present form at the beginning of the fifth century, Strack, 
op. cit., p. 65.
47
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In contrast to bar Pazzi, Rabbi Gamaliel argues that the depths and 
waters were created (T 2):
A philosopher asked Rabban Gamaliel, "Your God was a great 
artist, but he found for himself good m aterials which helped 
him ." Rabban Gamaliel replied, "W hat are these?" The 
philosopher said, "Chaos, darkness, waters, wind, and depths"
[see Genesis 1.2]. Rabban Gamaliel replied, "May the breath go 
forth from this man. It is w ritten concerning each of these. 
Concerning the creation of chaos, 'Who made peace and created 
evil' (Isaiah 45.7). Concerning darkness, 'Who formed the light 
and created darkness' (ibid.). Concerning the waters, 'Praise 
him, heaven of heavens and the waters, etc.' (Psalm 148.4).
Why? Because, 'H e commanded and they were created' (v. 8). 
Concerning the wind, 'For behold he forms the mountains and 
creates the w ind ' (A m o s  4.13). Concerning the depths, 'W hen 
the depths were not, I danced'" (Proverbs 8.24). (Bereshit Rabba 
1.9)48
His position that all the cosmic forces listed in Genesis 1.2 are created should 
not be taken as a statem ent of creatio ex nihilo. As David Winston has
Kara no .maa ma d‘mam mn n'rnna *»ts la  m v  -i am  
"p^ awa ibv ik&jh irn .n*an *aa bv nania am4?# nm  
p a m  p »  ’in laio ibwb *a p a  iKtpyi im  .o’maa imp
man bv p a n  rpin1? .era bv m aia
ed. Theodor, p. 4.
48
mn bn: n^s ib ia» bwbixi p i  m  buy in# oiaiai^a  
,|ira na *6 ia«  .lmsmottf o^aia naao ib aaa nav6K 
nam n'b iaa , mainm mm mai “jam inai inn n*6 ibk 
m^ a? nen» inai inn nana ana 'na ama ,aiaa ainm mnn 
o w n  •’aa? im ^ n  ma ,-pn anai n a  i s r  -pn ,sn anai 
min msr nan a^ m i .laiaai mas Kin ’a na*? mi cram 
'nbbin mainn paa mainn ,mi anai
ed. Theodor, p. 8.
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argued, in responding to a charge that God had helpers in creation, Gamaliel 
denies that any of the cosmic forces aided God in creation.49 He does not 
deny that there was a passive material, merely that there was any material 
which aided God in the construction of the cosmos.
The Rabbis were quick to deny that God had assistance, but they were 
not willing to go beyond the biblical text to speculate about what came before 
the world, material or otherwise. Gamaliel makes no claim as to what preceded 
the cosmic forces of Genesis 1.2. They could accept passive matter, but lacking 
a clear statement in Scripture they could not go as far as to devise a theory of 
creatio ex nihilo.
So neither in the Rabbis nor in Philo do w e find creatio ex nihilo. 
Given that it was not found in either the Greek or Jewish heritage, its appearance 
among the second century Christians remains mysterious.
49Winston, art. cit., pp. 187 f.
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Chapter 4, Early Church: The origins of creatio ex nihilo
Creatio ex nihilo appeared suddenly in the latter half of the second 
century C.E. Not only did creatio ex nihilo lack precedent, it stood in firm 
opposition to all the philosophical schools of the Greco-Roman world. As we 
have seen, the doctrine was not forced upon the Christian community by 
their revealed tradition, either in Biblical texts or the Early Jewish interpretation 
of them. As we will also see it was not a position attested in the New Testament 
doctrine or even sub-apostolic writings. It was a position taken by the apologists 
of the late second century, Tatian and Theophilus, and developed by various 
ecclesiastical writers thereafter, by Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen. Creatio ex 
nihilo  represents an innovation in the interpretive traditions of revelation 
and cannot be explained merely as a continuation of tradition. Inasmuch as it 
was a radical departure from the intellectual traditions of the larger culture 
and violated its manifest truths, it m ust have been a position which was 
strongly motivated.
Creatio ex nihilo can best be explained as a defense of the most 
controversial part of the Christian kerygma, the resurrection of the dead. It 
took a point as controversial yet essential to the Christian message as the 
resurrection to force the Christians to an equally controversial position as 
creatio ex nihilo. Bodily resurrection made no sense in any of the Greek 
philosophical understandings of the material world. For all the Greek systems 
of thought, sublunary matter was eternally subject to change and could not be 
incorporated into an eternal body. Humans had either to submit to the necessity 
of their own corruption or try to escape from matter as immaterial souls (see 
chapter 2). A hope of resurrection was not only deluded expectation of the
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impossible, for the Platonists it was m isguided in that it sought to preserve 
the m ost unpleasant aspect of the hum an condition, the corporeal. In 
attem pting to take their message to the larger culture, the Christians either 
needed to modify their teaching of resurrection or they needed to make inroads 
into the Greek understandings of the material world. Some Gnostics took the 
first approach and m aintained that the resurrection was not bodily.1 Tatian 
and Theophilus took the opposite tack and vigorously defended the bodily 
resurrection while attacking the Greek philosophical teachings about the 
material creation, linking God's creative power to his ability to raise the dead. 
In contrast to Tatian, Theophilus also turned creatio ex nihilo into an offensive 
weapon, to buttress the leading line of the Christian kerygma, the uniqueness 
of God. Theophilus and Tertullian after him  charged the Greeks with 
introducing another God and w ith lim iting the sovereignty of God by 
introducing m atter as a power equal to God.
G erhardt M ay's careful and well docum ented study, Schdpfung aus 
Nichts,2 shows that creatio ex nihilo did not appear in Christian writings 
until the second century C.E. Although May does not consider or refute 
Dorrie and M erlan's claims that Neopythagoreans taught creatio ex nihilo,3 
he is right on the timing of creatio ex nihilo. As we saw in chapter 2, the 
Neopythagoreans did not teach a creatio ex nihilo. However, May's explanation 
of the causes of creatio ex nihilo are unsatisfactory. May argues that creatio ex
’See the Treatise on the Resurrection, Nag Hammadi Codex I, Coptic Text, translation, 
and commentary in The Gnostic Treatise on Resurrection from Nag Hammadi, Missoula, Montana: 
Scholars Press, 1979.
2Gerhard May, Schdpfung aus dem Nichts: Die Entstehung der Lehre von der Creatio 
ex Nihilo. Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1978. Translated by A. S. Worall, Creatio ex Nihilo: 
The Doctrine o f 'Creation out o f N othing' in Early Christian Thought, Edinburgh: Clark, 1994.
3Stead in a review of May's book, JTS 30,1979, p. 589, noted that May had not considered 
Eudorus as possible background for creatio ex nihilo  (see above, chapter 2).
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n ih ilo  developed naturally when the scriptural teachings of the unity, freedom, 
and om nipotence of God m et Greek philosophical doctrines. It is first 
documented in the writings of Tatian:
Tatian is the first Christian theologian known to us who expressly 
advanced the proposition that matter was produced by God. We 
are concerned here w ith an idea which sooner or later had to be 
d raw n from the biblical belief in  creation, as soon as Christian 
thought engaged in a critical debate with the philosophical doctrine 
of principles .4
According to May, the Gnostic crisis of the second century forced orthodox 
Christians to examine and refine their teachings on creation which led to 
creatio ex nihilo,5 although the conclusion was predetermined by the tradition 
of revelation .6
Contra May, the importance of opposition to Gnostic teachings is not 
evident in  as m uch as creatio ex nihilo first developed in the context of 
anti-Greek apologies not in anti-gnostic writings. Gnosticism does not figure 
in the argum ents of Tatian and Theophilus or in their application of creatio
4May, 1994, p. 150.
At this point, May curiously seem s to exclude Basilides, w ho by his ow n account first taught 
creatio ex nihilo (see below). I think May's statement here is correct, because I do not feel that 
Basilides should be interpreted as teaching creatio ex nihilo (see below).
5May, 1994, p. 152, 'Tatian developed his teaching about the creation of matter in the 
course of controversy w ith gnostic positions."
cf. p. 117, "the gnostic speculations about the origins of matter provided an essential spur to the 
church theologians to seek on their part an answer to this problem.
6May, 1994, p. 132, "the dynamic of the Christian concept of God practically compelled 
acceptance of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, on the other hand how monstrously difficult it 
was for the thought stamped w ith the philosophical tradition to take in the biblical idea of 
creation to its full implications."
Hans-Friedrich W eiss makes a similar argument w ith respect to the Rabbis, Untersuchungen 
zur Kosmologie des Hellenistischen und Paldstinischen Judentums, Berlin: Akademie, 1966, p. 
91 f.
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ex nihilo.7
Neither can creatio ex nihilo be viewed as merely a natural development 
of the tradition of revelation. Revelation did not naturally lead to creatio ex 
n ih ilo  in Philo or Midrash. The Biblical teachings which May cites as leading 
to creatio ex nihilo, the unity, freedom, and omnipotence of God, were all 
doctrines shared by the Middle-Platonists, but Middle-Platonists also held the 
eternity and ontological independence of matter (see chapter 2). They did not 
view the inability of God to create ex nihilo or fully to subject matter to order 
as limitations in God, rather they were limitations and necessities of matter.
7May notes that the early second century Gnostic teacher, Basilides, taught that God 
creates the world out of nothing (d£ ouk ovtcov). May takes Basilides to be teaching creatio ex 
n ih ilo  (May, 1994, p. 75, 77), but by historical accident Basilides' teaching did not influence 
Tatian's and Theophilus' later formulations of creatio ex nihilo  (May, 1994, p. 84).
Contrary to May, I do not think that Basilides' formulation bore anything but a terminological 
similarity to the teaching of Theophilus. For Basilides dE, oiiic ovtcov is not a denial of a 
material substrate as it is in Theophilus. Basilides' statement expresses a strict idealism resulting 
from an ontological reading of Aristotle's Categories. By his reading of the Categories, genera 
have no independent existence but constitute the individual:
If neither animal, which I predicate of all particular animals, nor accidents, 
which are found in that in which they are accidents, can com e about by 
them selves, but from these individuals are com posed, then the three-fold  
substance w as com posed of that which does not exist and not from anything 
else.
Ei 5e ouxe to  £<aov, 8 Kaxd 7rdvxcov X iyco xwv raG' emcTTa i^ cocov, o ik e xa  
aunPepriKOxa, d  dv 7raaiv o is CTuppdpT|Kev eupiaKexai, 5uvaxov aiixd m G’ 
au xa  yevdcrGai, die xouxcov 81 cnj|i7rMipo0xai xa axopa, die xcov ot)k ovtcov 
KaGdCTTTiieev f] xpixfj 5rqpr|pdvTi oiicria ouk d  ^aW oov crvveoTcdoa. R efu ta tio  
O m nium  Haeresium  7.18. ed. Dunker and Schneidewin, p. 352.
For Basilides the non-existent God created the general seed of the world that contained the 
genera of all things, ev ov 8vxcos 'l%ei tauxco tcoAA&s oucricov 7ioA.up6p0cov Kai icoA.uxpwpdx(ov 
Kai 7roA.wuaxdxcov iSdas, R e fu ta tio  7.21, Dunker, p. 358. Neither the most general seed nor the 
genera existed. From the non-existent genera, the non-existent God created the existent 
particulars.
On the question of the authorship of the R efu ta tio , see Gerard Valine, A  Study in Anti-Gnostic 
Polemics: Irenaeus, H ippolytus, and Epiphanius, Waterloo, Ontario , Canada: Published for 
the Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion by Wilfrid, 1981, pp. 41-47.
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The Christians agreed with the M iddle-Platonist doctrine of God in large 
measure. It was not the doctrine of God which lead them to contrary positions 
concerning matter. It was the limitations and necessities in m atter that the 
Christians did not want to accept because they made the resurrection of the 
body impossible and undesirable.
Jonathan Goldstein noticed the connection between creatio ex nihilo 
and resurrection but confessed his inability to explain it .8 He attempted to 
explain creatio ex nihilo as a way out of the two-body paradox:
Jews and Christians did not insist on creation ex nihilo until 
driven to it by the paradox and its challenge to the doctrine of 
resurrection .9
By the two-body paradox, Goldstein means the challenge raised to the bodily 
resurrection which stated that one hum an could directly or indirectly eat the 
flesh of another hum an, rendering the bodily resurrection of both an 
impossibility. As he himself noted, his theory was weak in that the two-body 
paradox has not been documented as a second century problem (p. 192). Even 
if the problem could be found in second century texts, the two-body paradox is 
too incidental to explain sufficiently the total redefinition of m atter which 
creatio ex nihilo represented. Many less drastic approaches could have been 
taken to solve the two-body paradox. As we shall see, the concept of matter in 
the Greek system presented more central problems to the Christian apologists 
and creatio ex nihilo was developed as a fundam ental redefinition of the
“Jonathan Goldstein, "Creatio Ex Nihilo: Recantations and restatements," Journal of 
Jewish Studies 38 (1987), no. 2, pp. 187-194. Goldstein first published his theory in 'The Origins 
of the Doctrine of Creation Ex Nihilo," JJS 35 (1984), pp. 127-135. He published his "Restatement" 
under criticism from David Winston in "Creation Ex Nihilo Revisited: A reply to Jonathan 
Goldstein," JJS 37 (1986), no. 1, pp. 88-91.
’Goldstein, 1987, p. 192.
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material realm in relation to God.
First we turn to the New Testament and sub-apostolic writings to establish 
that creatio ex nihilo was not expounded there. Second, we will consider 
some Christians of the second century who adopted Platonist dualism to show 
that dualism  remained a viable option for Early Christians. These writers 
prove that creatio ex nihilo was not just a natural outgrowth of the revealed 
tradition. Then, we will examine the development of creatio ex nihilo in the 
work of Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, and Irenaeus.
New Testament
2 Peter 3.5 represents a New Testament text which is clearly in tune 
with the Near Eastern traditions which we saw in chapter 3:
For they willingly forget that the heavens existed of old and the 
earth was formed from waters and by waters through the word 
of God. (2 Peter 3.5)10
2 Peter shows continuity w ith the tradition of the creation from waters, but 
uses the creation in a new polemic, to justify the teaching of the end of the 
world and judgement. Already the polemical connection between creation 
and final judgement had been made.
Several New Testament texts have been educed as evidence of creatio 
ex nihilo. None makes a clear statement which would have been required to 
establish such an unprecedented position, or which we would need as evidence 
of such a break with tradition. None is decisive and each could easily be
loA.av0avei yap aiixous xoOxo 0eA.ovxaj oxi oupavoi fjaav eKTraAai Kai yfj e£, 'uSaxos 
Kai 5i’ u5axo$ auveaxcoaa xco xoO 0eoO A.oycp. ed. Barbara Aland, et al., Novum Testamentum  
Graecum, Nestle, 27th ed., Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1993.
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accepted by a proponent of creatio ex materia.
In the beginning was the w ord and the w ord was with God and 
the w ord was God. He was in the beginning with God. All 
things came about through him and w ithout him not one thing 
came about, which came about. (John 1.1-3)11
The punctuation of the last verse becomes critical to its meaning. Proponents 
of creatio ex materia could easily qualify the creatures of the Word to that 
"which came about," excluding matter. Proponents of creatio ex nihilo could 
place a period after "not one thing came about" and leave "which came about" 
to the next sentence. The absence of a determ inate tradition of punctuation 
in New Testam ent texts leaves room for both interpretations. Neither does 
creation by w ord imply ex nihilo (contra Bultmann) as we have seen in Egypt 
(chapter 1), Philo, and M idrash Rabba (chapter 3), and even in 2 Peter 3.5, 
where the w ord functions to organize pre-cosmic matter.
Hebrews 11.3 has also been cited as an example of creatio ex nihilo in 
the New Testam ent:12
By faith we understand that the ages were ordered by the word of 
God, so that the visible came about from the unmanifest. (Hebrews 
11.3)13
However, the notion of creation |if) eK 0aivo|ievcov was comfortable for Platonic 
dualists or Stoics, because it lacked all qualities.
11 Tv apxti fiv o A.6yos, m i  o A.oyos rjv 7rpo? xov 0eov, tcai Geos flv o A.oyos. ouxos fjv ev 
dpxfj 7rpos xov Geov. 7iavxa 8i' a ikob  dyevexo, Kai x«pis auxou dyevexo ou5e ev o yeyovev.
12R. M. Grant, Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought. 
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1953, p. 139f.
13ni(rxei vooupev mxTipxicjGai xous a iu vas piipaxi GeoO, eis xo pri dx <t»aivopevcov xo 
PAettopevov yeyovevai.
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Because all things in heaven and on earth were created in him, 
the visible and the invisible; w hether thrones or dominions, 
whether principalities or powers, all things were created through 
him and for him. (Colossians 1.16)14
Colossians would eventually provide strong support for proponents of creatio 
ex nihilo, but for proponents of creatio ex materia the creation of all things 
visible and invisible is limited to w hat immediately precedes and follows in 
the verse: "all things in the heavens and upon earth." The invisible are the 
angelic powers: the thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers.
Paul attributes the cause of the blessings of Abraham  to his faith in
God:
Just as it is w ritten, "I established you as the father of many 
nations," because he trusted in God who raises the dead and calls 
the non-existent as existent. (R o mans 4.17)15
The verse's "non-existent" need not be understood in an absolute sense of 
non-being. Mf) ovxa refers to the previous non-existence of those things 
which are now brought into existence. There is no direct reference to the 
absence or presence of a material cause.
In sub-apostolic w ritings one text above all others has been cited as 
evidence of creatio ex nihilo:'6
14oxi ev au tw  £kxict0t| xa  m ivxa i v  xols oupavoig Kai em  x% yfj?, xa  opaxa Kai xa  
aop axa, eixe Gpovoi eixe Kupioxrixes eixe apxai eixe e^ou aiar xa  7ravxa 5i’ auxou Kai eis 
auxov eKXicrxar
15Ka0cos yeYpaTtxai oxi 7iaxepa n o \\& v  £0vcov xe0eiKa ae, m x ev a v x i ox> em a xevo ev  
Qeov xou ^cpo7roiouvxos xou? vexpous Kai KaA.ouvxos xa pf| ovxa cos ovxa-
16So Grant, Miracle and Natural Lazy, p. 140.
For background on Hermes, see Norbert Brox, Der H irt des Hermas, ubersetzt und erklart von 
Norbert Brox, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991. He dates the writings of Hermes to
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First of all one m ust believe that God is one and that he has 
created and ordered and made them from the non-existence into 
existence, and contains all, but is alone uncontained. (Hermes 
Mandate l )17
Once again, ek |Lif) ovtos alone cannot be taken as absolute denial of material 
substrate. By itself the phrase is insufficient to carry the burden of a decisive 
and well-defined position because both ek and ov are notoriously equivocal. 
’Ek does not necessarily designate material cause, but it can be used temporally. 
V0 v does not necessarily refer to not absolute non-being, but the non-existence 
of what later came to be. To read it as creatio ex nihilo in Herm es goes far 
beyond the w arrant of the text, which makes no clear claims to the presence 
or absence of material and provides no discussion of the position.
The use of the phrase ek too |it] ovtos in both a relative and absolute 
sense can be illustrated from the writings of Aristotle. He uses it in a relative 
sense to describe natural generation:
For generation is from non-existence into being, and corruption 
from being back into non-existence, (de Generatione Animalium  
B 5,741 b 22 f.)18
Here Aristotle uses ek too (J.T] ovtos to refer to the previous non-existence of
that which is generated. He does not mean to deny the material cause for 
approximately 140 C.E., p. 25.
Brox, p. 191, takes M andate  1 as teaching creatio ex nihilo based on the parallel Jewish teaching 
of 2 Maccabees 7:28, see above chapter 3.
17jtpcoTov 7rdvTWV niaieuCTov o n  eis 4ctt'iv o Geos, o xa 7rdvxa KTiaas Kai Kaxapxiaas, 
Kai 7ioif|CTas 4k too |it) ovtos eis to e iv a i to. 7rdvxa, Kai mxvxa %a>pcbv, povos 5e axcopr|xos aiv. 
ed. Robert Joly, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1958, p. 144.
18€ctti yap f| pev yevecus 4k too pr] ovtos eis to ov, f] 5e <t>6opa 4k too ovtos 7iaA.iv eis 
to pf| ov. ed. H. J. Droussaart Lulofs, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, p. 74 f.
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generation.
To take eic too  |it) ovtos in the stronger absolute sense requires a clear 
context which denies a material cause for generation or creation. That cannot 
be found in Herm es or the Wisdom o f Solomon (see chapter 3) or any other 
text before the second century C.E.20
In the later second century, the positions w ith respect to m atter in 
creation became better defined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the position was 
not predetermined, as both creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo were taught 
by Christian w riters of the second century. Some Christians, Justin and 
Hermogenes, accepted the dualism  of the M iddle-Platonists w ith its eternal 
m atter.
Justin Martyr
Justin M artyr in the middle of the second century taught21 that Plato
Notice 8e 'Ava^ayopas a7reipa ouxcos oir|8fjvai 5 ia  to  b7roA.appd.ve1v Tqv koivtiv So^av 
tu v  (Jnxmcuv e iv a i aA.r|0fj, cos oii yiyvopevou ouSevog etc too  pfi ovtos. ed. Ross, op. cit.
“ Georg Schuttermayr in "'Schopfung aus dem  Nichts' in 2 Makk 7, 28?" Biblische 
Zeitschrift n.f. 17,1973, pp. 203-228 presents a very careful study of use of ook 4k ovtcov in early 
Christian authors, also referring to Philo and some Greek uses. He concludes that one must be 
careful in reading Greek causation into biblical and deuterocanonical texts.
21On the life and works of Justin Martyr, see Saint Justin, A pologies, ed. Andre Wartelle, 
Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1987, pp. 9-53.
Wartelle, p. 56 claims Justin does not answer the question of whether matter w as eternal or not. 
Given that the alternative to eternal matter had not yet been formulated, it seem s strange to 
consider it an unspoken option for Justin. H is claim that God created from formless matter 
should therefore be taken as clear enough evidence that he believed in the common Platonist 
formula of creation from eternal matter.
L. W. Barnard in Justin M artyr, His Life and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967, pp. 112, argues that Justin has "no particular theory of the origin and nature of matter."
Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 12, also feels 
that Justin "had not thought the problem out."
On faith and reason in Justin and other apologists see Robert Joly, C hristianism e et Philosophic: 
etudes sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxieme siecle, Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite 
de Bruxelles, 1973.
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had learned about creation from Moses:
Hear what was spoken by Moses himself, who as has been shown, 
was the first prophet and earlier than the authors of Greece, in 
order that you may learn that Plato received from our teachers 
(which we say by the word given by the prophets) the saying that 
God form ed the w orld by rotating (axpe\J/avxa) m atter which 
was formless. Through Moses, the prophetic spirit revealed how 
God fashioned the principle (dpxil) and  from w hat things he 
fashioned the cosmos. He said, "In the beginning God made the 
heaven and the earth. The earth was invisible and unestablished 
and darkness was on the abyss and the spirit of God bore itself 
over the waters. And God said, 'Let light come abou t/ and thus 
it came about." Thus, by the w ord of God, the whole cosmos 
came about from the substrates which were first set forth by Moses 
and Plato. (1 Apology  5 9 ,1-5)22
The subjects from which the world came about were the invisible and formless 
earth understood as m atter and darkness:
Since it was the first day on which God created the cosmos by 
turning darkness and matter. (1 Apology  67.8J23
Rotating (crxpe\l/avxa) and turning (xpe\|/as) echo Plato's Timaeus (34 A, B 36
For an overview o f som e of the key issues in the speculation concerning creation in the thought 
of Justin, Hermogenees, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian, and Origen, see Pierre Nautin, "Genese 
1 ,1 -2 , de Justin & Origdne," in In Principio: Interpretations des premiers versets de la Genese, ed. 
Paul Vignaux, Paris: fitudes Augustiniennes, 1973, pp. 61-94.
“ 'Iva Se Kai napa  xcov f|dtxdpcov SiSaaKaAcov, AeYopev Se xov \oyox> xov Sia xcov 
7rpo0T|Xcbv, Aapovxa xov IlAdxcova pa0T|xe x6 eineiv, vA-pv apop<t>ov ovcrav crxpe\|/avxa xov 0eov 
Kocrpov noifjcrai, aKOvaaxe xcov avxoAei^ei eipr|pevcov Sia Mcotioecos, xov 7rpo5e5r|Acogevou 
7tpa>xov Trpodnxov Kai 7ipeapvxepou xcov ev "EAAticti cruYYPci<t>dcov, Si’ ov pt|vvov xo 7rpo<t>T|xiK6v 
Ilveupa, 7Tcos xf)v dpxriv Kai £k xlvcov d5r|pioupYT|(Tev o 0eos xov Kocrpov, e<J>r| ovxcos’ "’Ev 
dpxii e7roir|aev o 0eos xov ovpavov Kai xf)v Y"nv. 'H Se Yn ilv aopaxos Kai aKaxaaKevaaxos, 
Kai c t k o x o ?  e7rdvw xfjs dpvooov Kai Flvevpa 0eov e7re((iepexo enavco xcov vSaxcov. Kai ei7rev 
o Geos- revr|0r|xco (fcos. Kai ^Yevexo ovxcos." "flaxe Aoyco ©eov dK xcov vnoKeipevcov Kai 
7ipo5r|Aco0evxcov Sia Mcoiiaecos YeYev'n°'6ai xov 7ravxa Koapov, Kai FIAdxcov. ed. Andre Wartelle, 
Saint Justin, Apologies, fitudes Augustiennes: Paris, 1987, p. 173-180.
“ dTreiSf) 7rpcoxr| daxiv -nuepcc, dv fj o 0eos xo o k o x o s  K a i  xf)v vAr|v xpevj/as K o a p o v  
dTroiriae. Wartelle, p. 192.
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E) where the demiurge creates the cosmos by setting the world soul in rotation. 
By the same act the body of the world, i.e., matter, is also brought into order. 
Like Philo, Justin had no difficulty interpreting Genesis in Platonistic terms, 
even though both Philo and Justin thought Plato was imitated Moses.
From the w ritings of Tertullian, we have testimony of another early 
C hristian who taught creatio ex materia. H erm ogenes wrote just before 
Tertullian, either late in the second or early in the third century. Therefore, 
he comes after the first form ulations of creatio ex nihilo in Tatian and 
Theophilus and might represent a early response to the new teaching. According 
to Tertullian, Hermogenes argued for creation from eternal m atter from the 
existence of evil:
But we find evil things made by him, although not by choice or 
will. Because if they were made by his choice of will, he would 
have made something inconsistent or unworthy of himself. What 
he does not make by his choice, must be understood to be made 
by the fault of another thing: from m atter w ithout doubt.
(adversus Hermogenem, 2.5)24
Hermogenes' argum ent relied on Middle-Platonist notions of the goodness of 
God and the evil in matter. But it is impossible to tell from Tertullian's scant 
testimony w hether he believed that the evil motions in  pre-cosmic matter 
were caused by an untrained, pre-cosmic world soul (pace Plutarch and Atticus). 
In any case, Herm ogenes' heavy reliance on M iddle-Platonist metaphysics 
shows their continued sway in the Christian tradition to the end of the second 
century.
24Inveniri autem et mala ab eo facta, utique non ex arbitrio nec ex voluntate; quia si ex 
arbitrio et voluntate, [nihil] incongruens et indignum sibi faceret. Quod ergo non arbitrio suo 
fecerit, intellegi oportere ex vitio alicuius rei factum, ex materiae sine dubio. ed. E. Dekker, 
Corpus Christianorum Series Latinorum  (CCSL) 1, Turnhout: Brepols, 1954, p. 398.
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creatio ex nihilo
It was not until the last quarter of the second century that Justin's 
disciple, Tatian, formulated a teaching of creatio ex nihilo and employed it as 
a justification of the resurrection of the dead. But we cannot even tell if the 
Christians w ere the first to make the connection betw een creation and 
resurrection. Celsus in his polemic against the Christians, the Alethes Logos, 
m ade the linkage in his argum ents against the C hristian doctrine of 
resurrection. Tatian's Oratio ad Graecos and Celsus' Alethes Logos have both 
been dated to 17725 and neither shows any dependence on the other. In order 
to show the opposition that the Christian doctrine of resurrection generated 
we will first look to Celsus' work in the context of pagan opposition to 
Christianity.
opposition
When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some scoffed, 
others said, "We will hear from you on this m atter later." So 
Paul left them. (Acts 17.32f.)26
In the account of The Acts of the Apostles, the mention of the resurrection 
ended Paul's  dialogue w ith the A reopagite assembly in Athens. The 
resurrection of the dead, both of Jesus and his followers, was the part of the 
kerygma most likely to offend the sensibilities of the Greek audience. It had
“ R. M. Grant, Greek Apologists o f the Second Century, P h ilad e lp h ia : Westminster 
Press, 1988. The date for Celsus is merely "possible," p. 136. The date for Tatian is "probably" 
177 or 178 C.E., p.113.
Henry Chadwick ed., Origen Contra Celsum, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 
xxviii dates the True Doctrine to 177-180 C.E.
26 ’Atcouaavtes 5e dvdcxiacTiv veicpcov o'l pev ix^evaC pv, o'l 8e eiTrav aKoixropeGa croi> 
7iepi toutou Kai 7raA.1v. ouxcos o nauA.os e^f|A0ev ek pecrou auxwv.
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no place either in traditional or philosophical Greek thought. Early on pagan 
writers noted the peculiarity of the belief and connected it to the Christians' 
willingness for martyrdom:
The poor fools persuade themselves that they will be deathless 
entirely and that they will live forever, and so they despise death 
and many give themselves up  willingly. (Lucian, Peregrinus 
13)27
"Entirely" sets the contrast w ith the Platonist view that the soul alone is 
immortal and the "foolish" Christian view that body and soul were resurrected.
Later w hen Celsus and Porphyry developed responses to Christian 
teaching, they seized upon the teaching of the resurrection as the height of 
folly:
W hat sort of hum an soul would desire a body even though it 
had rotted? . . .
What sort of body completely corrupted is able to come back to its 
prior nature and to its first composition from which it was loosed? 
Having no response, they flee to the most impossible way out, 
that all is possible with God. But God in no way is able to do 
shameful things, neither does he wish things contrary to nature.
Not even if you long for something repulsive because of your 
own depravity, is God able to do it nor should you believe that it 
will be. For God is the author not of the discordant drive and 
wandering disorder, but of right and just nature. Even if he can 
provide the soul with everlasting life, "the dead body," says 
Heraclitus "is more to be cast off than refuse." God is not willing 
or able irrationally to make everlasting the flesh which is full of 
things which are not beautiful. He himself is the reason of all 
things. He is not able to do anything irrational or contrary to his 
own nature, (in Origen, Contra Celsum, 5.14)28
^Trenti-Kaoi yap auxouj o'l KcucoSeupoves to  pev oA.ov aGavaxoi eaeGai Kai piaxjeaGai 
xov del xpovov, 7rap’ o Kai Kaxa<|>povoOoT to o  Gavaxoo Kai eKOvxe? auxou? emSiSoacriv 01 
710AA0 L ed. C. Jacobitz, Luciani Opera, v. 3, Leipzig: Teubner, 1853, p. 275.
“ noia  yap dvGpconau il/u%fi 7ro6f|cjeiev exi aw pa aearinos;. . .
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Celsus not only appealed to the implausibility of the body coming back together, 
he also presented an argum ent based on a metaphysical dualism .29 God as 
the reason of the world and the author of order was eternally opposed to the 
disorder of matter. Matter is an "discordant (7rAr|ji|LieAws) drive and wandering 
disorder (dKOO|Lua)" eternally opposed to God's will. Celsus' dualism and 
doctrine of creation echo Plato's in the use of the term  7rA7i|i|ieAws to describe 
the inherent motions of m atter (cf. Tim aeus 30A and discussion in chapter 2). 
The combination of 7rAT||i|ieA«s and dK oa|iia echoes Plutarch's description of 
the motions of pre-cosmic matter (de Animae Procreatione, 1016 c 9, see chapter 
2).
For Celsus, m atter has its own desires which are not subject to reason. 
There is no reason for a person to w ant to stay in  a m aterial body. The 
Christian hope of resurrection not only asks the impossible, it foolishly seeks 
to remain in the condition which the wise should endeavor to escape.
N early a century later Porphyry also attacked the resurrection in
7toiov yap acopa 7rdvxT) 5ia<)>0apev oibv xe d7ta.veA.0eTv e is  xfjv d£, apxfjs 4>ucnv Kai aiixfiv  
eKeivt|v, d£, fjs dAuGt), xf|v 7ipc6xr|v cnxrxacnv; ouSev e%ovxes d,7TOKpiva<T0ai KaxaiJieoyoucjiv eis 
axo7rcoxdxr|v dvaxcopr|criv, oxi 7rav Suvaxov xcp 0ecp. aAA oiixi ye xa  a ia x p a  o 0eos Siivaxai 
oiiSe xa  Ttapa <|>ucnv pouAexar ou8’ av  cni xi dTriOugijCT'qs icaxa xtiv aauxou po%0T|piav 
pSeAupov, o 0eos xoiixo Suvqaexai, Kai XPV niazeveiv evQvs oxi eaxai. ou yap xf|s vrArippeAous 
ope^ecos oiiSe xfjs 7rt7rAavT|pevT|s aKocxpias aAAa xfjs 6p0f]s Kai SiKaias bucrecos o 0eos eaxiv  
apxr|yexr|s. Kai ilruxfis pev aicoviov pioxfiv Suvatx’av  7rapaaxelv- "veKues 8e’\  (pricriv UpdKAeixos, 
"K07rpicov dKPArjxbxepoi." aapKa 8fi, peaxijv cov ou5e eiTtelv raAov, aicoviov d7io<|)iivai 7tapaAoycos 
oiixe PouAijaexai o 0eos ooxe Suvrjcrexai. aiixos yap eaxiv o 7ravxcov xcov ovxcov Aoyos- ox>8ev 
ouv oios xe TrapaAoyov oiiSe Trap' eauxov dpyaaaaGai. ed. Paul Koetschau, Origenes Werke, v. 
2.2, Die Greichischen C hristlichen Schriftsteller der ersteti drei Jahrhunderte, Leipzig: 
Hinrichs, 1899, p. 15.
^For background on Celsus, see On the True Doctrine: A  discourse against the Christians, 
translated and introduced by R. Joseph Hoffmann, N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
On anti-Christian polem ics in general, see pp. 5-29.
On the theology and text of Celsus, see Chadwick op. cit., pp. xvi-xxiv.
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arguments paralleling Celsus' (fr. 94, Harnack).30 He elaborated the difficulties 
of bringing bodies back together, once eaten or scattered in the seas. He noted 
that God cannot do the impossible, like changing the past or making 2x2=5. 
In each case he illustrated what Celsus had already said, but he did not make 
Celsus' dualist argument, because by Porphyry's day, Platonism had changed. 
Neoplatonism was monistic (see below, chapter 5). The view of matter had 
changed, so Porphyry does not object on the basis of material as Celsus had 
done. Instead, in considering Christian eschatology, Porphyry argues that it 
does not make sense for God to bring the heavenly bodies to an end while 
raising humans. The Christian eschatology upset the hierarchy of beings of 
the Neoplatonists.
Back in the second century, the view of m atter was the metaphysical 
sticking point for the Christian teaching of resurrection, and Tatian knew it.
Tatian
Tatian was more confrontational than his teacher, Justin . 31 Not content 
to defend Christians from charges of immorality and atheism, Tatian took the 
case directly to the Hellenistic culture and their intellectual tradition, attacking 
the trustw orthiness and laud of the philosophers, although he adopted a 
philosophically technical style of his own.
Tatian begins his positive doctrine by asserting the absolute iiovapxia 
of God:
^For background see Porphyry's A gainst the Christians: the literary remains, edited
and translated w ith  an introduction and epilogue, by R. Joseph Hoffmann, Buffalo, N.Y.: 
Prometheus Books, 1994.
31For a discussion of Taitian's life, education, and theology, see Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 
and Fragments, ed. M olly Whittaker, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, introduction and 
bibliography pp. ix-xxv.
See also Grant, Greek Apologists, pp. 113-132.
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O ur God does not have origin in time, he alone is w ithout 
beginning, while he is the beginning of all. (adversus Graecos
4)32
The a v a p x o v  of God was a key element of the Christian kerygma and apologetic. 
With it Aristides began his apology a generation before Tatian. Tatian expands 
the formula to the sole a v a p x o v  of God and uses it to attack the Stoic view of 
God and matter as twin principles. He also denies that God as a spirit "pervades 
m atter" ( 5 i f |K 0 V  5ia x f |s  uA.T|s) in language nearly reproducing Aetius' version 
of the Stoic doctrine of God: 7rveu|ia pev evSiTjicov 81’ 0 A.01) x o u  K o a p o u  (Long 
and Sedley 46A; Aetius 1.7.33). While he directs his words against the Stoics, 
his position lies contrary to the Middle-Platonists as well. Middle-Platonists 
had adopted a view of God as transcendent and utterly independent, while 
limiting his activity in the world and creation by matter and its necessities. 
Tatian captured a new vision of God utterly alone in his power and able to 
create m atter itself. He thus becomes the first person in recorded history 
expressly to teach creatio ex nihilo.
Tatian im m ediately enlists creatio ex nihilo in the defense of the 
resurrection:
N either is m atter without cause as is God, nor is it equal in 
power to God because it is without cause. It was generated and it 
was not generated by anyone else, but it was expressed only by
^Geos 0  icaG' f)na? o u k  e^ei aucrxaaiv ev xpovco, novo? avap xos cov icai a u to s  u 7rdpxcov 
xcbv oAcov dpx,T|. ed . M olly Whittaker, op. cit., p. 8 .
Tatian has much stricter requirements for bodily resurrection than Paul showed in I C orinthians 
15. Tatian requires that the body be returned to its pristine state. Paul allowed that God could 
give the resurrected any sort of body he wanted, even a heavenly one, I C orinthians  15:47 f.
Paul says that the resurrection body will be incorruptible (v. 42), spiritual (v. 44), and heavenly 
as Christ was from heaven (v. 48).
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the dem iurge of all. Therefore, we believe that there will be a 
resurrection of bodies after the consum m ation of everything, 
not as the Stoics who dogmatize about cycles of things becoming 
and the same things becoming again w ithout purpose. When 
the ages are once completed for us at the end, there will be a 
resurrection  of hum ans alone for ever for the purpose of 
judgement, (adversus Graecos 5-6 )33
Tatian makes the connection of creator and judge, just as we saw in 2 Peter. 2 
Peter 3.5 uses the balance of beginning and end to argue that God who brought 
the world about can bring it to an end. Tatian's argum ent goes further. He 
argues for the end of the age and the resurrection of the dead on the grounds 
(8 ia  touto) that matter is not avapxov. For the Stoics a personal resurrection 
made no sense in that everything was bound for eK7ropcocns. Even in the 
eK7nipw(Tis, matter bore the necessity for further cycles in the Aoyoi a 7rep|iaxiKo't. 
Tatian's rejection of matter as an apxil alongside of God removes the necessity 
of eK7rupcocTis and subsequent cycles. But Tatian does not stop there. Tatian 
extends the Petrine argum ent to the micro level, to the individual human. 
He denies that m atter imposes any such necessity on God with respect to 
individual bodies, as well as with respect to the cosmos:
God the regent, when he wills, will completely restore the
substance which is visible alone to him  to its original state.
Mo\)xe yap avapxos T) uAt| mGdixtp Kai o 0eos, ouxe 5ia xo avapxov m i auxfi 
iaoSuvapos x« 0 c m , yevxix-fi 8e m i ou% uno aAAou yeyovma, p6vou 5e utt6 xou 7ravxcov 
STiiitoupyoO 7rpo3e(3A.T|pevr|. m i 5ia xoOxo Kai crcoprixcov dvdaxaaiv ecrecrGai 7remaxeuKaiiev 
pexa xfiv xcbv oAcov auvxeAelav, oi>x &S oi SxcoiKOi Soypaxi^ouai mxa xivas kukAcov 7repi68ous 
yivopevcov aei mi. djroyivopevcov xwv auxcov ouk ini xi xpiicnpov, "a7ra£," 5e "xajv" m0" f|pas 
"aicovcov" 7T£7repaapevcov Kai eis x8 7ravxeAe§ 5ia povcov xcov av0pco7rcov xfiv aijcrxaaiv eaeaGai 
Xapiv Kpiaeco?. Whittaker, p. 10.
May m isses the connection Tatian makes between creatio ex nihilo  and the bodily resurrection. 
May attributes to Tertullian the first use of creatio ex nihilo as a proof of God's power to resurrect 
the dead, May, 1994, p. 137.
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(adversus Graecos 6 )M
Tatian uses the indiv idual creation to justify the ind iv idual resurrection. 
Tatian argues that the task of restoring a dead person who no longer exists is 
no more difficult than creating him from nothing to begin with.
Although Tatian is quite clear that matter comes about by the work of 
God, he is not clear about the process. M atter is expressed or cast forth 
(7rpopeP/\.T|!!evT]) by God. 7rpopepAT]|ievT| is the same term used to express Gnostic 
emanations w ithin the pleroma according to Irenaeus' account (1.1.1-2). In 
Irenaeus the term is used biologically as the first principle, the Depth, is cast 
forth into silence as a seed (1.1.1). However, the term is not used by Irenaeus 
to recount the Gnostic view of the generation of matter.
Tatian uses the word 7rpopaAAco in its more common sense of expressing 
words, thoughts, or questions. Earlier in the same chapter he refers to the 
casting forth of the voice (7rpopaAA6 pevos 5e ttiv  epauTon (ticovijv, Tatian, 
adversus Graecos 5, W hittaker, p. 10). The picture of vocal expression of 
m atter w ould seem to be an extension of Tatian 's Logos theology. Tatian 
himself draws an express parallel between the generation of the divine Logos 
and the creation:
The word which was generated in the beginning, in turn generated
our creation, himself for himself, as he had fashioned matter.
(iadversus Graecos 5)3S
Although the analogy is not fully developed, it seems reasonable that Tatian
^ G e o g  5 e  o  p a o rA e u c o v , o r e  p o i i A e r a t ,  x f iv  o p a r f i v  a u r a >  p o v o v  u 7 r o a r a a i v  d .7 r o K a r a a r n a e i  
7rpos t o  a p x a i o v .  W h i t t a k e r ,  p .  1 2 .
“o Aoyog iv dpxtl yevvr|0eig dvreyevvr|CTe Tfjv Ka0' f|pdg 7roiT|criv aorog eaorw, rf)v 
u A r |v  S r u n o o p y r ic r a g .  W h i t t a k e r ,  p .  1 0 .
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understands the Logos as the internal reason and matter as part of the subsequent 
vocal expression. Even though he uses emanationist language and draws a 
parallel to the generation of the Logos and the m aterial cosmos, Tatian 
maintains a distinction between God and the material cosmos (see above).
The coincidence of the povapx'ia, the need to defend the resurrection 
and the Logos theology conspired to produce an entirely new understanding 
of the material cosmos and its dependence upon God in Tatian's work. His 
new vision was seized upon almost immediately by other Christian writers 
and soon became the new orthodoxy.
Theophilus of Antioch
Theophilus, writing shortly after Tatian, (after 180) for he mentions the 
death of Marcus Aurelius in his chronology36) followed Tatian in adopting 
creatio ex nihilo and using the creative power of God as an apology for the 
resurrection (ad Autolycum  1.13).37 However, he went further than Tatian 
in developing metaphysical arguments for creatio ex nihilo based both on the 
nature of God and matter. In contrast to Tatian, who directed his barbs mainly 
against the Stoics, Theophilus directed his argum ents against the Middle- 
Platonists. Theophilus' own doctrine of God owed much to the Platonists 
and he directed the Middle-Platonist doctrine of God against their teaching 
concerning matter:
Plato and those of his school agree that God is ungenerated and
“ Grant, Greek Apologists, p. 143.
^For background on Theophilus' times and theology, see Theophilus o f Antioch, Ad 
A utolycum , text and translation by Robert M. Grant, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, introduction 
pp. ix-xxv.
See also Grant, Greek Apologists, pp. 140-174.
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the father and maker of all. Then, they suppose matter is divine 
and ungenerated and they say that it was flourishing with God. 
If God is ungenerated and m atter is ungenerated, no longer is 
God the maker of all as the Platonists say, neither is the sovereignty 
of God shown, by their own account. Further, just as God is 
changeless because he is ungenerated, so also, if matter is also 
ungenerated, it is also changeless and equal to God. For that 
which is generated is mutable and changeable. The ungenerated 
is immutable and unchangeable.
For how is it so great, if God made the cosmos from subject 
matter? For even the hum an artisan when he receives matter 
from someone, can make what he wants from it. The power of 
God is m ade manifest in this, that he made w hat he wanted 
from the non-existent. (eH, ouk ovtcov, ad Autolycum  2.4)M
In contrast to the earlier examples we have seen, Theophilus' use of the 
phrase ouk ovtcov stands in express opposition to the eternity of matter. 
The phrase clearly does express creatio ex nihilo in the sense of denying an 
independent material cause for the cosmos.
Theophilus attacks the consistency of an all-creating God (Apuleius, d e 
Platone et eius Dogmate p. 312, Clouard and other examples) and the Platonists' 
G od/m atter dualism. The attack demonstrates little more than Theophilus' 
prioritization of theology over physics.
T heophilus also charges the M iddle-P latonists w ith  their own 
anthropomorphic notion of the creator. The force of the charge derives from
Mn A d x c o v  5 e  K a i  o 'l r q $  a ip e c r e c o s  a u i o u  0 e b v  p e v  b p o A o y o O o r v  a y e v r i x o v  K a i  7 i a x e p a  
K a i  7io iT )T T ]v x c o v  o A co v  e i v a r  e i x a  U 7 r o x i 0 e v x a i  0 e o v  K a i  i )A r |v  d y e v T |x o v  K a i  x a u x T |v  O a a i v  
c j u v T ) K u a K t v a i  x c p  O eco. e i  5 e  0 e o s  d y d v r i x o s  K a i  \> A t| a y £ v r |T o s ,  o^k £ x i  o  O e o s  ttoitixtis xuv  
6A.C0V e c r x iv  m x a  x o u s  n A a x c o v i K o u s ,  o b S e  p r i v  p o v a p x i a  0 e o O  S e i K v u x a i ,  o a o v  x o  K a x  a u x o u ; .  
e x i  5 e  K a i  & x r7 iep  o  0 e b $ ,  d y e v r i x o s  w v ,  K a i  d v a A A o i c o x o s  £ c m v ,  o u x c o s ,  e i  K a i  f]  i)A r) d y e v r i x o s  
f j v ,  K a i  a v a A A o i c o x o s  K a i  i a o 0 e o s  f | v  x b  y a p  y e v r ) x o v  x p e r r x o v  K a i  a A A o ic o x o v ,  x o  5 e  a y e v r i x o v  
a x p e r r x o v  K a i  a v a A A o i c o x o v .
T i 5e p eya , ei o 0eos IE, bftOKeipevTis i)At|s d7roiei xbv Kbcrpov; Kai yap xexvixris a v 0 pco7ros, 
evrav uAt|v Aapri arco x ivos, iE, aiixfjs b o a  pouAexai 7roiei. 0eou 5e T] S u vap is ev xovxco 
pavepouxai i v a  e£, ouk ovxcov 7 ro ifi o a a  pouAexai, Ka0a7tep Kai xo il/vx^F Souvai Kai Kivr|aiv 
o\>x exepou xivos ecrxiv aAA’ f| povou 0eou. ed. Robert M. Grant, 1970, p. 26.
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the M iddle-Platonists own program  of de-anthropom orphism  of the poetic 
and popular vision of deity. According to Theophilus, they had not gone far 
enough in their ow n program.
From the side of matter, Theophilus develops a contradiction from 
Plato's basic premises for the cosmology of the Timaeus, where Plato taught 
that what is eternal is changeless (27 E-28 A). No response to Theophilus has 
been preserved, but Plato himself stated that the receptacle itself was unchanging 
(see above, chapter 2) Nevertheless, it was at least paradoxical that the substrate 
for change was itself unchanging.
With respect to his own teaching, Theophilus does not here or elsewhere 
say how God creates, he merely denies the need for matter. In effect, he places 
God's creative act into the realm of negative theology. Theophilus' own 
argument for creatio ex nihilo depended on a commonplace assertion of the 
Middle-Platonists, the self-sufficiency of God (Apuleius, de Platone et eius 
Dogmate p. 312, Clouard):
And first they [the prophets] taught us in harmony that he made 
all things from non being, for nothing is as ancient as God, but 
he is his own locus and without need and existing before the 
ages, he wished to make the hum an so that he would be known 
by him. For him he prepared the cosmos. For the generated is 
needy, the ungenerated needs nothing, (ad Autolycum  2.10)39
Theophilus agrees with Tatian that the world had been created for the sake of 
humans. For Tatian and Theophilus hum anity was the goal of creation of 
the cosmos. The Platonists, both Middle and Neo, saw humanity as inhabitants
^Kai vrpcoxov pev aupOcovcos dSiSa^av rm&s, o n  iE, ouk ovtcov xa 7rdvxa e7roir|crev. ou 
yap xi xcp 0ew auvf|K |iacjev aAA.’ auxo? eauxoO xo7ro? cov Kai avevSefis <ov Kai oTcapxcov rrpo 
xcov aicovcov f)9eAT)crtv avGpomov 7toif)crai co yvcoaQfi- xooxco o\>v 7ipor|Xoipacrev xov Koapov. o 
yap yevrixos Kai 7rpocr5ef|s ecrxiv, o 5e ayevr|xos oiioevoj 7rpoa5eixai. Grant, p. 38.
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of the lowest realm. The teaching remained a target in anti-Christian polemic, 
but it shows the close link between creation and anthropology which the 
Christians preserved from the Hebrew tradition.
Theophilus does not make the same explicit connection between creation 
and resurrection that Tatian does, but his discussions of resurrection and 
creation show strong parallelism in language and argumentation. He argues 
for creation e£, otjk ovtcov and argues that God can raise the person whom he 
created ouk ovtoj (ad Autolycum  1.8). He draw s an express parallel 
between God's life-giving and creative power:
It is God who heals and gives life by his own word and wisdom.
God by his word and wisdom created all things. (1.7)40
It is precisely God's ability to create and resurrect matter which set Theophilus 
and Tatian against the Platonist and Stoic views of the necessity of the material 
realm.
Theophilus used the Platonist doctrine of God not only to attack their 
view of matter but to develop a new view. In choosing the Middle-Platonist 
doctrine of God over their view of nature, he left nature entirely subject to 
God. As a result, although his doctrine is Middle-Platonist in its expression, it 
is steadfastly non-Middle Platonic in its outcome, both in its monism and in 
the radical dependence of nature upon God. Theophilus foreshadows the 
coming of monism to Platonist philosophy in the next century in the work of 
Plotinus. But as yet an account of the creation of the material realm by God 
had not been worked out.
40o 0eos, o 0 ep a 7reucov icai ^coo7toicov 5 ia  t o o  AoyoO Kai xfjs a o r ta s , o Geos o ia  t o o  
A.oyou auxoO K a i  rfjs a o rta s  e7roir|CTe xa  7ravxa. Grant, p. 10.
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Irenaeus
Irenaeus, w riting shortly after Tatian and Theophilus, adopted creatio 
ex nihilo, probably from Theophilus, as his writings show many similarities 
w ith Theophilus . 41 Like Theophilus, his teachings on creatio ex nihilo form 
part of his polemic against the Platonists. In his work, creatio ex nihilo 
moved from extram ural apologetic to intram ural anti-heretical writing. As 
the extramural w eapon became useful inside the church, it helped establish a 
new orthodoxy.
Irenaeus dismissed the Gnostic versions of the generation of the elements 
from the passions of Sophia as ridiculous myths. To the contrary:
We will not err in saying this about the substance of matter, that 
God brought it forth. For we teach from the scriptures that God 
holds prim acy over all things. Whence and how he emitted 
matter, neither does any Scripture explain, neither is it fitting for 
us to imagine, guessing infinite things about God by individual 
opinions. This knowledge must be left to God. (adversus Haereses 
2.28.7)42
In the end, Irenaeus thinks the Greek poets and philosophers are to blame for 
the errors of Gnostics. He accuses Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Plato, and the
41For background on Irenaeus see R. Grant, Greek Apologists, pp. 182-186.
Also Gerard Vallee, A  Study in Anti-G nostic Polemics: Irenaeus, H ippolytus, and Epiphanius, 
Waterloo, Ontario , Canada: Published for the Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion 
by Wilfrid, 1981.
See also A. Orbe, "San Ireneo y la creaci6n de la materia," Gregorianum  59, 1978, pp. 71-127. 
Orbe does not treat Irenaeus' argument for creatio ex nihilo, rather he sees Irenaeus as taking 
the statement of Hermes' M andate  as his rule faith, "El logion de HERMAS pasa a la 'regula 
veritatis,' con leves cambios redaccionales frente a los gndsticos," p. 73. Orbe's postion is similar 
to May's discussed above.
42H oc autem idem et de substantia materiae dicentes, non peccabimus, quoniam Deus 
earn protulit: didicimus enim ex Scripturis principatum tenere super omnia Deum. Unde autem 
vel quemadmodum emisit earn, neque Scriptura aliqua exposuit, neque nos fantasmari oportet, ex 
opinionibus propriis infinita conicientes de Deo, sed agnitionem hanc concedendam esse Deo. ed. 
Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, S. ]., S. C., v. 294 Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1982, p. 284.
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Stoics of deifying matter:
They say everything by necessity departs into those things from 
which they are made, and God is the slave of this kind of necessity, 
so that he cannot add  im m ortality to the m ortal or grant 
incorruptibility to the corruptible, but each departs into the matter 
appropriate to its nature. (adversus Haereses 2.14.4)43
Irenaeus focused on necessity, the dvdyxTl of the Timaeus, making a direct 
link from the cosmogonic necessity to the corruptibility of the body. Just as 
Tatian and Tertullian, Irenaeus shows not just idle concern for creation, but a 
concern bound w ith Christian anthropology and the hope of resurrection.
In the following century creatio ex nihilo was adopted by many Church 
writers, most notably, Tertullian and Origen, while creatio ex materia would 
disappear from orthodoxy. Creatio ex nihilo found a weakness in the Hellenistic 
systems which made it extremely successful both inside and outside the Church. 
It displaced from the Church those who sought a more conciliatory approach 
to Greek intellectual traditions, such as the Gnostics. Outside the church, it 
hera lded  the replacem ent of the M iddle-P latonist d u alist system  by 
Neoplatonist monism, a change which it probably helped to instigate. Still 
the ecclesiastical writers of the second and even the third centuries were still a 
long way from explaining the process by which matter was created. That was 
a challenge not taken up in the Church until Augustine.
‘“Quod autem ex necessitate unumquidque in ilia secedit ex quibus et factum esse dicunt, 
et huius necessitatis servum esse Deum, ita ut non possit mortali immortalitatem addere vel 
corruptibili incorruptelam  donare, sed secedere unum quem que in sim ilem  naturae suae
substantiam. Rousseau, p. 136.
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Chapter 5, Plotinus and Augustine: Evil and the generation of matter
Plotinus' break with earlier Greek philosophy was decisive. He taught 
the generation of all plurality from a single principle, with no passive potency 
presupposed. The Platonists and Peripatetics both presupposed matter as a 
passive principle eternally distinct from forms. Plato himself presupposed 
the receptacle. The Stoics presupposed a passive potency in the single material 
substance of the universe. The Neopythagoreans presupposed a passive potency 
in the monad itself. P lotinus1 (204/5-270 C.E.) saw passive potency of all 
generated things as derivative from the perfection of the first principle, rather 
than from a passive potency within or without the One.
To explain the production of plurality from  initial unity, Plotinus 
transformed the Neopythagorean notion peiv into eppetv, emanate. The change 
was more than lexical. Plotinus' new doctrine of emanation eliminated the 
charge Numenius had laid against Neopythagorean monism, the One "departed
’On the monism of Plotinus, see J. M. Rist, 'The Infinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter 
in Plotinus," Classical Q uarterly, n.s. 12,1962, pp. 99-107. Rist does not draw the distinction 
between Plotinus and his predecessors made here.
On the intellectualism of Plotinus' system of emanation, see A. C. Lloyd, "Plotinus on the Genesis 
of Thought and Existence," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5,1987, pp. 155-186.
For an overview of emanation, see A. H. Armstrong, The architecture o f the intelligible universe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940, chs. 4 & 5.
An interesting study on the intellect's generation from and contemplation of the One can be 
found in J. R. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus: A  commentary on 
selected texts, Leiden: Brill, 1988.
The question of whether matter was generated was a debate that never should have happened. 
See O'Brien's very thorough defense of eternal generated matter in Plotinus, "Plotinus on Evil, a 
study of matter and the soul in Plotinus' conception of human evil," Le N eopla tonism e, Paris: 
Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1971, pp. 114-146.
O'Brien gives a very detailed response to Schwyzer's arguments that matter is ungenerated, 
from Schwyzer, "Zu PlotinsDeutung der sogenannten Platonischen Materie," Zetesis (Festschrift 
E. de Strycker), Antwerp, 1973, pp. 266-280, esp. pp. 275 ff.
Also see O'Brien, art. cit., for a review of Kevin Corrigan's "Is there more than one Generation 
of Matter in the Enneads?," Phronesis 31,1986, pp. 167-181.
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from its ow n nature." Plotinus' emanation from the One did not require that 
the One "become two by difference" or "remove itself from quantity" as the 
Neopythagorean monists had done. For Plotinus plurality came not from the 
One flowing out from its own nature, but from the overflow of the One's 
own perfection. The One's very perfection which was production, not its 
self-deprivation.
Whatever else, Plotinus deserves the title of systematic thinker. Plotinus 
produced a single system of emanation under consistent principles which 
explain all the successive stages of emanation. The system  explains the 
generation of matter and its evil moral valence. Recent treatments of moral 
valuation which Plotinus assigns to m atter have driven a wedge between 
Plotinus the m etaphysician and Plotinus the ethicist.2 I th ink  this is 
unw arranted. Plotinus' moral valence of matter is not only consistent with 
his metaphysics, it flows quite naturally from it. This only becomes clear 
when one examines the principles of the system of emanation.
2A. H. Armstrong, calls the difference between matter as product of the one and matter 
as principle o f evil "a well known contradiction," in "Dualism Platonic, Gnostic and Christian," 
Hellenic and Christian Studies, Aldershot: Variorum, 1990, art. 12, p. 38, treats matter as a 
limit of reality and therefore a principle of evil: "But it is the inevitable cosm ogonic approach, 
which is necessarily movement away from being and form, to this absolute non-existence which 
makes \)A/r| the principle of cosmic evil, and the approach closer than is needed, by weaker 
individual sou ls not perfectly under the command of their higher souls, which enables it to 
become the principle of moral evil." Armstrong drives a w edge between cosm ic and moral evil, 
and does not note that the principle of evil for matter and soul is the sam e, the a o ris tia  of 
emanation. In the case of the soul, a o ris tia  is redeemable to the extent it participates in nous. 
Matter is absolute a o ris tia  and it is irredeemable. The problem for soul is not just its propinquity 
to matter, it is rather its ow n a o ristia  in which it remains, unless it participates in nous.
E. Costello, "Is Plotinus Inconsistent on the Nature of Evil," In terna tiona l Philosophical 
Q uarterly  7, 1967, pp. 483-97, distinguishes Plotinus' ethical from metaphysical teachings on 
matter: "Matter's metaphysical function is good; matter is evil only w hen it is taken as an 
object for the souls' orientation," p. 497. He reads treatise 1.8 as an entirely ethical treatise and 
so takes its statements of the evil of matter as hortatory ethical statements.
O'Brien in "Plotinus on Evil," attempts to resolve the problem by making matter only a partial 
cause of evil: "Plotinus' conception of matter and the soul's weakness as part causes of sin is 
skilful and consistent," p. 146.
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The unifying principles of emanation recur at every level of derivation: 
1 ) that the perfect necessarily produces something other than itself; 2 ) that 
that which is different from the perfect is necessarily indefinite, dopiorov, 
lacking its own positive nature in itself and 3) therefore, it is dependent on 
the perfect for its definition and being through participation. Plotinus' notion 
of participation is so strong that the perfect is wholly present in the participant. 
So that in  the end the em anated is fully contained in the source. These 
principles are repeated at the level of nous (intellect), soul, and m atter in the 
scheme of emanation. Furthermore, they explain why matter is evil and why 
the soul is in peril to evil.
fertility of the One
In a break w ith  his predecessors, Plotinus found difference not in 
prim itive contrast to perfection or in the self-deviation from perfection, but 
difference resulted from the nature of perfection itself. It is the very nature of 
perfection to produce something other than itself. Emanation is the overflow 
of the perfection of the One. Even in an early treatise, Plotinus had come to 
this conclusion. The arguments for such an abstract and universal principle 
appeal to empirical observation:
We see w hatever of the others which advances to perfection, 
generates and does not suffer to remain by itself, bu t makes 
another. This is so not only for that which exercises choice, but 
also those which grow w ithout choice. Even things w ithout a 
soul share of themselves as much as they are able, as fire heats 
and snow chills and drugs w ork on another as they do. All 
things imitate the principle unto goodness forever as they are 
able. How then could the most perfect and first good stay in 
itself as if it were jealous of itself or the pow er of all things be 
impotent? How would it still be a principle? (Etineads 5.4.1,
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Plotinus draws his major premise from induction. The observation of powers 
in natu re  convinces one that the m ore perfect is the m ore productive. 
Production is a necessity which results from the perfection of the One.4
Plotinus draw s the figures of fire and snow. They are productive of 
heat and cold, respectively. Each admits grades of perfection. A weak fire 
produces very little heat. The greater the perfection of the fire, the greater 
heat it produces.
Elsewhere, Plotinus cites the example of the sun:
It is an illumination from the One all around, as the One remains, 
just as light around the sun is always generated in a circuit while 
the sun remains. And while they remain, all beings from their 
ow n substance give their necessary and  fit reality  around 
themselves, outside themselves, from the available power, being 
an image of archetypes from which it grows. Fire gives heat 
from itself. And snow does not only retain coldness. Fragrances 
especially testify to this. As long as they are, something advances 
from  them  and around them  w hich the bystander enjoys. 
Everything which is perfect generates and the eternally perfect 
generates eternally. It generates something lesser than itself. (5.1.6, 
28-39)5
3o xi 8’ <£v xcov aAAcov ei? xeA.eicoaiv i-q, opdopev yevvdov Kai o6k avexopevov e«J>' 
eauxoO peveiv, aAA’ exepov 7toto0v, oii pdvov o xi &v rrpoalpeaiv dxi). dAAd Kai oaa 06ei aveu 
7rpoaipeCTecos, Kai xa a\|n)xa  pexaSiSovxa eauxoov KaGocrov Suvaxar oiov xo 7ii>p Geppaivei, 
Kai ilnixti t| Xl“v>Kai TC*. <t>dppam 8e els aAAo epya^exai oiov auxa — navxa xfiv dpxhv Kaxa 
Suvapiv d7ropipoupeva els di8i6xr|xd xe Kai dya06xr)xa. rrws ovv xo xeAecoxaxov Kai xo 
irpwxov ayaGov ev abxcp axalri dxr7rep (JiGovfjaav eauxou fj dSuvaxfjaav, t; 7iavxcov Svvapis: 
7T(5s 8’ dv exi apxT] eiT|; ed. Paul Henry and Hans Rudolf Schwyzer, Plotin i Opera, w . 1-3, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964-82, v. 2, p. 235.
cf. 5.1.6, 28 ff., 5.2.1, 7-9.
4A. C. Lloyd, art. cit., traces the origin of this principle to a m odel from Aristotle's 
physics, "every entity, once it reaches perfection, generates something additional," p. 158.
57rep(/\.ap\|uv ai>xoO pev, ££, aiixoO Se pevovxos, oiov tiA.Iou xo 7iepi auxo Aaprrpov 
dx77rep 7repi0eov, e  ^ auxoo aei yevvcopevov pevovxos. Kai 7ravxa xa ovxa, ecos pevei, ck xf|s 
auxcov oualas avayKaiav xfiv 7repi auxa 7rpos xo e^ co auxcov £k xfjs 7rapoucrT|s 8uvapecos
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The sun is a better illustration of the One than fire or snow, because it produces 
light w ithout changing itself (as an incorruptible heavenly body). The 
production of the sun is inseparable from its nature. It remains in its perfection 
as it produces light. It produces as long as it is and without any variation in 
its nature.
production of the other/undefined/defined
Being productive implies making something different (exepov 7COiouv, 
5.4.1, 28). To be a producer, the producer must make something which differs 
from itself. Plotinus distinguishes an act of the substance of a cause from an 
act which originates from a cause.6
There is one act of the substance and another which originates 
from the substance of each thing. Everything is the first act of its 
substance. The second act, which originates from the first, 
necessarily follows in every case, must be different from it. As in 
the case of fire, the first act is that which completes the substance 
of heat, by which time the second act will already come about 
from the substance, while the fire actualizes that which is natural 
to its substance as long as remaining fire. So it is also in that 
realm. Much prior, the One remains there in its own nature 
while the act which is generated from its perfect and unified act 
receives its existence. (5.4.2, 27-33)7
5i5oxnv abxcov d^T|pxr|pevTiv undcrxaaiv, eiicova  oucrav o iov  dp%eiuncov wv e^epir nup pev 
xt | v  nap’ a in o u  Geppoxrixa- Kai x ^ v  o u k  eiaco povov xo \|n>xp6 v K axexti' p a A iaxa  5e o a a  
euco&n papxupei xoOxo- ecos yap ecm , 7rp6eicri xi it, auxcov nep’i au xa , oov ano/\.auei bnoaxavxcov 
o nA.r|Cjiov. Kai n a v x a  5e o a a  fjSri xeA.eia yevva- xo 5e a e i xeA.eiov d e l Kai a t5 io v  y e v v d  Kai 
iXXazov  Se eavxou yevv^. Henry and Schwyzer, v. 2, p. 194.
6Lloyd argues that Plotinus follows Aristotle's principle that "the actualized movement 
or process in an agent was the same 'in subject/substrate' as the one it caused in the patient but 
that they differed in 'being/essence,'" art, cit., p. 168. Lloyd himself notes himself that Plotinus 
differs with Aristotle in that the effect has a lower degree of reality, loc. cit. Once that is 
conceded, there is very little left of the Aristotelian causal theory in Plotinus.
7evepyeia f| pev eaxi xfjs ovcrias, f) 8' £k xrjg oucrias emaxou- Kai f| pev xfjs oiioias 
aiixo £ ctxiv dvepyeia eKaaxov, f| 8 e an’ eKeivris, fiv 5el navx’i eneoGai it, avayKTis exepav
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The first act of ones nature is its own growth in perfection or the actualization 
of its substance, as a fire can grow in its own internal heat. The second act, 
which originates from one's nature, communicates act outside of one's own 
substance, as fire causes heat in another thing. The act which the agent 
produces in the effect is distinct from its own substance.
Because the One remains in its own perfect nature, any product cannot 
be of its nature. Its nature is perfect and its act is not only its ow n actualization, 
but also an external operation.
Necessarily, the product is inferior to the One. Since the first principle 
is perfect, it cannot make something greater than itself, therefore it makes 
something less:
For being perfect it had to generate, for being such it could not be 
sterile. Even there the product could not be greater, but being 
less, it was an image of nous, indefinite also, but defined by the 
producer as if it was made as a likeness. (5.1.7, 37)8
In another figure, the difference between the One and plurality which result 
from it is set out in terms of motion out and back:
Therefore it is inferior to the One, because to the degree it is 
plural, it is so much worse than the One. But plurality does not
oucrav auxou- o iov  Kai. en i too mjpos h  pev x ij ea x i aupTiAripooaa xf^v oucriav 0epp6xt|s, f) 6e 
d.7i’ €KeivT|S ti5t| yivopevri dvepyoOvxos ^Keivoi) xfjv cnjp<tiuxov x(j oucria i v  xw peveiv 7iup. ooxco 
5f] KaKer Kai 7roA.u 7ipoxepov eKel pdvovxos a u x o o  i v  xoj olKeico fi0 e i £k xfjs ev auxco 
xeA.eioxr|xos Kai auvouaris dvepyeias h  yevvr |0e iaa  evepyeia  OTOaxaaiv A.aPooaa. Henry and  
Schwyzer, v. 2, p. 237.
8K a i  y a p  x e A e i o v  o v x a  y e v v a v  e 5 e i ,  K a i  p f i  S i i v a p i v  o o a a v  x o a a i i x r i v  a y o v o v  e i v a i .  
K p e i x x o v  8 e  o \> x  ° i o v  t e  T jv  e i v a i  o i> 5 ' e v x a O G a  x o  y e v v c o p e v o v ,  a \X  e ^ a x x o v  o v  e i5 c o A .o v  e i v a i  
a u x o u ,  a o p i a x o v  p e v  ( i x r a o x o s ,  o p i ^ o p e v o v  5 e  m o  too y e v v p a a v x o s  K a i  o i o v  e i S o n o i o u p e v o v .  
Henry and Schw yzer, v. 2, p. 196 f.
c f .  5 . 1 . 6 ,  3 8  f .
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have the nature of that one, but as it departed, it became inferior. 
It was respectful to that one, and the m ultitude turned tow ard 
the One and remained. (6.6.3, 7-9)9
Plotinus states that any motion or difference from the first is aopioxov 
(indefinite):
Movement and difference from the first is indefinite (aopioxov) 
and stands in need of that first for definition. It is defined when 
it turns to the first. (2.4.5, 31 ff.)10
’Aopioxla is opposite to definition. The principle that any difference from the 
first is aopioxov is critical to Plotinus' whole scheme of emanation. The first 
is a limit and departure is a direct opposite. In a late treatise (1.8) Plotinus 
refers to the One as "measure and limit" (pexpov navrov  Kai nepas, 1.8.2, 
5).11 Any departure from the One is a departure from the nature of the One 
into aopioxia.
We can say that it is less one than the One:
It is clear that this one [the intellect] after the wholly One must 
be many, or else it would not be after that One, but it would be 
that One. It is also not possible that the one after that One be 
greater than that One, rather it m ust be inferior to that One.
Since the best is One, it m ust be more plural than the One, for 
plurality consists in lack [of perfection]. (6.7.8,17-22)12
9Kai 5ia xouxo 5e EA.axxoOxai xou evos, oxi 7rA.fj0os exei, Kai oaov npos xo ev x^pov- 
Kai ovk ix ov xf)v Ovaiv EKeivou, aAAa dKPePx|Kos, f^axxcoxai, x<£ 8' evi 7rap’ eKeivco xo 
crepvov exei, Kai avecrxpei|/e 8e xo 7iA.fj0os eis Ev Kai Epeivev. Henry and Schwyzer, v. 3, p. 
155.
10 » > O'- \ * • * f f * f » * , > * \ yaopicrcov oe m t  fi Kivrjais Kai r\ exepoxrig r| aTro tou ttpcotcvu, KaKeivau npo$ to 
6pia0fjvai Seopeva- opi^exai 5e, oxav irpos auxo E7iiCTxpa<!)fi' Henry and Schwyzer, v. 1, p. 170.
nN ote contrast to Plotinus' own statement that the One im poses limit, but it is not a 
limit itself (6.7.7, 15).
12oxi pev ouv noXXa  Sei xoOxo xo ev eiva i ov pexa xo 7idvxr| ev, Sfj^ov- f| ouk av fjv
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The product is inferior to the One because it lacks the definition of the One. 
Since it is less defined than the One and other than the One, it is a plurality. 
It is indefinite in itself:
The simple which is before this plurality is the cause of being 
and the cause of it being plural. It makes number. N um ber is 
not primary. For before the dyad is the One. The dyad is second 
and after having been generated from the One it has that One as 
its limit, for it is dopicrcov in itself. (5.1.5, 4-6)13
The dyad is the first plurality. It was generated first as an indefinite, only to 
receive limit from the One. Because it is other than the perfection and unity 
of the One, the ecepov is dopicrcov. In itself it lacks all definition and positive 
being. In itself it is only difference from the One, a difference which is itself 
dependent upon the One.
The product does not remain dopicrcov (indefinite). As dopicrcov it is 
dependent on the One for all its definition. It desires the perfection of the 
One. By participating in that perfection it becomes defined and limited. In 
definition and limit derived from the One, it finds being.
participation
Plotinus has a much stronger notion of participation than does Plato.
liex eKelvo, dAX diceivo. net’ eiceivo 8e ov urcep pev eiceivo 7rpos to ii&AAov ev yevecrGai ook 
f|v, £A.A.ei7tov 5’ dKeivoo- too 5’ ap iaxoo ovtos ev6? £8ei nX iov  t] ev eivai- to yap 7tA.f|0os ev 
eAAei\|/ei. Henry and Schwyzer, v. 3, p. 193.
cf. 6.2.15,14.
13o 6.7tA.o0s ica'i o 7rpo toiootoo 7X^000$, o aixios too Kai eivai Kai n o X w  eivai 
tootov, o tov apiGpov 7roiwv. o yap apiGpbs oo TrpuTos1 Kai yap npd 8oa8os to ev, 8e6xepov Se 
8oa$ Kai 7iapa too evbs yeyevri|ievr| dKeivo opiaxfiv e'xei, aoxfi 8e aopiaxov nap' abxfjs- 
Henry and Schwyzer, v. 2, p. 192.
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For Plato, participants were unreal im itations of real forms. Plotinus 
em phasizes that if a participant does not receive the whole of a form, it 
receives none of it, for forms are wholly, uniformly, and unchangeably what 
they are. To receive a part would be to have nothing of the form:
So if it is able to participate, it would participate to the extent of 
its ability in the whole of it. The participants must share it, just 
as it has not shared in another, because it does not belong to 
them. Thus, it would rem ain whole in itself even in those in 
which it appears. If it were not whole, it would not be it. (6.4.8, 
39-45)14
It is not what they receive but how they receive it that differentiates participants, 
both from each other and from the participated. At each level of emanation, 
the definition which belongs to the One is received differently by the 
participants. Nous receives definition, not by being perfect unity as the One 
is, but through contemplation. In the duality of knower and known, nous 
attains the unity through true knowledge, wherein the knower becomes the 
known. Soul receives definition, but only through motion, as it continually 
seeks after contemplation of the One. Matter receives definition only through 
composition with form.
Despite the limited potency of the receiver, the participated is fully 
present in the participant. Being, also known as "the all" is fully present in 
all its participants:
The entire all is not able to abandon itself, but it has fulfilled 
itself, even as it was equal to itself. It is the source of the all, for
14ucrxe ei m i  5uvaxai pexaiiaPeiv, oXov av aiixou m 06 a o v  5 w a x a i pexa/iapprivoi. 
5ei ouv xa pexaAappdvovxa aiixoO ovxus e^eiv auxou, us oii pexeA.ape, |jrj i5iou aiixuv ovxos- 
ouxus yap &v pdvoi aiixo £0' eauxou oA.ov m i  ev ois opaxai oXov. ei yap pj.fi oXov, ouk auxo. 
ed. Henry and Schwyzer, v. 3, p. 125.
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it is the all. Absolutely, if anything is established in  the all as 
something other than that, it participates in the all and meets it.
It draw s strength from the all, not by dividing it, but by finding 
that in itself as it comes to it, because the all does not happen 
outside itself. (6.4.2,14-21 )*5
Being is not participating in by that which is outside of it. It is participated by 
that which is within it. There is nothing outside of being. Plotinus adds that 
non-being cannot contain being, but being can contain non-being.
Where there is being, there is also the One (6.4.11, 16). Nous and the 
One are present in all as a soul is fully present in the entire body, different 
parts of the body do not share different parts of the soul, but it is fully present 
in each part of the body (6.4.2,46 f.).
Plotinus asks himself, if nous is wholly present in all and soul wholly 
present in all bodies, how can there be a multiplicity of souls and intellects? 
Plotinus answers that one can contain many (6.4.4, 41), as there are multiple 
understandings in a soul (6.4.4, 44-46). Each understanding is different, but 
they are all of the soul.
As the emanations gain their definition from the source, we learn that 
they are not really distinct from the source. The source is all in all. The 
emanations are truly overflows of its perfection, and not distinct entities.
That by which the emanations differ is the overflow of the perfection 
of the source. It is the second act originating from the substance of the source. 
But as the emanations participate in the source, they truly receive the source 
in its fullness, such that they are contained in the source. Just as distinct
157rav 5f) to 7ictv oi>K £crxiv o7rcos d7roAei7rexai eauxou, aAA’ eaxi xe 7re7rA.r)pcoKOs eaoxo 
m i  ov icrov eaux&r Kai ou xo 7rav, dKei auxd- xo yap 7rav atixo £cmv. oAcos xe, ei xi ev xw 
Ttavxi i5pu0r| aAAo ov 7rap’ eKeivo, pexaAappdvei aiixoO Kai auvxuyxdvei aiixw Kai iaxuei 
nap  aoxoO oii pept^ov dKeivo, aAA' eopicjKov a m o  ev eaoxco auxo 7tpoaeA0ov eKeivw eKeivou 
ook e^co eauxoO yevotievoo- ed. Henry and Schwyzer, v. 3, p. 116.
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thoughts in the m ind, they are fully contained in the source that generates 
them .
nous, soul, m atter as em anations
In specific terms, Plotinus explained the emanation of the world from 
the One. First, the One generated intellect and being, whence came soul:
Because nothing was in the One, everything came from it. In 
order that being be, it was not, but it was generative of being.
This was first as if it was generation. Being perfect, not seeking 
anything, nor having anything, nor lacking anything, but as an 
overflow and an over-fullness of itself it made something other.
That w hich came about turned back to it, and was filled and 
arose while looking at it, and this was intellect. Its station toward 
that [the One] made being, and its contemplation of itself became 
intellect. For it stood toward it in order to see, then intellect and 
being came about together. Because it is like its source, it made 
similar things by pouring out great power—this was its form—just 
as that which is prior to it poured it forth. This was the actuality 
of the soul which originated from substance, even while that 
one remained. For nous came about even as the One, which was 
before it, rem ained. The soul produced an image not as it 
rem ained, but as it moved. When it looked to whence it had 
arisen and was completed, it came forth in an opposite movement 
and then produced an image of itself, i.e., sensation and the nature 
which is in plants. (5.2.1, 5-21): 6
16fj o n  ou5ev fjv dv aiiicj, Sia touto d£, auiou ra v ia , m i  iv a  to ov fj, Sia touto auxo? 
ouk ov, yevvriifis 8e auiou- m i  7rpc6ir| oiov yevvr|ais auny  ov yap idAeiov tco pt|Sev Cnieiv 
ixr|5e exeiv pr|Sd SeioDai oiov U7repeppur| Kai to uftepTrAfjpes a ikou  7re7ro(r|Kev aAAo- to Se 
yevopevov els au io  e7tecrTpa<|>T| Kai e7rAt|pc60T| m i  dyeveio upos au io  pAdnov m i  vous outos. 
m i  T) pev upbs dKeivo a ia a is  auiou to ov d7roiT|CTev, f| 8e 7ipos aiiid  0ea tov voiiv. e7iei oov 
eair| 7ipos auTO, iv a  i8xi, opou vous yiyveiai m i  ov. outoj ouv wv oiov eKeivos id  opoia 7roiei 
Siivapiv Ttpo^eas 7ioAAf|v—eiSo? 8e m i  toOto aiiiou—oxmep au  to aiiiou Ttpoiepov npoexee- 
Kai auTt) £K Tfjs ouaias evepyeia \J/uxfjs toOto pevovios dKeivou yevopevt|- m i  yap o voo? 
pevovios too 7ipo au iou  dyeveio. f] 8e oii pdvouaa 7ioiei, aAAa KivT|0eiaa dyevva ei'ScoAov. 
dKei pev ouv pAe7iouaa, o0ev dyeveio, 7tAr|pouTai, 7tpoeA0ouaa 8e eis kIvtioiv aAAT|v m i  
dvavilav yevva ei8coAov auT% aiCT0r|aiv m i  <|>uaiv ttiv dv toTs 0i>tois. Henry and Schwyzer, 
v. 2, p. 203 f.
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nous (intellect)
Even at the first stage of emanation, the product of the One is aopioxov. 
Nous is aopioxov in itself (5.1.5, 8, 5.4.2.5), but it eternally and unchangeably 
considers the One, thereby gaining definition. It is made perfect as it considers 
the One:
This plurality came about from One, and knowing this, it saw it 
and then it became active vision. This is already nous, when it 
possesses and it possesses as nous. Before this it is mere yearning 
and vision lacking impression. This nous applied itself to that 
one, and when it received, it became nous. It was always disposed 
and became nous, being, and intellection, when it understood. 
(5.3.11, 9-16)17
N ous by itself is like vision without visual impressions, sight awaiting 
its object. "It looked as one without a m ind" (6.7.16, 14). There is not a 
temporal distinction between the mind before and after knowledge, but a real 
distinction between knower and known. The nous in itself is mere knower. 
It requires an object for knowledge for there to be intellection and for the 
nous truly to exist (5.1.7, 24). Nous is not simple (6.7.13, 1), but a composite of 
seer and seen (5.3.11, 29 f.). However, in true knowledge, the knower and 
known become one.
It is made as a potency in itself, so to receive its information from the 
One. The One is said to cause the potency and information of the nous like 
the sun both causes the eye to be and to see (6.7.16, 21-35). In other places the
l7ouxos 5e 7roA.vs evos dyevexo, m i  ouxcos yvous ei8ev airco, m i  tote dyevexo 
iSoucra o\|/is. xouxo 8e t]5t| v o u s ,  oxe e%ei, m i <us vous e%er 7rpo 8e xouxou edeais povov K a i  
axwrcoxos oil/is. ouxos ouv o vous d7tdpaA.e pev dKelvco, /iapcov 8e eyevexo vous, aei 8e 
evSiripevos Kai yevopevos m i vous Kai oucrta m i vdr|cns, oxe dvoT|<je- Henry and Schwyzer,
v. 2, p. 222.
cf. 5.1.7, 9-17; 6.7.17, 14.
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nous is given more credit for doing the work of contemplation and producing 
its ow n noesis (6.5; 6.7.15).18 But however expressed, nous is indefinite in 
itself, and only informed by eternally contemplating the One.
Because of its own derived perfection, nous must produce something 
beyond itself. It produces soul:
Nous generated soul, nous being perfect. For being perfect it had 
to produce, and being such a great power it could not be sterile.
(5.1.7, 36-38)19
Thus, in accord w ith the first principle one of emanation, nous produces, 
because it is perfect.
soul
Following along in the same passage, we see that the principles of 
emanation hold at the second stage as well:
Even there the product could not be greater, but being less, it was 
an image of nous, indefinite also, but defined by the producer as 
if it was made as a likeness. The offspring of nous is a certain 
reason and existence, i.e., that which is thought. This is what 
moves around nous, the light given off from nous and the 
completed trace of that one. In that realm it is gathered to that 
one and in this way it is filled and enjoys and shares in that and 
understands, but in this realm, it as affected by those things which 
come after it. It generates itself those things which m ust be less 
than soul. (5.1.7, 38-48)20
18See A. C. Lloyd, art. cit., p. 174.
19\ |/u Xt iv  yap yevva  vous, vous wv xeA.eios. Kai yap xeA.eiov ovxa yevvav e5ei, K a i  p f ]  
Suvapiv ouaav xoaauxT|v ayovov eivai. Henry and Schwyzer, v. 2, p. 1%.
^ K p e i x x o v  8e  o u x ,  o i o v  x e  f j v  e i v a i  o u 8'  d v x a u G a  x o  y e v v c o p e v o v ,  aXX  e X a x x o v  o v  
e iS c o A o v  e i v a i  a i i x o u ,  a o p i o x o v  p e v  a x r a u x o o s ,  o p i ^ o p e v o v  S e  t m o  x o u  y e v v f | c r a v x o s  r a ' i  o i o v  
e i S o T i o i o i j p e v o v .  v o u  S e  y e v v r j p a  ^ .o y o s  x i s  K a i  i m o c r x a c r i s ,  x o  S i a v o o i i p e v o v  x o u x o  5 ’ e a x i  x o  
T ie p i v o u v  K i v o u p e v o v  K a i  v o u  0cos K a i  r / y o s  e ^ T ) p x r |p e v o v  e K e i v o o ,  K a x a  G a x e p a  p e v  a u v r i y p e v o v
139
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The soul is produced as dopioxov, and gains inform ation from nous. The 
soul is less perfect than its producer. Unlike nous it is subject to motion. 
Neither does it contemplate the One directly. Nous mediates the One to the 
soul, nous makes soul rational, giving it vestiges of the One (6.7.17, 36-39). 
The soul is perfect enough to produce something itself, matter.
matter
As indicated above, soul produces that which comes after it (5.1.7, 47).
But what soul creates is absolute indeterminacy (3.4.1, 11). It is irrational and
incomprehensible (3.9.3, 10). Even at earlier stages, Plotinus refers to the 
indefiniteness of nous and soul as "matter." Final m atter is distinguished 
from intellectual matter by its absolute indeterminacy. In contrast to intellectual 
matter, it is dead (2.4.5, 18). It cannot move, think, live or produce. It cannot 
take on the definition from above. It cannot have any definition in itself, but 
only receives definition in a composition with form:
Just as everything which was came about before it, it came about
formless, and was informed by turning back to its generator as if 
it were being nourished. So also that which was generated from 
there was not the form of soul, for it no longer had life, but was 
completely indefinite. If there is indefiniteness in the prior things, 
it is only in form. They are not completely indefinite, but only 
w ith respect to their perfection. The new one is completely 
indefinite. It became body when it was perfected by receiving 
form which came upon potency. It is a receptacle of the generator 
and nourisher. (3.4.1, 8-16)21
eiceivcp K a i x a u x r | d 7r o m p 7rA.dn.evov K a i anohavov  K a i p e x a A a p p a v o v  a u x o t i K ai v o o u v , K a x a  
G a x ep a  5e  d ^ cu rx o p ev o v  x w v  p ex ' a i ix o ,  p a A A o v  Se yevvdov K a i a i ix o ,  a  \|n ix fjs avayK T i e i v a i  
X eip o v a - Henry and Schwyzer, v. 2, p. 197.
21f j ,  w a 7 r e p  7 r a v ,  octov 7r p o  x o i i x o u  d y e v v a x o ,  d p o p < t> co x o v  d y e v v a x o ,  e i S o 7 r o i e i x o  5e x w  
e7 u crx p e< l> e< 7 0 a i 7 rp o s  x o  y e v v f j c r a v  o i o v  d K x p e < |> 6 p e v o v ,  o i ix c o  Si) K a i  d v x a u G a  x o  y e v v r |0 e v  o o  
i|/x>Xf|S e x i  e l S o j — o u  y a p  e x i  ^ f |—aXX a o p i a x t a v  e i v a i  7 ta v x e A .f j .  e i  p e v  y a p  K a v  x o i ?  7 i p o x e p o i s
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Soul not only creates the a o p i c r x i a  of matter, it is also subject to suffering 
from the indefiniteness of matter. Because the indefiniteness of m atter is 
intractable, soul ends up pouring itself into a o p i a x i a  (2.4.11,31).
Because it is absolutely indefinite, matter is evil:
Because when something is completely lacking, i.e., matter, then 
it is truly evil and has no portion of the good. Neither does 
m atter have being that it may thereby share in the good, but its 
being is homonymous. Truly said it does not exist. Simple lack 
is in the state of being not good. Evil is complete lack. (1.8.5,
8ff.)22
At each level of emanation there is a progression of d o p i o r i a .  At each 
stage, the product departs from the source as a o p i o x o v ,  and returns to the 
source for definition. At each stage a new greater a o p i o x o v  is generated, until 
the product becomes too imperfect to reproduce and the process of emanation 
ceases.
evil
As absolute aopioxov, matter is said to be "true evil, without share of 
the good" (1.8.5, 9). At first blush matter as totally evil seems paradoxical to 
the monistic system of Plotinus. How can the necessary product of the perfect 
One be evil? Is evil matter a dualistic holdover in Plotinus' thought?
Puech postulated a progression in Plotinus' thought from m atter as
f| aopicrxia, a X X  ev eiSer 010 yap Travel] aopicrxov, dAX cos Trpos xf)v xeAeicomv auxou- xo 5e 
v w  7rdvxr|. xeAeioopevov 5t yivexai croopa pop0f)v Aa(3ov xf]v xrj Suvapei 7rp6<j<tiopov, imoSoyji 
t o o  yevvT|(javxos icai etc0pe\J/avxos' Henry and Schwyzer, v. 1, p. 283.
“ dA X  oxav 7ravxeAcos £AAei7n], 07rep dcrxiv f] uAri, xoOxo xo ovxeos m icov priSepiav 
e'xov ayaGoo poTpav. ou5e yap xo e iv a i i r] uA.t|, iv a  ayaGou xauxt) pexei%ev, a X X  
opcovopov abxfi xo e iv a i, ws aATiGes e iv a i Aeyeiv abxo pi] e iv a i. i) o w  eAAei\lns exev P££l xo 
pT| ayaGov e iv a i, f| 5e 7ravxeAf|s to  K axov Henry and Schwyzer, v. 1, p. 113.
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evil in his early thought to matter as good in his later thought.23 That theory 
cannot be m aintained in light of the very negative picture of m atter as the 
source of evils in  Plotinus fourth to last tractate (1.8). O thers postulate a 
difference between Plotinus' moral and metaphysical teaching. Plotinus saw 
matter as a metaphysical good but as a moral evil.24 Such a divide cannot be 
m aintained either.
Plotinus' ethical view of m atter is the natural product of his system of 
emanation. At each stage of emanation, potency precedes actuality, aopiatov 
precedes definition. Nous is the indefinite know er which gains definition 
only in contemplating the One. The potency of the knowing subject does not 
tem porally precede the actuality of nous, but in Plotinus' account, it is the 
indefiniteness of nous which explains the definition which it receives from 
the One. It is generated as an indefinite knower and dependent upon the One 
for information. The soul itself is created in dopim 'ia. It can move toward 
nous and the One or can descend into the greater d o p ia tia  of matter (1.8.4, 
25-32). The soul is subject to descend into evil because of its own mutability 
which results from its own aopicrua. M atter comes as the last stage as an 
dopioiov which cannot become defined. As such it is both a principle of evil 
and a natural progression of the outflow of dopicrr'ia which is emanation. 
The principle of emanation and the principle of evil are the same: dopicm a 
of the emanated. Plotinus' metaphysics and his ethics are founded on the 
same principle of dopiaxia and difference from the One.
The dop icm a of the product is not an accidental by-product of emanation. 
It is the principle of distinction which makes the everything proceed from the
^Henri-Charles Puech, Les sources de Plotin: Entretiens sur I 'a n tiq u ite  classique, V, 
Vandoeuvres-Geneva: FondationHardt, I960, pp. 182-85.
24See note to Armstrong, Costello, and O'Brien above.
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One. At its heart, Plotinus' metaphysics contains the seeds of evil.
A ugustine
By A ugustine's time (354-430) Plotinus had already deposed matter as 
the fundamental metaphysical principle of diversity. Augustine went further 
than Plotinus by also casting m atter dow n from its position as principle of 
evil. Augustine followed Plotinus in arguing that it was the perfection of 
power of the first principle that explained its ability to create beings other than 
itself. For Augustine creatio ex nihilo was the expression of God's omnipotent 
ability to create w ithout need of supporting causes. But Augustine departed 
from Plotinus' view of m atter as principle of evil. Plotinus argued that evil 
only entered at the last stage of emanation, in the absolute depravity of matter. 
Augustine countered that because every created intelligence had its origin ex 
nihilo , it also had to look beyond itself for its end. Every creature lacked 
God's perfection of being and was therefore mutable. Because it was mutable 
it could fall away from that end and become evil. Augustine centered blame 
on angelic and hum an wills. As created will turned to itself for beatitude 
rather than to God, sin entered into the cosmos. Matter was left as a passive 
bystander in the drama.
In spite of the many points of com parison betw een Plotinus' and 
Augustine's systems, they are fundamentally distinct.25 Although Plotinus'
^ h e  question of Augustine's Neoplatonic sources is still open. O'Meara has argued for 
Porphyry's influence in "Augustine and Neoplatonism," Recherches Augustiniennes 1, Paris: 
Iitudes Augustiniennes, 1958, pp. 91-111. To establish Porphyry's doctrines he turns to Augustine's 
ow n citations. See also "The Neoplatonism  of Saint Augustine," Neoplatonism  and Christian  
Thought, ed. D. J. O'Meara, Albany: State University of N ew  York Press, 1982, pp. 34-41.
For a defense of Plotinus as the m ost important source for Augustine's Neoplatonism, Robert J. 
O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory o f Man, A. D . 386-391, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 20-26. O'Connell downplays Porphyry as an 
independent thinker.
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nous is eternally generated and comparable to the Logos of the Trinity for 
Augustine, the Father and Son for Augustine are of the same substance while 
Plotinus' One and nous are substantially distinct. Plotinus' One is beyond 
being. Unlike Plotinus' One, Augustine's God is being, life, and intelligence. 
Whereas Plotinus develops emanation as a unfolding in stages, Augustine's 
creation is simultaneous and completely in the power of God. God creates 
everything without intermediaries.
A ugustine 's doctrine of sim ultaneous creation also in troduced a 
fundam ental change into Christian teaching.26 Theophilus of Antioch had 
introduced a notion of a two stage creation. God first created formless matter, 
from which he created the cosmos. The two stage creation truncated the 
theories of the Middle-Platonist creationists. It denied the eternity of matter, 
but maintained the temporal priority of matter over the cosmos. Augustine's
The comparison is made difficult because none of Porphyry's relevant works survive.
For fragments of Porphyry preserved in Victorinus, see Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 
Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1968.
26For an overview of several issues treated by Augustine with respect to creation see, 
William A. Christian, "Augustine on the Creation of the World," The Harvard Theological 
R eview , 46,1953, pp. 1-25.
For a discussion of Augustine's arguments for creation, see Christopher Kirwan, Augustine,London: 
Routledge, 1989, pp. 151-166.
None of these works treats Augustine's doctrine of creatio ex nihilo extensively. Peters' work 
focuses on Augustine's the question cited in its title. Christian and Kirwan give brief attention 
to creatio ex nihilo  in Augustine, Christian, art. cit., pp. 18-22, and Kirwan, op. cit., p. 155. 
Neither discusses the development of the doctrine throughout Augustine's career, nor his relation 
to earlier Christian thinkers.
Aime Solignac in "Exeg&se et Metaphysique. Gen&se 1 ,1 -3  chez saint Augustin," in In Principio: 
Interpretations des premiers versets de la Genese, ed. Paul Vignaux, Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 
1973, pp. 153-171, presents a chronological review of Augustine's exegetical treatment of the 
opening of Genesis.
On the question of God's alleged idleness before creation, see Edward Peters, "What Was God 
Doing Before He Created the Heavens and Earth?" Augustiniana, 34,1984, pp. 53-74.
For more on the question of God's activities before creation see, Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, 
and the Continuum: Theories in antiquity and the early middle ages, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1983, pp. 232-38.
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understanding of matter as absolutely qualityless made the two-stage creation 
unworkable. As a result he introduced a simultaneous creation. However 
his move from two-stage to simultaneous creation came in stages.
At first he pictured precosmic m atter as the confused stuff in terms 
sim ilar the standard  M iddle-Platonist readings of Plato's Timaeus. In the 
Confessions, he adopted a picture of absolutely qualityless matter which led 
him to posit an atemporal creation of matter. Finally, he moved to a concreation 
of form, matter, and of the entire cosmos in de Genesi ad litteram.27 In the 
end, Augustine's concreation of form and matter and the simultaneous creation 
of the cosmos would remain the principle alternative to the two stage creation 
of earlier Christian thinkers throughout the Medieval church.
de Fide et Sym bolo  (393)
In 393 while serving as an assistant to the Bishop of Hippo, Augustine 
wrote de Fide et Symbolo, an exposition of the Apostles' Creed and anti- 
Manichaean polemic. In opposition to Manichean dualism, Augustine argues 
that the om nipotent God of the Scriptures creates ex nihilo. The creatio ex 
materia of the Manichaeans contradicted God's omnipotence:
Thus they do not understand the creator of the world to be 
omnipotent, if he could not have made the world, unless some 
nature not created by him, like matter, helped him. (de Fide et 
Sym bolo  2.2)28
^For Augustine's use of Scripture in the discussion of creation see, Gilles Pelland, Cinq 
etudes d 'Augustin sur le debut de la Genese, Tournai: Desclee, 1972.
See also A im e Solignac, "Exeg^se et M£taphysique. Genfese 1 .1-3  chez saint Augustin," In 
Principio, Interpretations des premiers versets de la Genfese, Paris: fitudes Augustiniennes, 1973, 
pp. 153-171.
“ ita intellegunt fabricatorem mundi non esse omnipotentem, si mundum fabricare non 
posset, nisi eum aliqua non ab illo fabricata natura tamquam materies, adiuvaret. ed. Joseph 
Zycha, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, v. 41, Prague: Tempsky, 1900, p. 5.
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In arguing for creatio ex nihilo from the omnipotence of God Augustine was 
following Theophilus and Tertullian. However, Augustine went further in 
his analysis of m atter than Theophilus and Tertullian. They had simply 
argued that the co-eternity of m atter w ould make it a co-arche and equal 
power to God. Augustine understood matter as potency and argued that even 
potency depended on God:
In no way is it to be believed that m atter itself from which the 
world was made could have existed by itself, co-eternal and coeval 
w ith  God, w hether unform ed, invisible, or in any other way.
But whatever mode it had that it could be in whatever way and 
could receive the forms of distinct things, it d id  not have except 
by the om nipotent God. By his beneficence is not only every 
formed thing, but also everything formable. (de Fide et Symbolo 
2.2)29
As a potency, m atter has some being, even if merely potential being. At the 
early stage, however, he still held the two stage creation of the cosmos. He 
relied on Wisdom o f Solomon 11.28 (see above, chapter 3), which claimed 
that God created the world from materia invisa  or i n f  or mi, which Augustine 
understood to teach that God first created the unformed matter, from which 
he then created the world.
de Genesi liber imperfectus
In de Genesi liber imperfectus, written shortly after de Fide et Symbolo,
^nullo m odo credendum est illam ipsam materiam, de qua factus est mundus, quamvis 
informem, quam vis invisam, quocum que m odo esset, per se ipsam  esse potuisse tamquam  
coaeternam et coaevam deo; sed quemlibet modum suum, quern habebat, ut quoquo modo esset et 
distinctarum rerum formas posset accipere, non habebat nisi ab omnipotente deo, cuius beneficio 
est res non solum  quaecumque formata, sed etiam quaecumque formabilis. Zycha, p. 5.
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Augustine expressly maintains the two stage creation. Matter was created in a 
primal state of confusion reminiscent of Plato's Timaeus. Augustine explained 
Genesis 1:1-2:
This earth which God made, was invisible and not composed, 
until it was divided from the same and composed in a definite 
order of things from confusion. (de Genesi liber imperfectus 
4)30
Two-stage creation was soon to change under pressure from A ugustine's 
N eoplatonism .
Confessions (397)
In the Confessions, written in 397, shortly after A ugustine's elevation 
to Bishop of Hippo, A ugustine took Genesis 1:1-2 to teach the atemporal 
creation of matter.
The change in his exegesis followed from a change in view of the inform itas 
of matter. In place of the Middle-Platonist precosmic confusion, Augustine 
adopted the absolute indefinite matter of the Neoplatonists:
It is true that everything changeable conveys to our note some 
formlessness, by which it receives form and by which it is changed 
and is altered. . . .  It is true that formlessness, which is almost 
nothing, cannot have succession of time. It is true that whence 
anything comes about, can have the nam e of that thing from 
which it comes in some kind of speech. Therefore, that heaven 
and earth can be called some formlessness from which the heaven 
and earth are made. . . .  It is true that everything that is made 
from something formless, is first unform ed and then formed.
Mhaec autem terra, quam deus fecit, invisibilis erat et inconposita, donee ab eodem ipso 
discerneretur et ex confusione in rerum certo ordine constitueretur. ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 28.1, 
1894, p. 465.
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(<Confessions, 12.19.28)31
Absolutely formless m atter implies its atemporality. A ugustine takes the 
formlessness in Genesis 1:2 in the strong sense, as absolute lack of form, thus 
im plying the atem porality  of the creation of m atter.32 Since absolute 
formlessness could have no time, matter could not temporally precede the 
cosmos.
Obviously there can be nothing in the text of Genesis which would 
move Augustine to such a firm insistence on the absolute formlessness of 
Genesis 1:2. Augustine's reasons for rejection of a two-stage creation go deeper 
than the meaning of a single word. Augustine had moved away from the 
view of matter as a primitive difference which was inherent in the Middle- 
Platonist view of precosmic matter. He had moved to the view of the 
Neoplatonists which saw matter as a consequence of difference. For Middle- 
Platonists m atter was a primitive difference to the forms, which explained 
phenomena-form and body-soul dualism. For Neoplatonists, m atter came at 
the last stage of differentiation from the One.
A ugustine had rejected the M iddle-Platonist view  of m atter as 
independent prim itive and hence the view that it was created as a prime 
principle later to be formed into a cosmos made little sense.
31et verum est quod omne mutabile insinuat notitiae nostrae quandam informitatem, qua 
formam capit vel qua mutatur et vertitur. . .  . verum est informitatem, quae prope nihil est, 
vices temporum habere non posse, verum est quod, unde fit aliquid, potest quodam genere locutionis 
habere iam nomen eius rei quae inde fit: unde potuit vocari caelum et terra quaelibet informitas 
unde factum est caelum et terra. . . . verum est omne quod ex informi formatur prius esse 
informe, deinde formatum. ed. James J. O'Donnell, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 174.
^For the relation of Augustine's discussion of creation to his theory of time, see Joseph 
Moreau, "Le temps et la creation selon saint Augustin," Giornale di M etafisica, Torino, 1965, pp. 
276-299. Republished inStoicisme, Epicurisme, Tradition Hellenique, Paris: J. Vrin, 1979, pp. 
167-181.
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Augustine took matter for the cosmos not as a matter out of which, but 
as matter in which a composite exists. Silver is the m aterial out of which 
something new is made. Voice is a component in w hich the song exists. 
Voice does not and cannot preexist the composite:
So, matter is prior to that which was made from it. It is not prior 
because it m ade the world, rather it came about. Neither was it 
prior by some intervening time. For we do not first produce 
formless sounds w ithout song and then join or compose them 
to the form of a song as we do with the boards from which chests 
are made, or with silver from which a vessel is made. For such 
materials precede even in time the forms of the things which 
come about from them. But it is not that way with song. For 
when it is sung, its sound is heard. It does not sound first without 
form and then become formed into a song. Whatever first sounds 
is gone, and you cannot find anything from it which you can 
recover and compose by art. Therefore the song is developed in 
its sound, which is its matter. (Confessions, 12.29.40)33
Like the voice in a song, m atter did not exist prior to the creation of the 
cosmos. It exists only in composition with the cosmos. But in the Confessions, 
Augustine referred to the atemporal creation of matter. He had not yet taken 
the next step to which their co-dependence would lead him.
de Genesi ad literam
Augustine economized his theory in the Literal Commentary on Genesis 
where he abandoned the atem porality of formless m atter in favor of the
“ sic est prior materies quam id quod ex ea fit, non ea prior quia ipsa efficit, cum potius 
fiat, nec prior intervallo temporis. neque enim priore tempore sonos edim us informes sine cantu 
et eos posteriore tempore in formam cantici coaptamus aut fingimus, sicut ligna, quibus area, vel 
argentum, quo vasculum  fabricatur. tales quippe materiae tempore etiam praecedunt formas 
rerum quae fiunt ex eis, at in cantu non ita est. cum enim cantatur, auditur sonus eius, non prius 
informiter sonat et deinde formatur in cantum. quod enim primo utcumque sonuerit, praeterit, nec 
ex eo quicquam reperies quod resumptum arte componas. et ideo cantus in sono suo vertitur, qui 
sonus eius materies eius est. O'Donnell, p. 174.
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concreation. The concreation of form and matter was part of the simultaneous 
creation of the whole creation. In the Literal Commentary Augustine argues 
that the w ork of the six days was done sim ultaneously, adopting Philo's 
argum ent that narration of six days served only as a symbol for the order of 
creation. (Literal Commentary, 5.5, p. 145 f.)
Again he drew  his illustration from vocalization:
Not because formless matter is temporally prior to formed things, 
since both are created sim ultaneously, both that from which 
something is made and that which is made. Just as voice is the 
matter of words ("words" indicate formed voice), but the speaker 
does not first emit a formless voice so that he can then bind it 
and form it into words. So also God, the creator, did not at a 
prior time make formless m atter and then form it by the order of 
each nature as if by afterthought. He created m atter informed.
(Literal Commentary on Genesis, 1.15)34
Again relying on the figure of the spoken word, this time Augustine is ready 
to draw  the full implication of the co-dependence of form and matter. Not 
only is a formless voice atem poral, it is non-existent. Matter cannot exist 
without any form. Therefore, it m ust be created with form.
Augustine himself presented the best summary of his teaching in Contra 
A d versa riu m :
Matter is not completely nothing because it is said to be formless, 
neither is it co-eternal w ith God inasm uch as it is m ade from 
nothing, neither d id another make it so that God could have 
something from which to make the world. It is impossible that
^N on quia informis materia formatis rebus tempore prior est, cum sit utrumque simul 
concreatum, et unde factum est, et quod factum est —  sicut enim vox materia verborum est, verba 
vero formatam vocem indicant, non autem qui loquitur prius emittit informem vocem, quam possit 
postea conligere atque in verba formare: ita et deus creator non priore tempore fecit informem  
materiam et earn postea per ordinem quarumque naturarum quasi secunda consideratione formavit: 
formatam quippe creavit materiam. ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 28.1,1894, p. 21.
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the omnipotent one be said unable to create unless he found that 
from which he created. Therefore, God made matter. Neither is 
it to be considered evil because it is unformed, but it is to be 
understood as a good, because being formable is the capacity. For 
if form is something of the good, being capable of the good is 
something of the good. Just as a confused voice is a clamor 
without words, an articulated voice comes about when it is formed 
into words. Therefore, the former is formable and the latter is 
formed. The former receives form and the latter has form. It is 
clear which of these is that from which something comes about. 
No one says that the sound of the voice comes from words, but 
who does not understand that spoken words come about from 
the voice.
Neither is it to be thought that God first made unformed matter 
and then after an interval of time formed that which he had 
made unformed. But as sounding words come about from the 
speaker, when the originally unformed voice does not later receive 
form, but it is produced formed, so God should be understood to 
have m ade the world from formless m atter, so as to have 
concreated it with the world(l. 8 .11-9.12).35
Augustine asserts that matter has some share of the Good, if only as a potency. 
As a capacity for good, it is created.
In Augustine's theory, the pride of created intelligences dethrones matter 
made prince of evil by the Platonists. Souls and angels become evil by delighting 
in themselves as their own end rather than seeking their end in God. The
“ Non ergo quia informis dicta est, omnino nihil est, nec deo fuit vel ipsa coaeterna, 
tamquam a nullo facta, nec alius earn fecit, ut haberet deus, de qua faceret mundum. Absit enim 
ut dicatur omnipotens non potuisse facere, nisi unde faceret inveniret. Ergo et ipsam deus fecit. 
N ec mala est putanda, quia informis, sed bona est intellegenda, formabilis id est formationis 
capax. Quoniam si boni aliquid est forma, nonnihil est boni esse capacem boni. Sicut vox confusa 
est clamor sine verbis, vox vero articulata fit cum formatur in verba. Est ergo ilia formabilis, 
ista formata, ilia, quae formam capit, ista, quae habet. Nam  quid horum unde fiat, in promptu 
est. Neque enim  quisquam dixerit de verbis fieri sonum  vocis, sed potius de voce fieri verba 
sonantia quis non intellegat?
Nec putandus est deus informem prius fecisse materiam et intervallo aliquo interposito temporis 
formasse, quod informe prius fecerat, sed sicut a loquente fiunt verba sonantia, ubi non prius vox 
informis post accipit formam, sed formata profertur, ita intellegendus est deus de materie quidem 
informi fecisse mundum, sed simul earn concreasse cum mundo. ed. Klaus-D. Daur, Corpus 
Christianorum Series Latina 49, Turnholt: Brepols, 1985, p. 44 f.
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attention of the soul is not merely diverted by matter, rather it is the soul's 
own distinction from God that both requires it to look to God for this end and 
allows it to slip away from him.
Only God is true being, perfect, and unchanging. The creature is not 
from God (de Deo), it is not God and does not have God's nature:
God is the highest good who has no superior. Therefore he is 
the unchangeable good, and therefore eternal and immortal. All 
other goods are by (ab) Him but not of (d e) Him. That which is 
of him is that which is he himself. The things made by him are 
not that which he is. Therefore, if he alone is unchangeable, all 
which he made is changeable, because he made it from nothing.
He is so omnipotent that he could create good things, both large 
and small, celestial and terrestrial, spiritual and corporeal of (de) 
nothing, that is out of (ex) that which did not exist at all. (de 
Natura Boni, l)36
Augustine argues both from God as supreme good and as ipse esse. As supreme 
good, God is immutable. As ipse esse, he is who he is. The creature is not 
what God is, therefore it is not immutable or eternal as God is.
Augustine's use of the term ipsum esse is Platonic. Like the Platonists' 
distinction between the forms and the phenomena, Augustine postulates a 
complete distinction between God and creature. Unlike Plato, there is no 
receptacle which is eternally distinct from the forms. The difference is created. 
God makes something distinct from himself de nihilo. It is the omnipotence
^Summum bonum, quo superius non est, deus est; ac per hoc incommutabile bonum est; 
ideo vere aeternum et vere immortale. cetera omnia bona nonnisi ab illo sunt, sed non de illo. de 
illo enim quod est, hoc quod ipse est; ab illo autem quae facta sunt, non sunt quod ipse, ac per hoc 
si solus ipse incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt, tarn enim  
omnipotens est, ut possit etiam de nihilo, id est ex eo, quod omnino non est, bona facere, et magna 
et parva, et caelestia et terrena, et spiritalia et corporalia. ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 25.2, 1892, 
p. 855.
cf. Sed iam tibi dictum est, quia quod fecit, non de ipsius natura est, sed ex nihilo fecit, quia 
omnipotens est. non erat, et fecit, non de se, non de aliqua re, quam ipse non fecerat, sed ex 
nihilo. contra Felicem 2.19; ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 25.2,1892, p. 849.
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of God that creates difference. God's omnipotent creative power echoes Plotinus' 
perfection which produces difference.
Creatures are not of the essence of God. They are created de nihilo:
I say that the created rational nature could sin because it was 
made from nothing. What other reason could it sin other than 
it was not of the nature of God? For if it were not m ade of 
nothing, it would naturally be of God, whatever it were. If it 
were made naturally from God, it would be of God's nature. If is 
were G od's nature, it could not sin. Therefore, it could sin 
eventhough it was made by God, because it was made of nothing 
and not of God. (contra Iulianum Pelagium 5.38)37
The creatures differ absolutely from God. None is of God's nature or 
perfection, therefore none is immutable.
In a new twist to the teaching of creatio ex nihilo, Augustine uses the 
maxim of creatio ex nihilo as the principle of evil in creatures. Creatio ex 
nih ilo  implies that the creature's end is not natural. The creature needs God, 
because just as it is not sufficient for its own beginning neither is it sufficient 
for its own end. Nothing in the creature contributed to its beginning, therefore, 
its end is also not in the creature. It must seek an end which is higher than 
itself. Because the end is higher than itself, the creature can fall away from 
that end. It does not naturally find its end:
Although not every creature can be blessed (for neither beasts,
^hoc dico ego, naturam quae rationalis creata est, propterea peccare potuisse, quia ex 
nihilo facta est: quod aliud quid est, quam propterea peccare potuisse, quia natura Dei non est? 
si enim de nihilo facta non esset, de D eo naturaliter esset, quidquid esset: si naturaliter de Deo 
esset, Dei natura esset: si Dei natura esset, peccare non posset, ideo igitur peccare potuit, quamvis 
facta sit a Deo, quia de nihilo facta est, non de Deo. ed. Migne, Patrologia Latina 45,1475 f.
cf. cum enim deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex 
nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis 
minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit. de C ivita te Dei 12.2; ed. Bernard 
Dombart and Alphonsus Kalb, CCSL 48,1955, p. 357.
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nor trees, nor stones, nor anything of this kind attains or receives 
this gift) that creature which can, cannot do so from itself, because 
it is created from nothing, but it can from him by whom it was 
created. If God is received, the creature is blessed, if he is lost, the 
creature is miserable. God is not blessed by another but by himself, 
and therefore cannot be miserable because he cannot lose himself. 
Therefore, we say that only the one, true, blessed God is the 
immutable good. All things which he makes are good because 
they are by him, but they are changeable, because they are not 
made of him, but of nothing. (De Civitate Dei, 12.1)38
The creature can find its end only in God. If it turns away from God it 
becomes sinful and miserable. The fault lies in itself, not in matter. It is 
imperfect in itself to begin with and requires God as an end. It becomes sinful 
when it looks to itself as its end rather than to God. Its pride in itself is the 
principle of evil:
If the cause of the misery of the evil angels is sought, it happened 
justly, because they turned from him who ultimately is and turned 
into themselves, who are not ultimately. What else should this 
vice be called other than pride. "Pride is the beginning of every
MIta quamvis non om nis beata possit esse creatura (neque enim hoc munus adipiscuntur 
aut capiunt ferae ligna saxa et si quid huius modi est), ea tamen, quae potest, non ex se ipsa 
potest, quia ex nihilo creata est, sed ex illo, a quo creata est. Hoc enim adepto beata, quo amisso 
misera est. Ille vero qui non alio, sed se ipso bono beatus est, ideo miser non potest esse, quia non 
se potest amittere. Dicimus itaque inmutabile bonum non esse nisi unum verum beatum Deum; ea 
vero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo, verum tamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de 
nihilo facta sunt. CCSL 48, p. 355 f.
cf contra Iul.: catholica fides, Dei tantummodo sine initio naturam praedicat, summi scilicet 
atque incommutabilis boni, hoc est, illius ineffabilis Trinitatis: a quo sum m o, ut dictum est, 
atque incommutabili bono universam conditam dicit esse creaturam, naturasque omnes bonas, 
quamvis impares Creatori, quia ex nihilo creatas, ideoque mutabiles: ita ut omnino nulla natura 
sit, quae non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso facta sit; ut quantacumque aut qualiscumque natura sit, in 
quantum natura est, bonum sit. Quaerunt itaque a nobis, unde sit malum. Respondemus, Ex bono, 
sed non sum m o et incommutabili bono. Ex bonis igitur inferioribus atque mutabilibus orta sunt 
mala. Quae mala licet intelligam us non esse naturas, sed vitia naturarum: tamen simul 
intelligimus ea, nisi ex aliquibus et in aliquibus naturis esse non posse; nec aliquid esse malum, 
nisi a bonitate defectum, contra lulianum  Pelagium  1.8.36-37; ed. Migne, Patrologia Latina 
45.666).
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sin" (Sirach 10.13). (De Civitate Dei, 12.6)39
Augustine stands in such a unique position as the preserver and conveyor 
of Classical and Early Christian thought to the medieval world and beyond, 
sometimes it is hard to see the differences between his own thought and that 
which preceded. In the doctrine of creation, he did not pass on Classical and 
Patristic thought just as he had found it. He made deep changes to both 
traditions. He brought an end to matter as a prim ary metaphysical principle. 
It was a consequence of creation, not a primitive cause of generation. Neither 
was it the cause of evil. When one considers that it had served as the principle 
of evil from the time of Plato and that it had been universally despised by the 
dogmatic schools of Philosophy, Augustine's exoneration of m atter stands as 
no small feat.
At the same time, A ugustine's treatm ent of creation left a nagging 
question unanswered. Augustine was clear that God had created matter and 
everything else, but he provided no explanation of the relation of the creature 
to God. One finds Augustine painfully aware of the problem in his Confessions. 
After his conversion and baptism, he still is left to w onder how he as a 
temporal creature can approach the eternal God. The eternal truly is what it 
truly is, while the temporal constantly slips from  the future which does not 
yet exist and into the past which no longer exists; from nothing into nothing. 
Facing such a great gulf from God, teetering on the brink of non-existence, 
sometimes Augustine seems to have left the created world further from true 
being than Plato had.
^Cum vero causa miseriae malorum angelorum quaeritur, ea merito occurit, quod ab illo, 
qui sum m e est, aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non sum m e sunt; et hoc vitium quid aliud 
quamsuperbianuncupetur? h iitiu m  quippe omttis peccati superbia. CCSL 48, p. 359.
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Chapter 6, Being and Difference: Creatio ex nihilo and participation in Aquinas
When Aquinas (1224/5-1274) set out to explain the Christian doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo, he came face to face w ith a problem which his Christian 
predecessors1 had simply not addressed, how to explain the relation of the 
being of the creature to the being of God. Because creatio ex nihilo was long 
established as orthodox, Aquinas could not accept A ristotle's position that 
god, the separate substances, celestial bodies, and sublunary m atter were 
eternally existent, distinct, and that none caused the being of the other. Neither
’Augustine set the lim it of speculation concerning creation in the western Christian 
tradition [With the exception of John Scotus Eriugena, who under influence of Pseudo-Dionysius 
developed a very non-Augustinian view  of creation. His work was so distinct that it did not 
attract any imitators in the western tradition. On Eriugena's theory of creation, see John J. 
O'Meara, Eriugena, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 93-104]. Some followed Augustine very 
closely as did Taio Caesaraugustinus w ho became Bishop of Saragon in 646. He adopted 
Augustine's simultaneous creation of the whole cosmos and Augustine's arguments for simultaneous 
creation of form and matter (Sententiarum  1.6, Migne, Patrologia Latina, 80.48 f.). Bede (673-735) 
accepted the sam e arguments for simultaneous creation of form and matter, but he retreated 
from Augustine by taking the work of the six days of creation described in Genesis as successive 
works. Unlike Augustine, he did not interpret the phrase "the earth w as formless and void" 
(Genesis 1.2) as an expression for unformed matter, but for the unfinished state of the world (as 
before him had Ambrose in H exaem eron  1.7, horn. 2.25 & 27, Migne, 14.147 f., Basil in Hexaemeron  
horn. 2, Migne, 29. 33, and Chrysostom, In Genesin horn. 2, Migne, 53.31). Bede found all four 
traditional elements described in Genesis 1.2, "and the earth was form less and void and the 
waters covered the earth." In addition to earth and water that were named, Bede found fire 
and air hidden in the earth, citing the observable phenomena of vapors that still proceed from 
the earth and fire that heats underground fountains (H exaemeron  1, Migne, 91.13-15).
Bede's reading w as accepted by Rabanus Maurus (bishop of Fulda, 856) w ho quoted it in his 
Commentary on Genesis nearly verbatim (on Genesis 1.2, Migne, 107.446). A s late as the 12th 
century the scholast Honorius Augustoduensis still offered a paraphrase of Bede's explanation 
in his H exaem eron  (1, Migne, 172.255).
Other commentators followed Bede in principle with som e modifications in detail. Remigius 
Antissiodorensis (d. 908) agreed that fire was hidden in the earth but claimed that the heavens 
created in Genesis 1.1 should be understood as air ( Commentarius in Genesim ad loc., Migne, 
131.55). Hugo of Saint Victor (d. 1142) made the most creative modifications, arguing that on 
the surface of the earth lay the other three elements all mixed together in a cloud, a theory 
reminiscent of som e of the early Greek cosmologists (Adnotafiones Elucidatorines in Pentateuchon, 
In Genesim 5, Migne, 175.34).
None of these writers pursued the question of the creation of matter any further than Augustine 
had and confined their explanations of the origin of matter to locating the four elements in the 
creation account of Genesis.
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could he accept that the being of the creature was the being of god, as Plotinus 
had argued. What em erged as a solution to the problem  was unique to 
Aquinas' own metaphysics.
Given that the being of the creature derives entirely from God, how 
can one explain that the being of the creature differs from God? There is 
nothing in the creature which is not of God, by what does the creature differ 
from God? Further, if God is ipsum esse subsistens (being itself subsisting) as 
Aquinas was wont to say, how can there be a subsistent being which is not 
God?
Aquinas argues that if God is esse per se, his esse will be unique:
Everything which is in something not according to the being of 
the thing itself, is in it through some cause, as pallor is in a 
human. For what does not have a cause is primary and immediate.
It is therefore necessary that it be absolutely (per se) and be 
inasmuch as it is its very self. It is impossible that some one 
thing be in two things and be inasmuch as each is itself. For that 
which is said of a thing inasmuch as it is its very self, does not 
exceed it, as having three angles equal to 180° does not exceed a 
triangle, of which it is predicated, but is convertible w ith the 
same. (Summa contra Gentiles 2.15)2
God is esse inasmuch as he is. There can only be one such being. Since this 
esse is unique, other beings must not be per se esse, but have esse in another 
sense. Aquinas' challenge becomes to give an explanation of the being of the 
creature such that it does not have God's being, without positing some other 
being or potency independent from God by which to differentiate the creature
2Omne enim quod alicui convenit non secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam 
convenit ei, sicut album  homini: nam quod causam non habet, primum et immediatum est, unde 
necesse est ut sit per se et secundum quod ipsum. Impossibile est autem aliquod unum duobus 
convenire et utrique secundum quod ipsum. Quod enim de aliquo secundum se ipsum dicitur, ipsum 
non excedit: sicut habere tres angulos duobus redis aequales non excedit triangulum. ed. Leonine, 
Roma: 1918, p. 294 f.
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from God.
Creatio ex nihilo had already eliminated from consideration Plato's 
receptacle and Aristotle's matter as principles of difference. Plato argued that 
the receptacle as space underlay all change in the physical w orld as an 
independent principle of change and becoming. Aristotle introduced the term 
"matter" to describe the principle underlying change in the world. Aristotle 
argued that m atter could not exist independently as Plato's receptacle did. 
Nevertheless, m atter was distinct from the forms which appeared in it and 
from the separate substances as well. Matter was not caused by form, even 
though it could not exist without one form or another. Matter helped explain 
the differences between the celestial and terrestrial realms because Aristotle 
argued that celestial bodies were eternal and required a different matter from 
the matter of the earthly bodies. The Middle-Platonists, e.g., Atticus, Plutarch, 
Albinus, and A puleius, borrowed from both the Aristotelian and Platonic 
positions. They argued that matter was a principle of change, eternally distinct 
from god which explained the limited goodness of the creature.
Christian creatio ex nihilo as developed in the second century moved 
most directly against the Middle-Platonist solution. M atter was created, not 
an independent principle.
Neither could later Christians could accept the Plotinian solution, even 
though Plotinus' Neoplatonism eliminated matter as an underived principle 
of difference. As a thorough-going monist, Plotinus derived m atter and all 
else from the One, as a single principle of all being. But there was only one 
being in the Plotinian cosmos, participated in by all. Being was fully and 
wholly present in each of the participants, so in a sense one could say that the 
being of the creature was the being of the divine. Aquinas was familiar with
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the N eoplatonists in the works of Proclus and the Arabic Neoplatonist, 
Avicenna, but Plotinus' solution was not acceptable within Christian orthodoxy, 
which from  early on preached complete distinction betw een the creature and 
Creator (Ro m an s  1.25).
Augustine offered no adequate explanation of the relation of the creature 
to God. Even though Augustine was very clear that God had created all being, 
including matter. He also made it clear that the mutable nature of the creature 
was distinct from the eternal being of God. But he had no positive explanation 
of the relation of the being of the creature to God beyond an exemplarism, 
which explained that the nature of creatures im itated ideas in the divine 
intellect.
W hen Aquinas came to the problem of relating the being of the creature 
to the being of God, reliant as he was on Aristotle, the Neoplatonists and 
Augustine on so many points, the solution he forged was uniquely his own 
and unprecedented.
His solution can be stated in a word: participation.
The creature participates in God's being. Stripping the term of its Platonic, 
Aristotelian, and Plotinian meanings, Aquinas filled the term  "participation" 
with his ow n unique meaning. Plato had introduced the term participation 
to explain the relation of things to the forms. Participants were deficient 
likeness of wholly transcendent forms. The forms were so transcendent that 
they w ere not at all realizable by participants, who shared the form only 
denom inatively and not by any real likeness. Neither did the transcendent 
forms cause their likenesses in the world. The dem iurge modeled his work 
after the forms and the participant strove to imitate the forms, but the forms 
themselves remained utterly distinct, unchanged, and inactive.
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Aristotle had a weak notion of participation by which different subjects 
could be said to share a form, in that they were each of the same kind. But 
Aristotelian participation made no claims as to the transcendence of one form 
over the other.
Plotinian participation was far too strong in the likeness of participant 
to participated, in that the being of the participant was in some sense the 
being of the participated.
For Aquinas, the creature's participation in the being of God implied at 
once: that the creature's being was at most analogously like God's being; that 
the creature was wholly dependent upon God for its entire being and its being 
was entirely caused by God; that it was the transcendence3 of God beyond 
the creature that required that the creature be wholly dependent upon God. 
The merely analogous likeness of the creature to God m eant more complete 
dependence than the specific or generic likenesses found in other participation 
relations among other causes and effects. It was precisely the difference of the 
creature from God that signalled its absolute dependence upon God in all 
aspects of its being, showing creation to be absolutely ex nihilo.
creatio ex nihilo
Aquinas believes that creatio ex nihilo is rationally demonstrable and 
that it had been proven by philosophers as well as revealed by faith. By 
contrast, the temporal finitude of the created world is not demonstrable and
3By transcendence here I mean that the likeness of the creature to God is less than 
likeness of things sharing the same species and even less than likeness of things in the same 
genus. A stone and a person share the generic likeness of being corporeal. Two white surfaces 
share the sam e specific color, even if there are differences in the intesity of the color. God is 
not in any species or genus so no creature can share a specific or generic likeness with him, but 
only an analogous likeness.
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rests upon the claims of revelation alone.4 Aquinas does not believe that 
one could not prove the temporal finitude of the world from creatio ex nihilo 
as Bonaventure tried (Sententiarum  2.1.1.1, q. 2.6). In his late work, On the 
Eternity o f the World against Grumblers, Aquinas argues that the eternity of 
the world does not contradict creatio ex nihilo:
The question rests upon this, whether being created by God to 
the full extent of ones substance contradicts not having a beginning 
of duration or not. That they are not contradictory is proven 
thus: (de Aeternitate Mundi contra Murmurantesf
Aquinas argues that creatio ex nihilo does not imply non-being temporally 
preceded being. Ex nihilo does not mean that there m ust first have been 
nothing before there was something. Ex nihilo only denies that there was a 
material or passive potency from which God created the world.
Aquinas took time to argue that the eternity of the world did not 
contradict creatio ex nihilo, because if they were contradictory, the eternity of 
the w orld w ould be dem onstrably false, because creatio ex nihilo was 
demonstrably true by reason:
If it were understood that something could have existed forever
besides God, as if there could be something eternal besides him,
4Jaroslav Pelikan sets the eternity of the world against creatio ex nihilo  as contrary 
postions. He quotes Aquinas' discussion of the eternity of the world in Sutnma Theologiae 146.2 
as evidence that Aqinas held that "creatio ex nihilo  could be known only by revelation and 
that therefore the question lay beyond the competence of reason and philosophy to decide," 
The Growth o f Medieval Theology (600-1300), Chicago: Unviersity of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 
291.
In the passage cited, Aquinas only argues that the eternity of the world, cannot be disproved by 
reason, but that does not show that creatio ex nihilo is unprovable, because the eternity of the 
world and creatio ex nihilo are compatible positions (see below, in text).
5In hoc ergo tota consistit quaestio, utrum esse creatum a Deo secundum totam substantaim, 
et non habere durationis principium, repugnent ad invicem, vel non. Quod autem non repugnent, 
sic ostenditur. Opera v. 16, Parma: Fiaccador, 1865. p. 318.
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which was not made by him, this would be an abominable error 
not only in faith, but also among the philosophers, who agreed 
and proved that everything which is in any way, cannot be unless 
it be caused by God, who maximally and truly has being, (de 
Aeternitate Mundi contra Murmurantesf
In the de Potentia Dei, Aquinas names Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna as those 
who have proved that God was the universal cause of being and therefore 
showed creatio ex nihilo. Historically it is better to say that Aquinas developed 
argum ents for creatio ex nihilo from the writings of Plato and the second 
book of the Metaphysics (which is probably not by Aristotle). In any case, 
Aquinas believes that creatio ex nihilo was provable from the philosophy of 
Plato and Aristotle independent from revelation.
He considers the reasons for creatio ex nihilo to be necessary:
It was demonstrated above (q. 44 a. 1, 2) that no entity can be that 
is not from God, who is the universal cause of entire being.
Hence, it is necessary to say that God produces things from nothing 
(ex nihilo) into being. (Summa Theologiae 145.2)7
By creatio ex nihilo Aquinas does not only deny that any matter is 
presupposed to the creative act of God, but also that any essence, nature, form, 
act, potency, or order is presupposed to creation:
That, therefore, which is the cause of things inasmuch as they 
are beings, must be the cause of things not only inasmuch as 
they are things in such states by accidental forms, and not only
6Si enim  intelligatur quod aliquid praeter Deum  potuerit sem per fuisse, quasi possit 
esse aliquid aeternum praeter eum, ab eo non factum; error abominabilis est non solum in fide, 
sed etiam apud philosophos, qui confitentur et probant quod omne quod est quoquo modo, esse non 
possit nisi causatum ab eo qui maxime et verissime habet esse. ed. Parma, v. 16, p. 318.
7Ostensum  est autem supra quod nihil potest esse in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est 
causa universalis totius esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod D eus ex nihilo res in esse producit.
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inasm uch as they are of such a kind by substantial forms, but 
also according to all that which pertains to their being in any way 
whatsoever. Thus, we m ust also affirm that prim e m atter is 
created by the universal cause of beings. (Summa Theologiae I 
44.2)8
God creates all that pertains to being in any way whatsoever. Thus the potency 
of m atter by which material beings exist as individuals is created by God. The 
forms which give them  being are created by God. The essences by which 
creatures are w hat they are, are created by God. The natures by which their 
essences are displayed in operation are created by God. Their accidents, the 
order of subsisting things one to another, everything that in any way is, is 
created by God.
God creates esse
Aquinas' definitions of creation each define creation as the production 
of esse or ens:
1) We say this is to create, namely to produce a thing in being 
according to its entire substance. ( Scriptum super Libros 
Sententiarum  2.1.1.2)9
2) em anation of the entire being from a universal cause, and 
this emanation we designate by the name of creation. (S u m m a  
Theologiae 145.1)10
8Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non 
solumsecundumquod sunt fa I i a per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec  per formas 
substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et 
sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium. ed. Leonine, 
Opera v. 4, Roma: 1888, p. 458.
9Hoc autem  creare dicim us, scilicet producere rem in esse secundum  totam suam  
substantiam. ed. R. P. Mandonnet, O. P., v. 2, Paris: Lethielleux, 1929, p. 18.
10emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae est Deus: et hanc quidem emanationem 
designamus nomine creationis. ed. Leonine, v. 4, p. 464.
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Pursuant to the definition, Aquinas explains that the proper object of creation 
is the existing substance, that which exists per se. The substance is created as a 
package, which includes its principles (form and matter), and its accidents. 
Form and m atter are principles of the substance and do not have independent 
being any more than accidents do. There is no im m aterial form of a dog 
running loose any more than there is a color red existing independent of any 
surface.
Neither matter nor form nor accident is properly said to become, 
but that which becomes is the subsisting thing. Since becoming 
terminates in being, becoming properly belongs to that to which 
being belongs by itself, that is to the subsistent thing. Hence, 
neither matter nor form nor accident is properly said to be created, 
but to be concreated. Properly, the subsisting thing is created, 
whatever it is. (de Potentia Dei 3.1 ad 12)11
God creates matter, but only in conjunction with form in a substance. Matter 
considered by itself is in potency. To say that a merely potential being exists in 
act is a contradiction:
To say that matter proceeds without from, is to say that a being is 
in act w ithout act, which im plies a contradiction. (Su m m a  
Theologiael66.l)n
Although he is clear that m atter is only created informed, Aquinas
"neque materia neque forma neque accidens proprie dicuntur fieri; sed id quod fit est res 
subsistens. Cum enim fieri terminetur ad esse, proprie ei convenit fieri cui convenit per se esse, 
scilicet rei subsistenti: unde neque materia neque forma neque accidens proprie dicuntur creari, 
sed concreari. Proprie autem creatur res subsistens, quaecumque sit. ed. P. Bazzi, et. al . ,  
Quaestiones Disputatae, v. 2, Taurini: Marietti, 1965, p. 40.
cf. Summa Theologiae 145.4, de Potentia Dei 3.8, deVer 27.3 ad 9.
"Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu: quod 
implicat contradictionem. ed. Leonine, Opera v. 5, Roma: 1889, p. 154.
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refuses to choose between the two prevailing Christian theological accounts 
of the creation of the material world: the two stage creation and Augustine's 
simultaneous creation. He notes that both accounts agree that matter cannot 
be created w ithout any form whatsoever. Therefore, the doctors of two stage 
creation, Basil and Ambrose (see above), understood formless m atter of the 
first stage of creation as relatively formless. What is first created is not absolutely 
formless but only formless with respect to its later internal formation and 
place within the cosmos.
As for forms, Aquinas accepts no pre-substantial or eternal forms. As 
we have seen, forms come into being only in the created substance. The same 
is true for essences of things. Contrary to a common modern interpretation 
(of Gilson, Wippel, and Dewan), the essences of things do not exist prior to 
creation as distinct ideas in the mind of God eternally.13 According to this 
interpretation, some of these ideas serve as models for the things which are 
actually created, while others are merely possible. This interpretation, the 
exemplarist position, has been successfully challenged by Ross, who has argued 
that essences are created with things. He explains Aquinas' talk of ideas in the 
mind of God as Aquinas adoption of the "going" terminology, but a literal 
interpretation does not fit Aquinas' metaphysics. Ross argues that Aquinas is 
a voluntarist who claims that God chooses the universe and things he creates 
and creates the essences of things with things. I will not summarize Ross' 
arguments, many of which challenge the consistency of any exemplarist position
13See Etienne Gilson, H istory o f Christian Philosophy in the M iddle Ages, Random 
House, New York, 1955, p. 373.
John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of 
Nonexisting Possibles," ch. 7 of Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Washington, D. C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1984, pp. 163-90. Originally published in Revieiu of 
M eta p h ysics  34,1981, pp. 729-58.
Dewan, American Catholic Philosophical Q uarterly , 65,1991, pp. 221-234, see note below.
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in general.14 I will offer additional textual evidence for the voluntarist reading 
of Aquinas.
To begin, contra the exemplarist reading of Aquinas, ideas and created 
essences are distinct. Ideas are the essence of God, the essences of things are 
not. God knows things in a more excellent way than they exist in their own 
essences. He knows them through the perfection and in the unity of his own 
essence. He does not need ideas which are distinct from his essence to know 
or to create his creatures. Aquinas clearly distinguishes the essences of creatures 
from the essence of God:
It m ust be that that by which there is cognition of a thing is 
united to the knower. Hence, the essence of created things, since 
it is separate from God, must not be the medium by which God 
knows the things themselves. But he knows them through a 
more noble m edium , namely through his essence. Therefore, 
he knows them more perfectly and in a more noble way, because 
nothing but his essence is the principle of his cognition. (Scriptum
14James Ross, "Aquinas's Exemplarism; Aquinas's Voluntarism," Am erican Catholic 
Philosophical Q u a r te r ly , 64,1990 pp. 171-198.
See responses to Ross by A. Maurer and L. Dewan, American Catholic Philosophical Q uarterly , 
65,1991, pp. 213-220 and 221-234.
Maurer argues that Ross has read Gilson and Maurer's postions unfairly, because they all agree 
that God's essence is his one idea. H owever Ross argues that multiplicity is only said of hte 
divine ideas ad extra, Maurer seem s to smuggle plurality back into the divine essence: "Plurality 
enters into the ideas through G od's knowledge of himself as capable of being participated in 
many ways by creatures," p. 216.
Dewan unabashedly claims that there are a plurality of divine ideas and that Aquinas is a 
photo-exemplarist, p. 221, and: "The multiplication of divine ideas by denom ination from 
creatures is not from actua l creatures, or even from creatables which have been 'tagged' to be 
created, but from creatables themselves, prior to the intention of the divine choice to create," p. 
222 (emphasis Dewan's).
See Ross' reply to Maurer and Dewan, American Catholic Philosophical Q u a rterly , 65, 1991, 
pp. 235-243.
For another critique of exemplarism, particularly with respect to ideas for the possibles, see W. 
Norris Clarke, "What is Really Real?" Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical studies in honor 
o f Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart, Bruce: Milwaukee, 1955, pp. 61-90. Clarke argues that real 
existence of mere possibles would violate creatio ex nihilo and divine simplicity, p. 87.
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super Libros Sententiarum 1.36.2.1 ad 3)15
Created essences, unlike ideas are "separate" and distinct from the essence 
of God. Unlike God's essence, essences of created things are created with 
things:
Because being is attributed to an essence, not only the being, but 
the essence itself is said to be created, because before it had being, 
it was nothing, except perhaps in  the intellect of the creator, 
where it is not a creature, but a creating essence. (de Potentia Dei
3.5 ad 2)16
Divine ideas cannot be identified with created essences, for Aquinas identifies 
them w ith the essence of God:
Therefore, it m ust be said that in the divine w isdom  there are 
accounts of all things, which we above (q. 15 a. 1) called ideas, 
that is exemplar forms existing in the divine mind. A lthough 
these are multiplied w ith respect to things, in reality they are not 
other than the divine essence, for his similarity can be participated 
by diverse things in diverse ways. Thus, God himself is the first 
exemplar of all things. (Summa Theologiael44:.3y7
15oportet illud per quod est cognitio rei, esse unitum cognoscenti; unde essentia rerum 
creatarum, cum sit separata a Deo, non potest esse medium cognoscendi ipsas res a Deo; sed 
cognoscit eas nobiliori medio, scilicet per essentiam suam; et ideo perfectius cognoscit et nobiliori 
modo; quia sic nihil nisi essentia eius est principium suae cognitionis. Parma, v. 6, Parma: 
Fiaccador, p. 292.
16quod ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum  esse, sed ipsa quidditas 
creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est 
creatura, sed creatrix essentia, ed. Bazzi, p. 49.
cf. de Veritate  5.9: omnem naturam immediate esse a Deo conditam. ed. Bazzi, op. cit., p. 164.
17Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes om nium  rerum: quas 
supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. Quae quidem, licet 
multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout 
eius sim ilitudo a diversis participari potest diversim ode. Sic igitur ipse D eus est primum  
exemplar omnium, ed. Leonine, v. 4, p. 460.
cf. Sum m a Theologiae 1 15.1 ad 3.
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Ideas really are "nothing other than the divine essence." The same cannot be 
said of created essences. How could ideas equal both the essence of God and 
created essences? How could other ideas be merely possibles while the essence 
of God is in no way potential?
As the passage makes clear, God himself is the exemplar of all things. 
All creatures are likenesses of him. They all participate in his being, but they 
also im itate him in their essences, only by a different mode. Both the esse 
and the essence of the creature are similitudes of God. There is one exemplar 
of all creatures, but it is infinitely imitable by diverse creatures, because of its 
perfection in being.
How do we get to talk of many ideas? The ideas are "multiplied" with 
respect to things. In reality they are only one: the divine essence. They are 
only m any because the ideated things are many. There are many things 
which are made as likenesses of God. There are infinite ways he can and is 
copied. Therefore, there are many ideas. The multiplicity of ideas arises only 
from the multiple and diverse copying of the single divine essence. Talk of 
ideas presupposes that something is made which is an image of the divine 
essence. If there were no creation, there would be no ideas. The term idea 
refers to the divine essence with respect to something which is a copy of the 
divine essence, just as creator refers to God with respect to the work of creation 
(Summa Theologiae I 13.7). Whereas creator refers to the whole of creation 
and is therefore singular, the relation of idea is different according to the 
diversity of kinds of creatures and is therefore plural. But the plurality signifies 
the multiplicity of copies, not in a multiplicity of the essence of God.
Hence, this name idea names the divine essence according as it is 
the exemplar imitated by the creature. The divine essence will
168
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
be the proper idea of this thing according to a determined mode 
of imitation. Because diverse creatures imitate it in other ways, 
it is said that it is another idea or account by which hum an and 
horse are created. Hence, it follows that w ith respect to many 
things which imitate the divine essence in different ways, there 
is a plurality among ideas, although the imitated essence is one. 
(Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum 1.36.2.2)18
God creates essences in substances. In A quinas' creationist and 
substantialist system, there is no room and no need for distinct ideas as models 
for creation.
order of nature
Just like essences, the whole order of nature (or laws of nature) is 
created and instituted by God (de Potentia Dei 6.1 ad 6; Summa Theologiae I
25.5 ad 3). Here as elsewhere, Aquinas' substantialism comes through. Laws 
of nature do not float around as disconnected abstractions. The course or law 
of nature consists in the ordering of creatures one to another, that is in the 
exercise of the power of one substance over another: "cursus autem naturae 
est secundum ordinem unius creaturae ad aliam" (de Potentia Dei 6.1 ad 3).
The universal governing principles of the cosmos rest in the power of 
the highest created substances, separated intelligences, i.e., angels. The higher 
in the order of the universe the creature, the more universal its effects:
The higher any substance, the more universal is its power. The
18Unde cum hoc nomen id e a  nominet essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar 
imitatum a creatura, divina essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum  determinatum  
imitationis modum. Et quia alio m odo imitantur earn diversae creaturae, ideo dicitur quod est 
alia idea vel ratio qua creatur homo et equus; et exinde sequitur quod secundum respectum ad 
plures res quae divinam essentiam diversimode imitantur, sit pluralitas in ideis, quamvis essentia 
imitata sit una. Parma, v. 6, p. 293.
cf. de Veritate 3.2 co, ad 2.
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pow er of an intellectual substance is more universal than the 
power of a body. The higher intellectual substances have powers 
which are not explicable by any corporeal power. Therefore, they 
are not united to any body. (Summa contra Gentiles 3 80)19
Since the separate intellectual substances are more universal than bodies,
they have power over all bodies:
Particular powers are naturally able to be moved by universal 
powers, as is clear as much in art as in nature. It is right that 
intellective power is more universal than any other operative 
power, for intellective power contains universal forms. Every 
operative power is only from some proper form of the operator.
It is therefore necessary that every other creature is moved and 
ruled by intellectual powers. (Summa contra Gentiles 3 78)20
These are the immutable intellectual principles of the universe. They govern 
everything that happens in the physical realm, both heavenly and terrestrial. 
They govern the motions of the heavenly bodies:
Elements therefore act by the pow er of the celestial bodies and 
the celestial bodies by the power of the separate substances. Hence, 
when the activity of the separate substances ceases, then the activity 
of the heavenly body must cease. When it ceases, the activity of 
the elemental body must cease, (de Potentia Dei 5.8)21
19quanto aliqua substantia est superior, tanto virtus eius est universalior; virtus vero 
intellectuals substantiae est universalior virtute corporis: superiores quidem  inter intellectuals  
substantias habent virtutes non explicabiles per aliquam virtutem corpoream, et ideo non sunt 
corporibus unitae. ed. Leonine, v. 14, Roma: 1926, p. 232.
cf. Summa Theologiae 1 110.1.
V ir tu te s  p articu lars natae sunt moveri a virtutibus universalibus: ut patet tarn in 
arte quam in natura. Constat autem quod virtus intellectiva est universalior omni alia virtute 
operativa: nam virtus intellectiva continet formas universales, om nis autem virtus operativa 
tantum est ex aliqua forma propria operantis. Oportet igitur quod per virtutes in tellectuals  
moveantur et regantur omnes aliae creaturae. ed. Leonine, v. 14, p. 230.
n Elementa ergo agunt in virtute corporum caelestium et corpora caelestia agunt in virtute 
substantiarum separatarum; unde cessante actione substantiae separatae, oportet quod cesset 
actio corporis caelestis; et ea cessante oportet quod cesset actio corporis elementaris. ed. Bazzi,
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Their effects in the lower bodies are only mediated through the motion of the 
heavenlies (de Veritate 5.8). Through the heavenlies, the separated substances 
have very specific effects on earth:
Such forms proceed from  separate substances as from  first 
principles, which by the mediation of the pow er and motion of 
heavenly bodies, impress forms which are intellectual with them 
into corporeal matter, (de Operationibus Occultis Naturae)22
The form s which Aquinas mentions are the forms found in the hierarchy of 
nature above the virtues of the elements and minerals and below the human 
soul. These include the forms of minerals, plants, and animals. Aquinas 
attributes the forms of minerals, plants, and animals to the agency of the 
heavenly bodies (see below), but they can be traced further back to more 
universal causes: the separated substances. Aquinas gives specific examples 
of this in the de Anima :
Above these forms are again the souls of plants, which have a 
similarity not only to the heavenly bodies, but also to the movers 
of the heavenly bodies, inasmuch as they are the principles of 
any motion for all which move themselves. Further above these 
are the souls of beasts which have a similarity to the substance 
moving the heavenly bodies, not only in the operation by which 
they move bodies, bu t also because they are cognitive in 
themselves, even though the knowledge of beasts is only of 
material things and is material itself, in that it needs material 
organs, (de Anima 1 co.)23
p. 152.
“ Procedunt tales formae a substantiis separatis sicut a primis principiis, quae mediantc 
virtute et motu caelestium  corporum imprimunt formas apud se intellectas in materiam  
corporalem. ed. Leonine, Opera v. 43, Roma: 1976, p. 184.
“ Super has autem formas sunt iterum animae plantarum, quae habent similitudinem  
non solum ad ipsa corpora caelestia, sed ad motores corporum caelestium in quantum sunt principia 
cuiusdam motus, quibusdam seipsa moventibus. Super has autem ulterius sunt animae brutorum,
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In good A ristotelian tradition, the motors of the celestials are separated 
substances. The sim ilarities referred to here are the forms of plants and 
anim als and are among the forms referred to as the effects of the separate 
substances in the passage from the de Operationibus Occultis Naturae quoted 
above. Thus, the similarity here is not accidental, but it is a participation 
caused by the separated substances themselves. They produce the power of 
motion in plants and animals as their own likeness in the material realm.
The changes suffered by the effects of the separated substances in the 
material realm are due to the mediation of the motions of the celestial bodies 
which introduce alteration into the lower realm  (Summa Contra Gentiles 3 
91.4). The celestial bodies cause generations and corruptions in the material 
realm  (Summa Theologiae 1115.3 co, ad 2).
Thus Aquinas establishes a hierarchy of substances by which higher 
substances produce both forms and orders in lower realms. There are no 
absolute, abstract laws of nature in his system. The "laws" governing the 
cosmos are all effects of substances. Both substances and their subsequent 
order are produced by God ex nihilo.
Even m athem atical tru th s follow  from  the creation of things. 
Mathematicals are not independent entities but abstracted from the motion 
and m atter of things:
Mathematicals do not subsist as independent beings. Because if 
they subsisted, there would be some good in them, namely their 
being. But mathematicals are independent only in reason, as 
they are abstracted  from m otion and  m ateria l. (S u m m a
quae sim ilitudinem  iam habent ad substantiam m oventem  caelestia corpora, non solum in 
operatione qua movent corpora, sed etiam in hoc quod in seipsis cognoscitivae sunt; licet brutorum 
cognitio sit materialium tantum, et materialiter, unde organis corporalibus indigent, ed. Bazzi, 
op. cit., p. 284.
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Theologiae 15.3 ad 4)24
M athem aticals are abstracted from things. T ru th  and im possibility in 
mathematics and even in logic rest only in the formal reason of things:
The logician and mathematician consider things only according 
to formal principles. Hence, nothing is impossible in logic or 
mathematics, except that which is contrary to the formal reason 
of a thing, (de Potentia Dei 6.1 ad l l ) 25
There is no independent tru th  to numbers, only that which is grounded in 
the reality of things from which they are abstracted. Had God made different 
things, then the truths of mathematics would have been different. We know 
that different geometries are possible merely by varying principles such as the 
definition of straight lines. Given a universe not based on three dimensions 
or extension in space as we know it, it is easy to imagine that the truths of 
mathematics would be quite different.
participation
Aquinas' discussions of creatio ex nihilo tell only part of the story of 
the creature's dependence upon God. For a fuller picture of the relation of 
the creature to God, we need to consider the meaning of the term "participation."
The term  is very im portant in Aquinas' works, occurring over 3000 
times in his w ritings (in both noun and verb forms: participation and to
24mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse: quia si subsisterent, esset in eis 
bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, 
prout abstrahuntur a motu et materia, ed. Leonine, v. 4, p. 59.
“ logicus et mathematicus considerant tantum res secundum principia formalia; unde 
nihil est im possibile in logicis vel mathematicis, nisi quod est contra rei formalem rationem. 
ed. Bazzi, p. 160.
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participate). It also occurs at very key points in the presentation of both of 
Aquinas' longest and most systematic presentations of Christian doctrine, the 
Summa Contra Gentiles26 and the Summa Theologiae.27
In the past, the Platonist overtones of the term led many Thomas scholars 
to relegate it to secondary importance. That changed with the work of Fabro 
and Geiger, two scholars who rightly estimated the importance of the doctrine 
and successfully brought it to the forefront of Thomistic studies.28
26Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 c. 16 n. 5; c. 17 n. 7; c. 22 n. 9; c. 23 n. 2; c. 25 n. 6; c. 28 n. 4; 
c. 29 n. 5; c. 32 n. 6; c. 32 n. 7; c. 38 n. 4; c. 38 n. 5; c. 40 n. 3; c. 41 n. 3; c. 43 n. 8; c. 43 n. 9; c. 60 n. 4; c. 75 
n. 3; c. 75 n. 4; c. 78 n. 3; c. 81 n. 4; c. 89 n. 12; c. 96 n. 3; c. 98 n. 4; c.102 n. 4; lib 2 c. 2 n. 4; c. 8 n. 3; c. 15 
n. 5; c. 32 n. 9; c. 35 n. 7; c. 35 n. 8; c. 52 n. 8; c. 53 n. 4; c. 59 n. 3; c. 98 N.10.
27Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, q. 3 a. 2 co.; q. 3 a. 4 co.; q. 3 a. 8 co.; q. 4 a. 2 co.; q. 4 a. 2 
ad 3; q. 4  a. 3 co.; q. 4  a. 3 ad 3; q. 5 a. 2 ad 1; q. 5 a. 3 ad 3; q. 6 a. 1 co.; q. 6 a. 1 ad 2; q. 6 a. 4 co.; q. 9 
a. 1 ad 2; q. 10 a. 2 ad 1; q. 10 a. 2 ad 2; q. 10 a. 3 co.; q. 10 a. 3 ad 1; q. 10 a. 5 ad 1; q. 11 a. 1 ad 2; q.
12 a. 11 ad 3; q. 12 a. 2 co.; q. 12 a. 2 ad V, q. 12 a. 4 co.; q. 12 a. 6 co.; q. 12 a. 6 ad 3; q. 13 a. 10 co.; q.
13 a. 3 ad 1; q. 13 a. 5 ad 1; q. 13 a. 9 co.; q. 13 a. 9 ad 1; q. 13 pr.; q. 14 a. 6 co.; q. 14 a. 9 ad 2; q. 15 a.
2 co.; q. 18 a. 4 ad 3; q. 19 a. 2 co.; q. 22 a. 2 co.; q. 23 a. 4 ad 1; q. 24 a. 2 ad 3; q. 25 a. 3 ad 3; q. 33 a. 3 
ad 1; q. 41 a. 3 ad 4; q. 42 a. 1 ad 2; q. 43 a. 3 co.; q. 44 a. 1 co.; q. 44 a. 1 ad 1; q. 44 a. 3 co.; q. 44 a. 3 
ad 2; q. 44 a. 4 ad 3; q. 45 a. 5 co.; q. 45 a. 5 ad 1; q. 47 a. 1 co.; q. 47 a. 2 ad 2; q. 48 a. 6 co.; q. 49 a. 3 
ad 4; q. 54 a. 1 co.; q. 57 a. 1 co.; q. 57 a. 3 ad 4; q. 57 a. 4 ad 3; q. 61 a. 1 co.; q. 63 a. 3 co.; q. 64 a. 1 ad 
4; q. 65 a. 4 co.; q. 65 a. 4 ad 2; q. 68 a. 4 co.; q. 75 a. 5 ad 1; q. 75 a. 5 ad 4; q. 77 a. 7 co.; q. 79 a. 2 ad 
2; q. 79 a. 3 co.; q. 79 a. 4 co.; q. 79 a. 4 ad 1; q. 79 a. 4 ad 5; q. 80 a. 1 co.; q. 84 a. 1 co.; q. 84 a. 4 co.; q. 
84 a. 4 co.; q. 84 a. 4 ad 1; q. 84 a. 5 co.; q. 84 a. 6 co.; q. 85 a. 1 co.; q. 85 a. 3 ad V, q. 85 a. 8 co.; q. 86 
a. 4 ad 2; q. 87 a. 1 co.; q. 88 a. 1 co.; q. 89 a. 1 ad 3; q. 89 a. 4 co.; q. 90 a. 1 ad 2; q. 90 a. 2 ad 1; q. 93 
a. 2 ad V, q. 93 a. 3 ad 3; q. 94 a. 1 co.; q. % a. 1 co.; q. 96 a. 1 ad 4; q. 103 a. 2 ad 2; q. 103 a. 4 co.; q. 
104 a. 1 co.; q. 105 a. 5 co.; q. 106 a. 4 co.; q. 107 a. 2 co.; q. 108 a. 5 co.; q. 108 a. 5 ad 2; q. 108 a. 5 ad 
4; q. 109 a. 4 co.; q. 110 a. 2 co.; q. 113 a. 3 ad 3; q. 113 a. 6 co.; q. 115 a. 1 co.; q. 115 a. 1 ad 4; q. 115 a.
3 ad 2; q. 117 a. 1 co.
mL.-B. Geiger, O. P., La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Paris:
1942.
Cornelius Fabro first m ade his distinction betw een transcendental and predicamental 
participation ir. La nozionem eta fisica  di partecipazione secundoS. Tommaso d'Aquino, Torino: 
1939,2nd ed., 1950.
See also Fabro, Participation et causa lite  selon s. Thomas d'Aquin, Louvain-Paris, 1961, which, 
in spite of its title, is also in Italian.
For my discussion I am relying on Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The 
notion of participation," Review o f M etaphysics 27,1974, trans., B. M. Bonansea, pp. 449-491.
Check also C. A. Hart, "Participation and the five Ways," The New Scholasticism  26, 1952, 
pp. 267-282. Hart interprets participation in esse as an essence participating in the act of esse: 
"He thus establishes his own unique doctrine of participation by making the act of existence the 
supreme act which is participated in various kinds of existing beings by a distinct limiting
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The systematic presentations of Fabro and Geiger played key roles in 
elucidating the term. However, neither properly took into account the 
equivocacy of the term in Aquinas' text. Given its complex history and Aquinas' 
proclivity to use rather than reform the terminology of his predecessors, 
equivocation was almost bound to occur in Aquinas' use of the term.
Fabro and Geiger
Fabro and Geiger each presented his own two-fold system of participation. 
Geiger d istinguished two systems of participation: 1) participation by
composition and 2) participation by similarity also known as participation by 
formal hierarchy. In the first, composition is the cause of the limited perfection 
of the participant. In the second, participation by similarity, composition is 
consequent to formal lim itation in the partic ipan t.29 Geiger draw s his 
distinction based on his study of Aquinas' discussion of participation in the 
Commentary on the de Hebdomadibus of Boethius. T here A quinas 
distinguishes three readings of the term participation, which in general means 
to possess a part.30 Aquinas says that the recipient possesses only a part 
because it receives 1) a universal as a particular; 2) an abstract as a concrete
subject; or 3) a cause as an effect. As examples of case 1 Aquinas cites a species
principle of potential existence designated as essence," p. 282. The picture of an essence 
participating in an act of esse is misleading. N o prior potential essence exists in order to 
participate.
Aquinas does refer to natures participating in being when he is discussing separate substances as 
a way of explaining the real distinction between essence and existence (de Spiritualibus Creaturis 
1, de Substantiis Separatis), but this is not his general way of discussing participation.
^Si la composition explique  la limitation, nous som m es en presence de la participation 
par composition. . . .  Si la limitation est anterieure, naturellem ent, a la composition, encore 
qu’elle puisse l’impliquer, et meme n6cessairement, h titre de consequence, nous avons affaire a 
la participation par hi£rarchie formelle. Geiger, op. cit., p. 29.
“ Est autem  participare quasi partem capere. in Librum Boetii de Hebdomadibus, 
Expositio  2, ed. Parma, v. 17, Parma: Fiaccador, 1864, p. 341.
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participating in a genus (e.g., hum an in animal), and an individual participating 
in a species (e.g., Socrates in human). As examples of concrete subjects (case 2) 
Aquinas uses m atter participating in form and a subject in accidents. Effects 
are said to participate in their causes (case 3) especially w hen they are not 
adequate to their causes (as in the case of air participating in the light of the 
sun).
Geiger takes the first example as proof that participation can occur without 
composition, for species and genus are not composed, rather they form a 
substantial unity (p. 50). Their participation is by similarity and dissimilarity 
with respect to a form.31
M aterial diversity in the world is based on composition, and formal 
multiplicity is based on formal hierarchy (p. 68). Aquinas took Aristotelian 
participation, that by composition, as the base for the sensual knowledge of 
the world and superimposed on it a modified Platonic participation of similarity 
which explained the formal diversity of the world as the creation of God (p. 
455).
Fabro takes issue with Geiger's distinction betw een participation by 
composition and similarity, charging that to do so "is to break the Thomistic 
synthesis at its center which is the assimilation and m utual subordination of 
the couplets of act-potency and participatum-participans in the emergence of a 
new concept of esse."32 Fabro himself distinguishes a fundam ental division 
of participation between transcendental and predicamental participation. 'T he 
form er is concerned w ith esse, w ith the pure perfections that are directly
31Mais le point de vue formel qui d£finit la participation et qui permet de Intend re aux 
rapports entre le genre et l’espbce, comme k ceux de l'espfece et de l'individu, c'est bien la relation 
de similitude ou de dissm ilitude entre les etats differents d'une m em e forme. Geiger, op. cit., p. 
49.
“ Cornelio Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics," p. 469.
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grounded in it; the latter is concerned with univocal formalities, such as 
genera w ith respect to species and species with respect to individuals" (p. 471). 
Transcendental and predicam ental participation can each be further divided 
into static and dynamic participation. Static is the act-potency distinction 
between essence and esse in the case of transcendental participation. In the 
case of predicamental, it is the act-potency distinction between m atter and 
form and substance and accidents. "Parallel to the division of static participation 
and dependent on it, is the division of dynamic participation as causality, 
inasmuch as being by participation stems from being that exists by its very 
nature" (p. 473). Created esse is act with respect to the created essence, which 
itself derives "from the divine essence through divine Ideas" (p. 474). "Causality 
as predicam ental participation, on the other hand, is concerned with fieri, 
which is the becoming or development of created reality w ithin the order of 
genera and species" (p. 474). I don 't think Fabro or Geiger succeeded in 
dividing participation according to the proper criteria. Each system misses the 
distinctions which Aquinas m aintains in his usage. Geiger's division by 
composition and similarity seeks to divide two of the key features which are 
shared by all participation. All participation involves composition and 
similarity.
F ab ro 's  fundam en ta l d is tin c tio n  betw een  tran scen d en ta l and 
pred icam ental leaves out a w hole class of non-transcendental, non- 
predicamental participations which are the prime examples Aquinas uses to 
explain participation in the being of God. These are equivocal causal 
participations, such as air participating in the light of the sun or water 
participating in heavenly motions. They are not transcendental predicates, 
but neither do they fit individual/species or species/genus participation of
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Fabro's predicamental participation. Neither do they fit the predicamental 
participation in that their causation is not a causation of fieri  as is the case in 
Fabro's predicamental participation.
By failing to divide participation properly Fabro and Geiger give a wrong 
picture of the participation of the creature in God. It is fundamentally unlike 
the participation of individuals in species and species in genera.
There is a fundam ental distinction in participation which cuts across 
both Fabro's and Geiger's distinctions. It is a distinction which Aquinas never 
makes very directly, but it does emerge quite clearly upon consideration of 
Aquinas's use of the term. More im portantly the distinction does help to 
elucidate some of the interpretative difficulties presented by Aquinas' text. 
Grammatically speaking the distinction is between transitive and intransitive 
participation. In intransitive participation, the participants share a form with 
each other. The object of participation is logical only. There is no species or 
genus external to the individuals which are said to participate in them. In 
transitive, the participant shares a form with its cause. The cause really exists 
beyond the participants.
For example, consider "Socrates and Plato participate in humanity" 
versus "Socrates participates in the being of God." In each case participation 
means to share, but in each usage, the minimum conditions for sharing differ. 
Intransitive participation requires a plurality of participants, as the notion of 
sharing arises from the mutuality of the participated among the participants. 
In transitive, only one participant is required as the notion of sharing arises 
from the participated communicating something of itself with the participant. 
In intransitive participation, no hierarchy between participants is implied. 
Socrates and Plato can share humanity equally. In transitive, the participated
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is the cause and the participant has a diminished likeness of the actuality of 
the participated.
Because of the distinction between mutuality and hierarchy, intransitive 
will henceforth be called horizontal participation, and transitive will be called 
vertical. Horizontal and vertical participation share little more than a 
name and should be considered equivocal. Each participation requires its 
own definition. When one considers the definition which Aquinas gives for 
participation, it becomes clear that it applies only to vertical participation, not 
to horizontal. Aquinas gives a definition for participation in only one place:
To participate is nothing other than to receive partially from 
another. (Commentary in de Caelo et Mundo, 2.18)33
The definition fits the sense of vertical participation in that it makes explicit 
reference to reception from an external cause. It does not fit horizontal 
participation. Socrates does not receive anything partially from humanity. 
Aquinas never makes this distinction in participation directly, but he does 
distinguish two types of similarity which makes the distinction we are looking 
for:
Things can be said similar in two ways. They either participate 
in one form, as two white things participate in whiteness, . . . 
or one which has a form by participation imitates that which has 
it essentially, as if a white body were said to be similar to separate 
whiteness, or the body mixed with fire were similar to fire itself.
A creature can have such a similarity which places composition 
in one and simplicity in the other, w ith respect to God, as it 
participates in goodness or wisdom  or anything of this kind, 
each of which is in God as his essence. (Scriptum super Libros
Mnam participate nihil aliud est quam ab alio partialiter accipiere. ed. Leonine, v. 3, 
Roma: 1886, p. 193.
179
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Sententiarum 148.1.1)34
In one similarity, sim ilar things share a common form. In the other, 
one shares the form which the other has essentially. These are the two types 
of sharing or participation which we have been discussing. Notice too that 
the example of sharing whiteness is really a case of horizontal participation 
although Aquinas uses a counter-factual case of independent whiteness as an 
example of vertical participation. In the real w orld sharing whiteness is 
horizontal participation, but Aquinas uses it counter-factually to illustrate 
vertical participation. He uses this type of counter-factual example frequently, 
even though he does not believe in an independently existing form of whiteness 
or heat. Because these types of examples m uddle the lines between the two 
kinds of participation, they are a source of a good deal of confusion. Because 
they are juxtaposed here, the true whiteness of horizontal participation can be 
easily distinguished from the counter-factual independent form of whiteness 
that w ould be required to make sharing whiteness a true case of vertical 
participation.
Participation in the esse of God is a case of vertical participation. Cases 
of horizontal participation, such as participation in hum anity or whiteness, 
tell us very little about participation in the being of God. In the main, Aquinas 
uses examples of vertical participation to illustrate participation in the esse of 
God. On rare occasion he will use an example of horizontal participation in
^Contingit autem aliqua d id  similia dupliciter. Vel ex eo quod participant unam formam, 
sicut duo albi albedinem. . . .
Vel ex eo quod unum quod participative habet formam, imitatur illud quod essentialiter habet. 
Sicut si corpus album diceretur simile albedini separatae, vel corpus mixtum igneitate ipsi igni. 
Et talis sim ilitudo quae ponit compositionem in uno et simplicitatem in alio, potest esse creaturae 
ad Deum  participants bonitatem vel sapientiam vel aliquid huiusmodi, quorum unumquodque 
in D eo est essenta eius. ed. Parma, v. 6, p. 375 f.
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connection with participation in the esse of God. That does not nullify the 
distinction which Aquinas himself makes. It rather illustrates his ability to 
use analogous illustrations.
Again, A quinas' defines to participate etymologically as: to possess 
partially from another.35 His definition can be more fully explained as: to 
receive act (form or being) in a limited way from an agent. The participant 
does not receive the form of the agent equally w ith the agent, but according to 
some limitation. The greater the limitation, the less the similarity.
At the closest level the participant shares the form of the cause according 
to a m aterial limitation. A material limitation is not great enough to make 
the shared form of a different species. At the next level, the shared form is so 
limited so as to bear only a generic likeness w ith the agent. At the lowest 
level of similarity, the being of God transcends specific and generic comparison 
with the being of the creature, so that the creature is only analogously like the 
being of God.
Aquinas illustrates the generic and specific similarity among corporeal 
causes and effects:
Of the forms which come into act in m atter through the activity 
of a corporeal agent, some are produced according to the perfect 
account of the species and according to perfect being in material, 
just as the form of the generator. Therefore, contrary principles 
do not remain in the matter and forms of this kind remain after 
the activity of the generator, until the time of their corruption.
But some forms are produced according to a perfect account of 
the species but not according to perfect being in material, just as 
the heat which is in heated water has the perfect species of heat, 
but not perfect being, because it is from the application of the 
form to matter. Therefore, a form contrary to this quality remains
^ h e u s e o f  p a r tia lite ra n d c a p e re  in the definition are clearly based upon an etymology 
of parti-c ipere . The definition of participation in Aquinas' commentary on Boethius' de 
H ebdom adibus  2 is even more directly etymmological: partem capere.
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in the matter. Forms of this kind rem ain for a time after the 
activity of the agent, but they are prevented from remaining for 
long by the contrary principle which is in the m atter. Some 
forms are produced in matter according to an imperfect species 
and according to imperfect being, as light in the air from a lighted 
body. For light is not in the air by a natural and perfect form as it 
is in the lighted body, but through an intentional mode. Hence, 
the appearance of a person remains in a m irror only as long as it 
is opposite the person. Thus, the light is not in the air, except in 
the presence of the lighted body. Intentions of this kind depend 
upon natural forms of bodies absolutely, and not only accidentally. 
Therefore their being does not remain w hen the activity of the 
agent ceases, (de Potentia Dei 5.1 ad 6)36
When heat is received by water, it receives a materially limited form of heat, 
not a formally limited form of heat. It is still the species of heat even though 
water does not receive the act of heat with the same perfection by which the 
heat exists in the fire. Because water is by nature cold, opposition to the heat 
of the fire remains in the matter of the water. Still the heat exists in the same 
specific nature of heat and behaves as the heat in the fire does, tending upwards, 
heating others and the like.
Because the water does not fully have the form of heat, even though it 
has heat according to the same formality, it is said merely to participate in the
'’‘’for mar urn quae incipiunt actu esse in materia per actionem corporalis agentis, quaedam  
producuntur secundum perfectam rationem speciei et secundum perfectum esse in materia, sicut et 
forma generantis, eo quod in materia non remanent contraria principia, et huiusmodi formae 
remanent post actionem generantis, usque ad tempus corruptionis. Q uaedam  vero formae 
producuntur quidem secundum perfectam rationem speciei, non autem secundum perfectum esse in 
materia, sicut calor qui est in aqua calefacta, habet perfectam speciem  caloris, non tamen 
perfectum esse, quod est ex applicatione formae ad materiam, eo quod in materia remanet forma 
contraria tali qualitati. Et huiusmodi formae possunt ad modicum remanere post actionem agentis; 
sed prohibentur diu permanere a contrario principio, quod est in materia. Quaedam  vero 
producuntur. in materia et secundum imperfectam speciem et secundum imperfectum esse, sicut 
lumen in acre a corpore lucido. Non enim lumen est in aere sicut quaedam forma naturalis perfecta 
prout est in corpore lucido, sed magis per modum intentionis. Unde sicut similitudo hominis non 
manet in speculo nisi quamdiu est oppositum homini, ita nec lumen in aere, nisi apud praesentiam 
corporis lucidi: huiusmodi enim intentiones dependent a formis naturalibus corporum per se, et 
non solum per accidens; et ideo esse eorum non manet cessante actione agentium. ed. P. Bazzi, p. 
132.
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form of heat.
By contrast an image of a person in the m irror does not have the same 
specific form as the person has. The person in the m irror is not a living, 
breathing animal, even though it shares something of the appearance of a 
living breathing animal. Although the image in the m irror shares nothing of 
the substance of the person, it does share something of the quality and quantity 
of the person. Thus, there is some shared generic likeness according to the 
genera of quality and quantity.
To say that the creature participates in the being of God is to speak of 
even a greater limitation. The being of God is not of a different species or 
genus, but transcends all species and genus. The being received by the creature 
is only analogously like God's being, and not merely limited by being of a 
different species:
Since every agent makes that which is similar to itself inasmuch 
as it is an agent, and every agent acts according to its form, it is 
necessary that a likeness of the form of the agent is in the effect. 
Therefore, if the agent is contained in the same species as the 
effect, there will be a likeness between maker and made in form 
according to the same specific account, just as a human generates 
a human. If the agent is not contained in the same species, there 
will be a likeness, but not according to the same specific account, 
just as the things which are generated by the power of the sun.
They do not receive the form of the sun in a specific likeness, but 
in a generic likeness.
If, therefore, there is an agent which is not contained in any 
genus, its effects will even more remotely approximate a likeness 
of the form of their agent, not by participating in a likeness of the 
form of the agent according to a specific or generic likeness, but 
by a certain analogy, just as being itself is common to all. Such 
are those which are from God. Inasmuch as they are beings, they 
are like him as the prime, universal principle of entire being.
(Summa Theologiae 14.3)37
^Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens, agit autem unumquodque 
secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo agens
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The sun causes heat in terrestrial bodies, but according to Aquinas, the heat 
caused by the sun on the earth is not of the same mode as heat in the sun 
(Summa contra Gentiles I 29). In Aristotelian physics, the heat in earthly 
bodies tends upw ards, heat in the sun does not. The sun  does not have 
motion from the center, but only its eternal circular orbit. Even though they 
are not of the same specific formality, the heat in both sun and earth are 
corporeal effects, and they share a generic likeness.
God transcends genus and species, therefore no creature shares a specific 
or generic likeness w ith God. Nevertheless there is a real likeness, albeit 
analogous. Thus common predicates applied to God and creatures are only 
analogous (Summa Theologiae 1 13.5).
Aquinas illustrates by citing the notion of ipsum esse, which he says is 
common to all. But it cannot be common to all by shared specific or generic 
likeness, since it applies to all genera. It bears only an analogous likeness 
across genera. Thus to say "exist" in the statem ent that gram s exist (in the 
genus of quantity) is only analogous to existence in the statement that a dog 
exists (in the genus of substance). To say "exist" in "the relationship of paternity 
exists between a father and his daughter" (in the genus of relation) is only 
analogous to saying "exist" in "the daughter exists." The existence in the
relationship is consequent upon the substantial existence of the child.
sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitude* inter faciens et factum in forma, 
secundum eadem rationem speciei; sicut homo generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum 
in eadem specie, erit sim ilitudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut ea quae 
generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam similitudem solis, non tamen ut recipiant 
formam solis secundum similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis.
Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus eius adhuc magis accedent 
remote ad similitudinem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formae 
agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut 
ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc m odo ilia quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum 
sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse. ed. Leonine, v. 4, p. 54.
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To say that any creature exists is only analogously like saying God exists. 
Comparison is further restricted in that the creature can be said to be 
like God, not God like the creature:
Because that which is perfectly in God is found in other things by 
some deficient participation, that by which similarity is noted, 
belongs to God absolutely, not to the creature. Thus, the creature 
has something that is of God and is thus rightly said to be like 
God. It cannot be said that God has something that is of the 
creature. Hence, God cannot consistently said to be like the 
creature, just as we do not say a person is like an image, but the 
image is rightly said to be like the person. (Summa contra Gentiles 
129)38
The creature shares a likeness with God, not God with the creature. We use 
similar conventions in speech today. For example, we say that a daughter is 
like or takes after her mother, not that a mother takes after her daughter.
Creation is not from any passive potency in God. There is no passive 
potency in God:
That which is in potency, is not brought into act except by a being 
in act. It was shown (q. 2 a. 3) that God is the first being. It is 
impossible that there is any potency in God. (Summa Theologiae 
1,3.1)39
Creation is not a actualization in God from potency to act. In Aquinas'
^Quia igitur id quod in D eo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem  
participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod sim ilitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter 
est, non autem  creaturae: Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est, unde et D eo recte sim ilis recte 
dicitur. N on autem sic potest dici Deum  habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter 
dicitur Deum creaturae similem esse, sicut nec hominem dicim us suae imagini esse similem, cui 
tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur. ed. Leonine, v. 13, p. 90.
^quod est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum autem est igitur 
quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. ed. Leonine, 
v. 4, p. 35 f.
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metaphysics act precedes potency and nothing is brought from act to potency 
except by a being in act. A creator who moved from potency to act would 
require another being in act to move it from potency to act, which would 
contradict the concept of creator. Creation is not a change in God.
For Aquinas creation is not a change at all, for a change implies difference 
in something, before and after. In creation there is no change in God, neither 
is there a change in the creature properly speaking:
In every change or motion, there m ust be "something which is 
in a different state now than before. This is what the name 
'change' means" (Aristotle, Physics A 7). W hen the entire 
substance of a thing is produced in being, there cannot be anything 
which is in different states, because that thing w ould not be 
produced, but presupposed to production. Therefore, creation is 
not a change. (Summa contra Gentiles 2.17)40
Since there was nothing to change from, there is no change in creation. Creation 
is a newness of being in the creature with relation to the creator, not a change 
from an earlier state:
Hence, in creating God produces things without motion. When 
motion is removed from action and passion, nothing remains 
except relation, as was said (a. 2, ad 2). Hence, it remains that 
creation is only in the creature as a certain relation to the creature 
as to the principle of its being. (Summa Theologiae 145.3)41
“ in omni mutatione vel motu oportet esse illiquid aliter se habetts nunc et prius: hoc 
enim ipsum nomen m utationis ostendit. Ubi autem tota substantia rei in esse producitur, non 
potest esse aliquod idem  aliter et aliter se habens: quia illud non esset productum, sed productioni 
praesuppositum. N on est ergo creatio mutatio. ed. Leonine, v. 13, p. 304.
cf. ST 145.2 ad 2.
41Unde Deus, creando, producit res sine motu. Subtrado autem motu ab actione et passione, 
nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi 
realtio quaedam ad Creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse. ed. Leonine, v. 4, p. 467.
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Creation is only a real relation in the creature. In God it is merely a rational 
relation. Aquinas argues that when things are not of the same order, then the 
relation can be real on one side and merely rational on the other. For example, 
sensible and intellectual being in the senses and m ind are not of the same 
order as their objects in the world. The sense is ordered to the knowledge of 
the object and when the sense comes to know its object it stands in a real 
relation to its object. The object has only a rational relation to the sense 
(Summa Theologiae I 13,7). W hen I look at the moon, I stand in a real 
relation to the moon as a perceiver. The moon does not stand in a real 
relation to me, but only in a rational relation as that to which my sight is 
directed.
God is outside of all created order and therefore does not stand in a real 
relation to any created thing:
Since God is outside the entire order of the creature, and all 
creatures are ordered to him, and not the reverse, it is clear that 
creatures are really referred to God. But in God there is no real 
relation to creatures, but only a rational relation, inasm uch as 
creatures are referred to him. (Summa Theologiae 113.7)42
The creature is ordered to God as its creator, he is not ordered to the creature.
Since creation is only a rational relation in God, names such as creator 
and governor when applied to God are applied by external denomination. 
Such terms are vantaged from the creation as it is ordered to God, not from 
any ordering of God to the cosmos (Summa Theologiae 113.7).
Any difference which may have occurred in the creation is similarly
“ Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et om nes creaturae ordinetur ad 
ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed 
in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum 
creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. ed. Leonine, v. 4, p. 153.
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vantaged from the creature, and implies no difference in God. Had God made 
a different world, that does not mean that he w ould have acted differently. 
On the question of whether God could have created melius (better or something 
better), Aquinas responds that taken as the object of creation, God could have 
created something better, but:
If "better" is an adverb, and it implies m anner on the side of the 
doer, God cannot do better than he does, because he cannot act 
from greater wisdom or goodness. (Summa Theologiae 1,25.6 ad 
l)43
Thus, even had God made a better cosmos, he would not have acted better. A 
better world does not a better God make. His w ork is still perfect, despite the 
quality of the universe, because he creates from nothing according to his 
infinite goodness and power.
The being of God is absolute in itself and uncaused by any other. God's 
being is his nature and essence. God exists per se. Because he exists per se, his 
being is uniqueness. No other being is its being, but is a participated being:
Everything which is in something not according to the being of 
the thing itself, is in it through some cause, as pallor is in a 
human. For what does not have a cause is primary and immediate.
It is therefore necessary that it be absolutely (per se) and be 
inasmuch as it is its very self. It is impossible that some one 
thing be in two things and be inasmuch as each is itself. For that 
which is said of a thing inasmuch as it is its very self, does not 
exceed it, as having three angles equal to 180° does not exceed a 
triangle, of which it is predicated, but is convertible w ith the 
same. (Summa contra Gentiles 2.15)44
^Si vero ly m eliu s  sit adverbium, et importet modum  ex parte facientis, sic Deus non 
potest facere melius quam sicut facit: quia non potest facere ex maiori sapientia et bonitate.
44Omne enim quod alicui convenit non secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam  
convenit ei, sicut album  homini: nam quod causam non habet, primum et immediatum est, unde 
necesse est ut sit per se et secundum quod ipsum. Impossibile est autem aliquod unum duobus 
convenire et utrique secundum quod ipsum. Quod enim de aliquo secundum quod ipsum dicitur,
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To say that God is per se is to say that:
1) His being does not depend upon another.
2) His being is not limited.45
3) His being is unique.
Anything w hich is per se, is unique, because that which is per se true of a 
thing does not exceed the thing. A per se feature is not true of anything else. 
It is a predicate or feature is convertible with its subject. Thus, if you have a 
regular, Euclidean, plane figure whose interior angles are 180°, you have a 
triangle. For Aquinas a human is per se rational. By its nature a human is 
rational and it is the only thing which is rational. If you have a rational 
being, you have a hum an being.
A per se feature is unlim ited and absolute. God can be said to be 
understanding per se, eternal per se, life per se, etc. In each of these acts, he is 
infinite and unrestricted.
A per se feature however is not the logical complement of a feature by 
participation. Not everything which is participated in by another is a per se 
feature. Material participata, such as the heat of fire, do not belong exclusively 
to their subjects. There can be many fires and many hot things. Thus even
though fire is hot by nature, it is not hot per se. Likewise the sun is gives
light by nature (lucens per naturam), but it does not give light per se, because 
many stars give off light by their natures. In contrast, the moon only gives off 
light by participation in the light of the sun.
ipsum non excedit: sicut habere tres angulos duobus rectis aequales non excedit triangulum, de 
quo praedicatur, sed eidem convertibiliter est. ed. Leonine, v. 13, Roma: 1918, p. 294 f.
*5Sum m a contra Gentiles 2. 52: Esse autem subsistens oportet esse infinitum, quia non 
terminatur aliquo recipiente. Impossibile est igitur esse aliquod esse per se subsistens praeter 
primum.
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Aquinas says the same would be true of heat if it were immaterial. An 
immaterial heat would be per se hot, and would be unique. It would not be 
limited to a definite material subject as is the heat of fire. Neither could it be 
m ultiplied among many subjects as material heat is m ultiplied in the sun 
and in different fires:
The being of God itself is distinguished and individuated from 
any other being because it is being subsisting by itself and it is not 
appropriate for any nature which is other than being itself. Every 
other being which is not subsisting, must be individuated by a 
nature and a substance which subsists in such a being. And in 
these it is true that this being is different from his being, because 
it is of another nature, just as if there were a single heat existing 
per se without matter or subject, by this it would be distinguished 
from every other heat, although heat existing in a subject is not 
distinguished except by its subjects. (de Potentia Dei 7.2 ad 5)46
If there were a heat existing per se, it would be unique and unrestricted in its 
heat. Any other heat would be a participation of that heat. The same would 
be true of an immaterial, per se white, as Aquinas says:
It is impossible to understand that there are many separated 
whitenesses. If there were a whiteness separated from every 
subject and recipient, it w ould be unique, (de Spiritualibus 
Creaturis l)47
The same is true of any separate form: "Neither can any form, if it is considered
'“’ipsum  esse Dei distinguitur et individuatur a quolibet alio esse, per hoc ipsum quod est 
esse per se subsistens, et non adveniens alicui naturae quae sit aliud ab ipso esse. Omne autem  
aliud esse quod non est subsistens, oportet quod individuetur per naturam et substantiam quae in 
tali esse subsistit. Et in eis verum est quod esse huius est aliud ab esse illius, per hoc quod est 
alterius naturae; sicut si esset unum calor per se existens sine materia vel subiecto, ex hoc ipso ab 
omni alio calore distingueretur: licet calores in subiecto existentes non distinguantur nisi per 
subiecta. ed. Bazzi, p. 192.
47im possibile est intelligere quod sint plures albidines separatae; sed si esset albedo 
separata ab omni subiecto et recipiente, esset una tantum.
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as separate, be more than one" (de Substantiis Separatis).48
Since God is immaterial, his being is not m ultiple am ong different 
material subjects, he is per se subsistens.
Not every participation relation is between that which is per se and 
that which is per participationem, to try to explain all participation in these 
terms is too restrictive.49 Such an interpretation loses the force of the examples 
of participations in material things which Aquinas uses so frequently. The 
proper contrast is between that which is per participationem and per nataram :
It is necessary to say that everything which is in any way is by 
God. For if anything is found in anything by participation, it is 
necessary that it is caused by that which has it essentially, as iron 
becomes fired by fire. It was shown above (q. 3 a. 4) when 
treating the divine simplicity that God is his own being, subsisting 
by himself. It was also shown (q. 7 a. 1 ad 3: a. 2) that subsisting 
being could only be one, just as if whiteness were subsistent, it 
could only be one, as whiteness is m ultiplied by recipients. It 
remains therefore that everything other than God is not being, 
but participates in being. It is therefore necessary that everything 
which is diversified by diverse participations in being, such that 
they are more and less perfect, are caused by one first being, 
which is most perfect. (Summa Theologiae 144.1)50
‘“sicut nec aliqua forma, si separata consideretur, potest esse nisi una.
49See W. N orris Clarke, "The meaning of participation in St. Thom as Aquinas," 
Proceedings o f the American Catholic Philosophical Association 26, 1952, pp. 147-157. Clarke 
gives a clear but brief presentation of participation. He defines it as the "the limited reception 
by the participans of a perfection that exists in its source in a state of illimitation or infinity." 
This is true for participation in God's esse, but not for the participations of the terrestrials in 
the celestials, nor for more run of the mill participations upon earth.
“ necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque m odo est, a D eo esse. Si enim aliquid invenitur 
in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; 
sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, 
quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest 
nisi unum: sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non potest esse nisi una, cum albedines multiciplicentur 
secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum  esse, sed participant 
esse. N ecesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, 
ut sint perfectius vel m inus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissim e est. ed. 
Leonine, v. 4, Roma: 1888, p. 455.
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hierarchy of participation
In considering preservation of being in Summa Theologiae I, 104, 
Aquinas first devotes considerable space to a discussion of the notion of 
causation. In the process he develops quite explicitly an hierarchy of 
participation.
Aquinas notes that every effect depends on its cause. While some 
effects depend on their causes only for their becoming, others depend on their 
causes for both their being and their becoming. This is the basis of his distinction 
between the causa essendi and causa fiendi. To be a causa essendi, a cause 
must be a cause of form, because esse follows form. If a cause is not cause of 
form then it is merely causa fiendi. To determine what type of cause is in 
view Aquinas analyzes the nature of the form in the effect. Does the form of 
the effect follow from the virtues of the material, as occurs in the case of 
artifacts?
Every effect depends upon its cause, inasmuch as it is its cause. It 
must be considered that some agent is the cause of its effect only 
with respect to its becoming and not directly w ith respect to its 
being. This happens both in artifacts and in natural things. The 
builder is the cause of the house only with respect to its becoming 
and not with respect to its being directly. It is clear that the being 
of the house follows its form, for the form of the house is its 
composition and order. This form follows the natural powers of 
certain things. Just as the cook cooks food by applying a certain 
natural, active power, namely fire, so also the builder makes the 
house by applying cement, stones, and wood, which are receptive 
of and maintain such a composition and order. So the being of 
the house depends upon the natures of these things, just as the 
becoming of the house depends upon the activity of the builder.
(Summa Theologiae 1104.1)51
51Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum  quod est causa eius. Sed 
considerandum est quod aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe 
secundum esse eius. Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus naturalibus. Aedificator 
enim est causa domus quantum ad eius fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum
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In the case of artifacts, the form of the effect follows upon the arrangement of 
the virtues of the material. As such the form of the artifact does not depend 
on the agent, and hence the being of the artifact does not depend on the agent 
either. It is a clear case of causa fiendi.
In natural causation, the form of the agent is reproduced in the effect, 
e.g., fire produces fire or hum an generates human. In these cases the natural 
agent reproduces its own form in other material. But it cannot be said to be 
the cause of the form of the effect, because that is also its own form. Nothing 
can be the cause of its own form. Aquinas does not explain why here, but 
since forma dat esse, to be the cause of one's own form would be to be the 
cause of one's ow n being (see de Ente et Essentia 4) which is contradictory. 
The cause of its own being would be actual and potential in the same respect 
and at the same time.
—By similar reason we must consider natural things. Because if 
an agent is not the cause of the form inasmuch as in is of this 
kind, it will not be the absolute cause of the being which follows 
such a form, but it will only be the cause with respect to becoming.
It is clear that if two things are of the same species, one cannot be 
the absolute cause of the form of the other, inasm uch as it is 
such a form, because then it would be the cause of its own form, 
as they have the same account. But it can be the cause of this 
kind form inasm uch as it is in matter, that is that this m atter 
acquires this form. This is a cause with respect to becoming, as a 
hum an generates a human, and fire generates fire. Therefore, 
whenever a natural effect is able to receive the form of the agent 
according to the same account by which it is in the agent, then 
the becoming of the effect will depend upon the agent and not its
est enim quod esse dom us consequitur formam eius: forma autem dom us est compositio et ordo; 
quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit 
cibum adhibendo aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator facit domum  
adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis 
et ordinis. U nde esse dom us dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri dom us dependet ex 
actione aedificatoris. ed. Leonine, v. 5, Roma: 1889, p. 464.
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being.52
Aquinas next turns to a consideration of the only possible candidate for 
cause of being, the equivocal cause. Aquinas is careful to note that an equivocal 
cause may be a cause of being, not that it must be.
—But sometimes the effect is not able to receive the impression 
of the agent according to the same account by which it is in the 
agent, as is clear in all agents which do not make something 
similar in species, as
the celestial bodies are the cause of generation of the lower bodies 
which are dissimilar in species. Such an agent can be the cause 
of the form according to the account of such a form and not only 
inasm uch as it is received in this matter. Therefore it is the 
cause not only of the becoming but of the being.53
Aquinas does not spell out what among the celestial bodies' effects are 
caused to be and which are merely caused to become. It is a problem because 
the celestial bodies are responsible for so much in Aquinas' science. Celestial 
bodies are responsible for terrestrial generation and corruption (Sum m a  
Theologiae I 115 ad 3) and for the forms of everything above the level of the
52— Et simili ratione est considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non 
est causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod consequitur ad talem 
formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tantum.
Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa 
formae alterius, inquantum est talis forma: quia sic esset causa formae propriae, cum sit eadem  
ratio utriusque. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi formae secundum  quod est in materia, idest 
quod haec materia aquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut cum homo 
generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionem 
agentis recipere secundum eadem  rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus 
dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. ed. Leonine, v. 5, p. 464.
53— Sed aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem 
rationem secundum quam est in agente: sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile 
secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium  
secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non 
solum secundum  quod aquiritur in hac materia: et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. 
ed. Leonine, v. 5, p. 464.
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elements up to but not including the hum an soul (de Operationibus Occultis 
Naturae). Each of these effects are equivocal, but for which are the celestials 
the causa essendi?
If we use the same analysis which Aquinas gave for natural and artificial 
causes and apply his test of dependence, the issue becomes clearer. The celestials 
do not cause the being of the four elements, because their virtues merely 
follow the material dispositions of matter. The human soul is not caused by 
celestial body but by a higher cause. It is created by God and its rational 
activity exceeds the virtues of m aterial bodies (de Operationibus Occultis 
Naturae). Therefore, the soul cannot be caused by material beings, even celestial 
ones.
The heavenly motions are the cause of generation and corruption of 
elements and humans, not of their forms. If the heavenly motions cease, 
then generation and corruption of elements and of humans will cease, but 
the elements and hum an souls will continue (de Potentia Dei 5.7, see below).
Forms which exceed the virtues of the elements, but are lower than the 
human soul are caused by heavenly bodies. That includes the forms of minerals, 
magnets, plants, and beasts (de Operationibus Occultis Naturae; de Potentia 
Dei 5.9). The motions of the heavenly bodies are the cause of the forms of 
each of these, and hence the cause of their being. They pass the test that 
Aquinas demands for the cause of being: if the activity of the agent ceases, the 
being of the effect ceases. As Aquinas argues in the de Potentia Dei, if the 
motions of the heavenlies cease, then each of these forms and creatures will 
cease to exist (d e Potentia Dei 5.9).
In Summa Theologiae I 104, Aquinas does not discuss any of these 
examples rather he cites the example of light in air:
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Just as the becoming of a thing cannot remain, if the activity of 
the cause of becoming ceases, so also the being of a thing cannot 
remain, if the action of the agent which is not only of becoming 
bu t also of being ceases. This is the reason why heated w ater 
retains its heat when the activity of the fire ceases, bu t air does 
not rem ain illuminated, not even for a moment, when the action 
of the sun ceases. The m atter of the w ater is receptive of the 
heat of the fire according to the same account by which it is in 
the fire, hence if it is perfectly led to the form of fire, it will retain 
heat always. If, however, it participates imperfectly in something 
of the form of fire in a certain mere beginning, the heat will not 
rem ain forever, but for a time, because of its weak participation 
in the form of fire. Air, however, is in no way able to receive 
light by the same account by which it is in the sun, that it might 
receive the form of the sun, which is the principle of light. 
Therefore, because it has no root in the air, the light ceases 
immediately, when the activity of the sun ceases.54
Aquinas contrasts examples of causa fiendi and essendi: fire as a cause of heat 
in water; and sun as a cause of the illumination of air. In each case, the effect, 
be it being or becoming, depends on the action of the cause and will cease in 
the absence of the cause. Water cannot become hot w ithout fire, but air can 
neither become nor be illuminated without the sun. W ater can be hot for a 
time after the fire is removed but water will eventually lose its heat, because 
of the contrary condition of its nature, which is wet and cold (see de Potentia 
Dei 5.1 ad 6, see below). By air becoming illum inated, Aquinas means the
^Sicut igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus 
secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus 
non solum secundum  fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio quare aqua calefacta retinet 
calorem, cessante actione ignis; non autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante 
actione solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis secundum eandem rationem 
qua est in igne: unde si perfecte perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem 
imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam inchoationem, calor non semper 
remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo 
modo natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in sole, ut scilicet 
recipiat formam solis, quae est principium luminis: et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, 
statim cessat lumen, cessante actione solis. ed. Leonine, v. 5, p. 464.
196
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
blue glow of the sky in sunlight, not merely the intentional light which air 
carries as a m edium  for perception. Fire causes an intentional light in the air 
which allows the eye to see the fire, but the intervening air does not itself 
become illum inated.
A lthough the heat in the w ater is less intense, it is univocal with the 
heat of the fire, because it occurs in the same material substrate. Since water 
is of the same m atter as fire, under the right conditions it can be transformed 
into air and then fire. Because it is a univocal cause, fire cannot be the cause 
of the being of the heat in water, merely of its becoming.
By contrast sunlight in the air is equivocal with the light of the sun. As 
Aquinas states, it exists according to a different account. Air does not receive 
the form of the sun, neither does it receive the formal ability to illuminate as 
the sun  does. Celestial forms cannot be produced in terrestrial matter. 
Terrestrial matter is subject to contraries, while celestial forms are not. Because 
the effect is in a different matter, it is equivocal.
Aquinas makes a further distinction in the de Operationibus Occultis 
Naturae  between equivocal causes:
It m ust be considered that an inferior agent acts or is moved by 
the pow er of a superior agent in two ways. In one way, the 
activity proceeds from the inferior agent by a form or a pow er 
which is impressed upon it by the superior agent, as the moon is 
illum inated by the light which is received from the sun. In the 
other way, the agent acts only through the power of the superior 
agent, w ith no form received for activity, but the agent is only 
moved by the motion of the superior, as a carpenter uses a saw 
for cutting. The cutting is principally the activity of the artisan 
and secondarily of the saw inasmuch as it is moved by the artisan 
and not because the activity follows any form or pow er which 
rem ains in the saw  after the m otion of the artisan, (de 
Operationibus Occultis Naturae)55
55aliquod agens inferius secundum superioris agentis virtutem dupliciter agit vel movetur.
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Here Aquinas distinguishes receiving a form by which the inferior may act, as 
the moon receives the formal ability to illum inate, from merely receiving 
action as an instrument. Further on Aquinas cites the example of sea water 
which receives wave motions from the motions of heavenly bodies. It does 
not receive the ability to move itself, merely the act of motion (de Operationibus 
Occultis Naturae). Since motion is an accidental form, the waters do receive a 
form, but not forma ad agendum. Similarly, air receives illumination, but 
not a form by which it may illuminate on its own.56
Other earthly bodies, such as magnets and minerals, receive formas ad 
agendum  from heavenly bodies. Even though they receive formas ad agendum, 
the forms they receive are still equivocal. They are received in terrestrial 
matter, which is distinct in the Aristotelian science from celestial. Because 
they are in different matter, the forms received by magnets and minerals are 
equivocal with the celestial agents.
The example of light in the air is thus doubly removed from the light 
in the sun. Sunlight in the air is equivocal with the light of the sun and the 
air is illumined but it does not receive a form by which it can illumine. Thus, 
when the sun goes down, the air has no formal ability to illuminate in itself 
and it loses its light immediately. In contrast, the w ater does receive a form of 
heat which exists for a time in it in the absence of fire.
Uno quidem m odo in quantum actio procedit ab eo secundum formam vel virtutem sibi impressam 
a superiori agente, sicut luna illuminat per lumen a sole receptum. Alio vero m odo inferius agens 
agit per solam virtutem superioris agentis, nulla forma recepta ad agendum, sed per solum motum  
quo a superiori agente movetur; sicut carpentator utitur serra ad secandum, quae quidem sectio 
est principaliter actio artificis, secundario vero serrae in quantum ab artifice movetur, non quod 
talis actio sequatur aliquam formam vel virtutem quae in serra remaneat post motionem artificis. 
ed. Leonine, v. 43, Roma: 1976, p. 183.
^Even though air does illuminate, it does not have its ow n form by which it illuminates, 
see de Veritate 5.8, the sun causes illuminata et illuminanta.
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Since the form of light is caused by the sun, the being of the light 
depends on the sun, and its existence ceases upon the cessation of the activity 
of the sun. S un  light in the air is not something the air has taken on as its 
own form, it is merely the passive transparent conduit for sun light.
Aquinas next draws the conclusion he has been heading for by comparing 
the air's participation in sunlight to creature's participation in the being of 
God:
Thus is every creature with respect to God, as the air is to the 
illuminating sun. Just as the sun lights by its own nature, but air 
becomes luminous by participating in light from the sun, not by 
participating in the nature of the sun, so also only God is being 
in his essence, because his being is his essence, and every creature 
is a being by participation, not because his being is its essence.57
Along the way Aquinas has shown in great detail five different causal 
relations, three of which he refers to as participation relations. He referred to 
artificial and natural substantial causation, neither of which he called 
participation. He reserved the term "participation" for 1) natural accidental 
causation, e.g., heated water; 2) equivocal causation, e.g., illuminated air; and
3) creation.
In each case of participation, the form of the agent is not reproduced in 
the effect. The effect has a limited version of the act of the cause. The light of 
the sun in the air is both formally and materially limited. It does not have a 
specific likeness of the sun, but only a generic likeness, as a generically corporeal 
effect. Air is terrestrial matter and cannot receive the specific likeness of the
57Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem  illuminantem. Sicut 
enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non 
tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia 
est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. ed. 
Leonine, v. 5, p. 464.
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sun, which only exists in celestial material. The being of the creature is 
limited even further. The creature's likeness is only analogous.
Summa Theologiae I 104.1 shows that at each level of similarity, the 
less the sim ilarity, the greater the dependence of the participant upon the 
cause. At the greatest level of similarity, the heat in the water depends only 
upon the fire for its becoming, not for its being. Any specific likeness will be 
at most dependent for becoming alone, because a nothing can cause its own 
specific form to be.
At the next level, the light in the air depends upon the sun for its 
being, because it does not share a specific likeness with the sun. The sun can 
cause the light to be because that light is not of its specific nature. The sun 
cannot cause the being of the air as a body, because sun and air share a generic 
corporeal nature and are both dependent upon a more universal cause.
At the highest level, the creature shares no specific or generic likeness 
w ith God, and is therefore dependent upon God for its entire being. God 
transcends all genus and species, therefore he can cause the being of everything 
whatever its species or genera. The creature has nothing which is not specific 
or generic in nature. They all depend upon God for their being.
All creatures, despite their hierarchy among themselves, depend entirely 
upon God. The creature is compared to other creatures according to its genus 
and species and God is the cause of each in whatever genus or species it is in. 
Therefore, each creature and the hierarchy among them depends entirely 
upon God.
matter and the resurrection of the dead
As we have seen the world in all its order depends upon the creative
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will and act of God. Even so Aquinas considers the present order only temporary 
and headed for a consummation once the num ber of the elect is completed. 
Then God will establish a new order, in which created m atter still has a role 
to play.
Aquinas seeks to explain how matter which is pure potency to change, 
can exist in everlasting bodies. By so doing he completes the account of 
problem of the resurrection that creatio ex nihilo was designed to overcome 
over 1000 years before his time.
In the w orld to come, the essential parts of the universe will remain, 
but since hum an generation has already produced the full num ber of the 
elect, there will no longer be any need for motion. The essential parts of the 
universe include angels, the heavens, the elements, and humans, body and 
soul (C om pend ium ll70} de Potentia Dei5.9).
The celestial motions can cease because contrary to the teachings of 
Greek science, they do not move by nature. Aquinas argues that movement 
by nature tends to a determ inate end, which the circular motions of the 
heavenlies do not. Neither do they move merely for the sake of motion but 
for some purpose, a purpose which cannot be less noble than themselves. 
Aquinas gives two possible ends for the celestial motions: 1) motions could 
exist to be a similitude of God by causing other things, which is the position of 
some philosophers, but not the position of faith; 2) the motions could exist to 
produce the full num ber of the elect, which is A quinas' position and the 
position of faith. Even though it cannot be established by reason, it is more 
probable than position 1 because of the nobility of the hum an soul:
We propose that the motion of heaven is for fulfilling the number
of the elect. For the rational soul is more noble than any body,
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even heaven itself, (de Potentia Dei 5.5)58
Motions cause generations of humans, until the num ber of elect is fulfilled. 
Then their job is done and they should cease because they have accomplished 
their end. Once they cease, generation and corruption will also cease, although 
the elements will remain:
Because the heavenly body has an exterior active principle of its 
motion, it can be that its motion cease while it remains, without 
violence, as was said above. Thus, it can be that the corruption 
of elements cease while their substances remain, because the 
exterior corruptive ceases, which must be traced to the motion of 
heaven as to the first principle of generation and corruption, (d e 
Potentia Dei 5.7)59
The elements will remain because they are essential for hum an bodies. They 
are also essential for the physical realm. Any physical world will require the 
elements, whose natures follow from their positions in the universe, the 
heaviest in the center and the lightest on the outside. There is no such need 
for mixed bodies:
In that renewal of the world, no mixed body will remain besides 
the body of humans, (de Potentia Dei 5.9)60
MPonimus enim quod motus caeli est propter implendum numerum electorum. Anima 
namque rationalis quolibet corpore nobilior est, et ipso caelo. ed. Bazzi, p. 143.
wquia corpus caeleste principium sui motus activum habet extra, potest esse quod eius 
motus cesset ipso manente, absque violentia, ut supra dictum est; ita potest esse ut corruptio 
elementorum cesset eorum substantiis manentibus, exteriori corruptivo cessante, quod oportet 
reducere in motum caeli sicut in primum generationis et corruptionis principium. ed. Bazzi, p. 
150.
“ in ilia mundi innovatione nullum corpus mixtum remanebit praeter corpus humanum. 
ed. Bazzi, p. 153.
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Mixed bodies are ordered to the benefit of humans who will no longer need 
them. Neither will humans need plants and animals:
Every being of plants and animals is to live, which does not 
happen in corporeal things without motion. Hence, animals die 
w hen the motion of the heart ceases, and plants when nutrition 
ceases. In these things there is no principle of motion which 
does not depend on prime mobility, because the souls of animals 
and plants are totally subject to the impressions of the heavenly 
bodies. Hence, when the motion of heaven cease, neither will 
m otion be able to rem ain in  them nor life, (de Potentia Dei 
5.9)61
As we have seen, the forms of plants and animals are caused by separated 
substances through the motions of the heavenlies, and they will cease to exist 
w ithout those motions.
conclusion
The present world order exists for the generation of the elect, the new 
will be for their beatitude. Aquinas has given us a picture which extends 
beyond the present world order, but brings both the present and the coming 
world order together in a common purpose and account. From beginning to 
end his presentation of the creation speaks of the same purpose of divine 
goodness shared out to rational and intellectual creatures headed for divine 
beatitude.
I have argued in chapter 4 that the teaching of creatio ex nihilo began as
61 esse enim plantarum et animalium quoddam vivere est, quod in rebus corporalibus sine 
motu non existit; unde animalia deficiunt cessante motu cordis, et plantae cessante nutrimento. 
In his autem rebus non est aliquod motus principium non dependens a primo mobili, quia ipsae 
animae animalium et plantarum totaliter subiiduntur impressionibus caelestium corporum. Unde 
motu caeli cessante, non poterit in eis motus remanere, nec vita. ed. Bazzi, p. 154.
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a defence of the resurrection. Before Aquinas, it was limited to defending 
God's sovereignty over matter. If God could make matter, he could resurrect 
the body and allow it to live per perpetuity. No one ever explained how it 
would work, until Aquinas explained it as part of the created order, in which 
the motions of the heavenlies and everything else headed for a definite purpose. 
Once their created end was accomplished, the m otions w ould cease and 
elemental and hum an bodies would persist unto their new end, everlasting 
beatific rest.
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Rppendix
Coffin Text 80, ed. A. de Buck, The Egyptian Coffin Texts, Chicago, 1935, v. 
Transliteration by author according to Coffin B 1 C.
2 7 d i Qmnyw ipw m heh n  hehw
Snnw p t m rwy-sn 
2 8 a  s3kw p t 3kr n gb
ms-n-tn Sw m Hhw m Nw m Tnmw m Kkw
3 3 e  sk-w i w3-kwi
hnr Nw m [nnwt] (so in B 2 L, B 1 P) 
n gm -n-i bw ' h r- i  im n gm-n-i bw hms-i im 
n g rg -t In wnn-i im -f
3 4 a  n ts-t Mhw hms-i hr-f
n ir- t p t wn-s hr tp-i 
34 c [missing in  B 1 C]
3 4 d n m sy-t ht tp t
n hpr-t psdt p3tt 
w n -in -sn  h n r-i 
dd-in Tm n Nw 
iw -i h r m ht wrd-k(w)i wrt 
p ''t-i nni 
in s3 rnh ts ib-i 
3 5 a  srnh-f h3ty-i s3k-n-f rwt-i iptn wrd wrt
3 5 j m s-n-f wi m sn-f 
3 6 a  pr-n-i m m s3dty-f
wd wi r b rnt-f sn-f wi hnr snt-i M3rt 
w bn-f hrw nb pr-f m swht-f 
m s-t n tr prt 
3 7 a  N rnh ts tpw smn wsrwt srnh htwt 
iw-i ts-i Tm
iw smn-i tp n 3st hr nhbt-s 
ts-n-i bksw n 0 p r n-f
N i3hw-i pd nmtwt in  hrt n Tm r §rt Rr hrw nb 
iw t-i Sm-i
wp-i w3t n Rr skd-f r 3[jt imntt
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Papyrus Leiden, Hieroglyphic text ed. A. Gardiner, "Hymns to Amun from a
Leiden Papyrus," ZAS 42,1905, pp. 12-42.
Transliteration by author.
c .4 0  hfflw sw nn rfc kiw-f
inw nfr {jprw m bs dsr
kd sSmw-f km3 sw ds-f
sfjm nfr snfr ib-f
ts m r3y-f (sic) hnr dt-f
r sjjprw sw ht-f m hnw -f St3w
Jjprw {jprw tw t mswt
mnk sw [. . .] m3r [. . .] hmw hm
c. 80 0 m nw y  hPrw -^ tpy
r km -k nn iw -k wr-ti
s§t3w dt-k m m r smsw 
im n-n-tw  m Imn m h3t ntrw 
iry-k  hptw -k m T3 twnn 
r sms p3wt psdt m p3wt psdt-k tpt
c. 200 (iv 13) Rr ds-f sm3w m dt-f
ntf p3 smsw im y rn
iw ddy-tw T3-twnn r-f 
Imn pr m Nw 
sSm w-f hrw 
ky hpnv-f m 0m nw y 
p3wt b3h p3wt psdt sms Rr 
tm -f sw m Tmw IT wr hnr-f 
ntf nb r dr S3r wnnt
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Coffin Text 80. ed. de Buck.
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